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Abstract and Keywords 
Upon becoming President of the United States in 1981, Ronald Reagan faced a rapidly 
deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union in the midst of the ongoing Cold War, 
exacerbated by the events of the 1980s, including the 1980 Olympic boycott and 
President Jimmy Carter’s administration.  President Reagan’s bellicose statements and 
staunch anti-communism stance further aggravated the situation, reasserting and 
deepening Cold War anxieties in the Soviet Union.  Compared to his predecessors, 
Reagan was a war hawk determined to bring an absolute end to the Soviet Union and the 
socialist world.  This was no more apparent than in his foreign policy towards the Soviet 
Union during his first four years in office when he initiated his desire for the strategic 
defense initiative, his massive American military buildup, and his decision to invade the 
Caribbean island of Grenada to stave off Soviet influence in the Third World.  Each and 
every action taken by President Reagan was constructed in order to bring the Soviet 
Union to its knees via political and economic pressure.  However, Reagan seemingly had 
a sudden change of stance when Los Angeles hosted the 1984 Olympic Summer Games.  
The Kremlin, in turn for Soviet Bloc attendance at the Olympics, requested several 
demands that had to be met – for example, the right for Soviet Aeroflot flights to land at 
Los Angeles International Airport and an unprecedented amount of security to protect 
Soviet athletes and interest.  Reagan’s decisions concerning the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Summer Games were a glaring anomaly when compared to the previous three 
years of Reagan’s harsh anti-communism and “hawkish” actions and opinion regarding 
the Soviet Union.  Drawing from declassified documents from the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library and Museum, this research examines how and why the Olympic 
Movement was able to transcend Cold War politics in regards to President Reagan 
meeting each and every one of the Soviet demands despite numerous outside pressures 
and occurrences making it increasingly difficult for him to do so. 
 
Keywords: President Ronald Reagan, 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, Cold War 
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Chapter 1 – Prelude 
“Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction.  We 
didn’t pass it to our children in the bloodstream.  It must be fought for, 
protected, and handed on for them to do the same.”1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the early morning of 20 January 1989, United States President Ronald Reagan 
stood in the Oval Office one final time as the highest elected American official.  He 
would soon be escorted down Pennsylvania Avenue to the inauguration ceremonies for 
President-elect George H.W. Bush.  Before Reagan exited his office, National Security 
Advisor Colin Powell entered to provide Reagan with his last national security briefing.  
After years of teetering on the verge of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, 
Powell informed Reagan: “Mr. President, the world is quiet today.”  With that, Reagan 
departed the Oval Office.2 
The Cold War Reagan consigned to Bush was immensely different from the 
conflict Reagan inherited from President Jimmy Carter.  Upon his arrival in the White 
House, Reagan brought with him a reputation of being a “hawk on national defense” and 
being the main protagonist for enacting “openly confrontational policies towards the 
                                                
1
 An excerpt from a 30 March 1961 Reagan speech to the annual meeting of the Phoenix Chamber of 
Commerce.  Tom Freiling, Reagan’s God and Country: A President’s Moral Compass, (Ventura, 
California: Regal Books, 2003), 56. 
2
 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 722. 
 2 
Soviet Union.”3  These policies were aimed at achieving one goal: completely reversing 
the course of the Cold War.  In only his first three years of office, President Reagan 
approved a substantial military buildup aimed at driving the Soviet Union into 
bankruptcy, several overt military operations ordered to stem the tide of communism 
spreading into the still free world, a significant campaign to limit Soviet access to 
Western technology, and two detailed national-security directives written to directly 
challenge the Soviet Union. Reagan’s approach to the Soviet Union stood in stark 
contrast to his immediate predecessors.  While they sought to simply operate in a 
peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, Reagan desired to bring the Soviet Union to 
its knees and bring an end to what he considered nothing more than a pre-ordained failed 
social experiment.   
Before Reagan’s election as President, the American approach towards the Soviet 
Union had been that of détente and containment.4  Reagan believed that détente, a term 
integrated into the American political lexicon after the thirteen days that defined the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, was a “one-way street that the Soviet Union used to pursue its own 
aims.”5  Opponents from both sides of the American political spectrum argued that 
détente provided only a sense of legitimacy to both the Soviet Union and the socialist 
                                                
3
 Jim Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2009), 39. 
4
 At their core, détente and containment were a defensive strategy aiming to prevent the expansion of 
Soviet influence outside of its satellite states while waiting for a gradual mellowing in relations. For more, 
see Mark Lagon, The Reagan Doctrine: Sources of American Conduct in the Cold War’s Last Chapter 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994). 
5
 Quoted in Francis Marlo, Planning Reagan’s War: Conservative Strategists and America’s Cold War 
Victory (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2012), 13. 
 3 
order.  While Carter focused on the “immorality” of détente, Reagan, on the other hand, 
argued that the feebleness of détente underscored an acknowledgment of American 
weakness.6  Further, Reagan felt containment, a strategy developed under President Harry 
Truman’s tenure, was failing.7  Reagan’s beliefs were not unsubstantiated.  Of utmost 
concern were the Soviet advances into the Third World, particularly Central America and 
Africa.  The eruption of the Carnation Revolution in April of 1974 provided the Soviet 
Union an opportunity to spread communist ideology to Africa.8  For example, in the 
battle for political control of Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
– a declared Marxism-Leninism faction – received support from both the Soviet Union 
and Cuba.  The capture of Angola to Marxism-Leninism rule supported Reagan’s 
conviction that containment was no longer stemming the growing sphere of communist 
influence.  To Reagan’s dismay, Angola was not the only African country to fall prey to 
the communist threat; Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, Cameroon, and Mozambique were all 
                                                
6
 Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of 
the Cold War (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2013), 149. 
7
 Strikingly familiar to the ‘Reagan Doctrine,’ the ‘Truman Doctrine’ was birthed in March of 1947. 
Truman made it robustly clear to world leaders that the American government would provide both financial 
and military aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent their falling into the Soviet sphere. Truman’s philosophy 
ultimately derived itself from the famed “Long Telegram” as authored by George F. Kennan in 1946. 
Kennan vehemently argued that the Soviets would only respond to use of force; thus, the optimal way to 
combat communism was through slowing its geographical expansion. For a thoroughly detailed account see 
Arnold Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Palo Alto, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2002) and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall 
Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe (New York: Free Press, 2008). 
8
 There is substantial literature on the Angola situation of 1974-1976. Many of these histories contain the 
history of those last Portugal colonies in Africa that also took part in the revolution. See for instance Arthur 
Jay Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (New York: Westview, 
1980); Rene Lemarchand, ed., American Policy in South Africa: The Stakes and the Stance, 2d ed. 
(Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1981), 63-143; Suzanne Jolicoeur Katsika, The Arc of 
Socialist Revolution: Angola to Afghanistan (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1982), 55-84. 
 4 
within the Soviet orbit by the 1970s and 1980s.9  Moreover, the Soviet’s 1979 Christmas 
Eve invasion of Afghanistan was another damaging low to the concept of containment.  
The spirit of détente also dissolved with the invasion. 
In the public realm, Reagan was the definition of an oratorical “freedom fighter.”  
Even on the campaign trail during his failed 1976 bid for the presidency, Reagan was 
harsh on the Soviets.10  In a 31 March 1976 nationwide campaign speech, Reagan 
implored Americans to ask the citizens “of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, and all the others” what it was like to live in a world “where the Soviet 
Union is number one.”  Reagan insisted that he did not want to live in a world like that 
and he was not ready to “consign” every state of the Union “to the dustbin of history.”11  
Reagan’s anti-communist rhetoric continued unceasingly through his 1980 election as 
President.   
 Indeed, Reagan’s Soviet discourse frightened Soviet leadership.  Reagan’s 
declamatory approach to the Soviet Union was derivative of his first National Security 
Planning Group.12 The consortium intended to begin a “concerted effort to play on the 
                                                
9
 For a detailed account of the Soviet Union’s foray into Africa see Vladimir Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’: 
The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 
10
 Generally, the term “soviet” is defined as the organizations during the Russian Revolution that guarded 
against counter-revolution until an election of a constituent assembly could take place.  In the text of this 
research – in line with broader and popular Cold War history – the term “Soviets” will be used as a 
connotation to describe the Soviet government or the Soviet leadership as a whole. 
11
 David W. Houch and Amos Kiewe, Actor, Ideologue, Politician: The Public Speeches of Ronald Reagan 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 157. 
12
 Heresafter NSPG. 
 5 
Soviet psychological vulnerabilities and weakness.”13  As further explained by Richard 
Allen, one of Reagan’s national security advisors, the Kremlin14 “thought they had some 
first-class nut-ball on their hands.”15  The general thinking among Reagan’s 
administration was that the Soviets did not desire to play a game of “nuclear chicken with 
a madman.”16  Early in Reagan’s first term, KGB Chief Yuri Andropov worried that the 
“new administration” was attempting to “push the whole development of international 
relations on to a dangerous path.”17 
 Reagan’s vitriolic lambasting continued.  On 17 May 1981, Reagan provided the 
first public hint of his strategy towards the Soviet Union during a speech at Notre Dame 
University. “The West,” he said, “won’t contain communism, it will transcend 
communism. It will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages 
                                                
13
 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened The Collaspe of 
the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 8. 
14
 The word “Kremlin” can be argued as being quite ambiguous.  In its most literal sense, a kremlin 
(lowercase) is a significant fortress complex in historic Russian cities.  Throughout this research, the word 
“Kremlin” is used as a synecdoche to refer to the Moscow Kremlin as the government of the Russian 
Federation much like how the term “White House” is often used to refer to the American government.  
Doing so is standard practice in the writing of both Sovietology and Kremlinology and in general Cold War 
history.  For examples, please see Benjamin Lambeth and Kevin Lewis, “The Kremlin and SDI,” Foreign 
Affairs (66), no. 4 (Spring, 1988), 755-770; David Holloway, “The View from the Kremlin,” The Wilson 
Quarterly (7), no. 5 (Winter, 1983), 102-111; Ian Bremmer, “Who’s in Charge in the Kremlin,” World 
Policy Journal (22), no. 4 (Winter, 2005/2006), 1-6; Paul Klebniov, Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline 
of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism (New York: Harcourt Books), 2000; Gregory Mitrovich, 
Undermining The Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert The Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956 (Cornell, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2000); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold 
War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1997. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Hanhimaki, 141-42. 
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are even now being written.”18  In a speech in front of the British House of Commons on 
8 June 1982, Reagan stated his certainty that “… freedom and democracy will leave 
Marxism and Leninism on the ash heap of history.”19  However, Reagan’s most pointed 
verbal attack on the Soviet Union occurred on 8 March 1983.  In a speech to the National 
Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, Reagan lectured: 
They preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over 
individual man and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on Earth. 
They are the focus of evil in the modern world. So, in your discussion of 
the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride, 
the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves about it all and label both 
sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive 
impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant 
misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between 
right and wrong and good and evil.20 
Despite the harsh words, the leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union 
realized that acting upon them would lead to a nuclear confrontation and, thus, likely the 
end of the world.  Many American Presidents prior to Reagan struggled with the concept 
of fighting a conceptual war without troops, infantry, planes, or ships.  Notwithstanding 
the best wishes of the International Olympic Committee, Cold War politics was a long-
entrenched feature of international competition upon Reagan’s election as president.  As 
                                                
18
 Paul Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: Harper Perennial, 
2007), 77. 
19
 Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 293. 
20
 Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1897 (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 486. Italics mine. 
 7 
aptly phrased by historian Kenneth Osgood, the Cold War thus became an ideological 
struggle for the “hearts and minds of the world.”21  With either side wishing to avoid 
armed conflict, the battle to prove the supreme ideology moved in part to the athletic field 
– specifically the Olympic Games, no doubt due to its global scale and social reach. 
 In Carter’s case, the 1980 American-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics was an 
overt use of the Olympic Games to declare discontent over the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan – the first time since the end of World War II that the Soviet Union occupied 
territory not already under its control.  Conversely, Reagan’s use of the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Summer Games stood in vivid contrast to the President’s desire to bring an end 
to the Soviet Union and the socialist world.  
 
1.2 Statement of Purpose 
 This research examines how and why the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer 
Games became a noticeable exception to President Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union and communism.  That is, Reagan’s decision to concede to all 
Soviet demands in turn for Soviet Bloc attendance at the Los Angeles Olympics was in 
direct contrast to his long-held and firmly entrenched anti-communism and “hawkish” 
beliefs as evidenced by his desire to construct the strategic defense initiative, his peace 
through strength program, his anti-Soviet rhetoric, the assistance given to Third World 
countries to fend off the impulses of communism, and his Presidential order to invade 
Grenada.  
                                                
21
 Kenneth Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, 
no. 2 (May, 2002), 85-107. 
 8 
 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
That the keepers of the Olympics failed to keep the movement free of political 
interference cannot be argued.  The historiography of political intrusion of the Olympic 
Games is voluminous, oft entangled in multiple social, cultural, racial undertones, the 
origins traceable to various groups, people, and causes.  For instance, the 1968 Mexico 
City Olympic Summer Games were marred by two enduring political statements: (1) the 
raised, gloved fists of Tommy Smith and John Carlos in an attempt to bring focus to the 
plight of African Americans in the tumultuous times of the American civil rights 
movement and, (2) the massacre, by members of the Mexican armed forces, of students 
protesting the cost of hosting the Games.22 Additionally, one interested in political 
statements made via the Olympic Games need look no further than the ‘Munich 
Massacre’ at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, West Germany.  The Palestinian 
group Black September took eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team hostage and 
demanded the release of 234 prisoners held hostage in Israeli prisons.  The end of the 
hostage crisis was an unthinkable tragedy; all the hostages were murdered.23  These two 
examples underscore an infallible theme:  the history of political interference in the 
Olympic Movement is vast, each topic subjecting researchers and readers to abundant 
rabbit holes to investigate in order to disclose the entire account both accurately and 
                                                
22
 For an unsurpassed account of both these incidents see, Kevin Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the 
World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008). 
23
 For more about the hostage situation, and the response of the IOC, specifically that of President Avery 
Brundage, see, Allen Guttman, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). For a comprehensive work on just the hostage situation see, 
Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response (New 
York: Random House, 2007). 
 9 
comprehensively.  To circumvent a meandering narrative, this review will maintain a 
focus on those instances where the Olympic Games were intertwined with American 
foreign policy. 
The first such occurrence transpired during the lead-up to the 1936 Berlin 
Summer Olympics, otherwise referred to as the Nazi Olympics.  The issue at hand was 
that of American participation.  The Berlin Games, awarded to the city before Hitler’s 
accession to supremacy, became a political ploy to display Nazi ideology.  Most 
worrisome was the Third Reich’s treatment of Jews.  As noted by historian Alan Bullock, 
Hitler’s hatred of the Jews “was perhaps the most sincere emotion of which he was 
capable.”24  By 1 April 1933 all non-Aryans employed through civil service and at 
universities were removed from their positions.  Shortly after, the edict included the 
professions of law and medicine.  Members of the Olympic Movement did not avoid 
Hitler’s purge.  As noted by Richard Mandell, there was “consternation” within the IOC 
when members learned Dr. Theodor Lewald, the Christian president of the German 
Olympic Committee, was among those removed from power.25  It rapidly became 
apparent that Germany’s Olympic teams would field no athletes of Jewish descent.  In 
reaction to the Gleichschaltung of German sport, American sports leaders called for a 
boycott of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin.  The boycott debate quickly descended 
into the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.  However, as Olympic historian Stephen 
Wenn noted, the White House resisted being dragged into the participation issue “despite 
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the personal protestations of a number of American private citizens in the latter stages of 
1935 and early months of 1936.”26  Indeed, the Roosevelt administration argued that the 
Olympic Games and all pertinent decisions were a matter best left to those private 
organizations that ran such events.  Despite the German government’s marked 
propaganda purposes for hosting the Olympic festival, the State Department and Franklin 
Roosevelt, as Wenn stated, opted not to mix politics into the Olympic Movement.27 
After the Olympics departed Berlin, the German atrocities continued – leading to 
the second World War.  The last desperate offensive measure of the German army failed 
in January of 1945.  On 4 February 1945, the leaders of the Allied countries convened for 
the Yalta Conference, deciding on both the occupation of post-war Germany and the 
action needed in the Pacific theatre.  The signing of the Japanese surrender documents 
aboard the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945 marked the end of the death and 
widespread destruction caused by World War II.  However, it also heralded the 
establishment of the Cold War. 
The birth of the nuclear age made a third World War unthinkable to both the 
White House and the Kremlin.  Therefore, the two superpowers of post-World War II 
were forced to find other ways to prove superiority over the other.  Cold War historian 
John Lewis Gaddis stated it succinctly: 
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Both of the ideologies [Capitalism and Communism] that defined [these] 
worlds were meant to offer hope: that is why one has an ideology in the 
first place.  One of them, however, had come to depend, for its 
functioning, upon the creation of fear.  The other had no need to do so.  
Therein lay the basic ideological asymmetry of the Cold War.28 
Thus, to succeed as an alternative, the American ideology of capitalism had to show that 
communism suppressed freedom, and that only capitalism could sustain such freedom.  
Conversely, the Soviet Union desired to prove to its people and the rest of the free world 
that communism was the dominant ideology over capitalism.29  Gaddis argued that both 
“embraced ideologies with global aspirations” and those leaders from either side 
concluded “what worked at home would also do so for the rest of the world.”30 
In lieu of a “hot war,” the Soviet Union and the United States waged an 
ideological battle that encompassed all parts of culture and society.  The Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations were the first to utilize non-diplomatic entreaties.  In his 
seminal 1997 book, Walter Hixon illustrated that “modern communications, including 
radio, television, and film, as well as direct contracts through exhibitions, tourism, and 
exchange programs, were agents of Western political infiltration.”31  Future 
administrations continued the activities.  Frances Stoner Saunders outlined the Congress 
for Cultural Freedoms, which, from 1950 to 1967, assisted in the operations of all manner 
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of artists, writers, and academics behind the Iron Curtain.  The objective, Saunders 
explained, “was to inoculate the world against the contagion of communism, and to ease 
the passage of American foreign policy interest abroad.”32 
The Cold War became what Kenneth Osgood described as a “Total War.”  
Further, he explained “virtually every aspect of the American way of life – from political 
organization and philosophical ideas, to cultural products and scientific achievements, to 
economic practices and social relationships – was exposed to scrutiny in this total contest 
for the hearts and minds of the world’s people.”33  Sport was not overlooked as an avenue 
to compete with the Soviet Union and communism. As British sports historian James 
Riordan stated, “sport became an area of great social significance” only after “the 
division of much of the world into two camps in the 1950s with the nuclear stalemate and 
the intensifying ‘battle for men’s mind’s.’”34  After the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet 
Union ignored “bourgeois” sport – especially the Olympics Games, viewed by the 
Soviets as an organization designed to “deflect workers from the class struggle and to 
train them for new imperialist wars.”35  Riordan argued that the development of the ten-
state Soviet Bloc – and, thus, the change of the balance of power in the world – warmed 
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the Soviets to sport as an “obvious arena for defeating one’s ideological opponent.”36  
The Soviet Party resolution on sport in 1949 confirmed Riordan’s claim, urging all sports 
committees “to spread sport to every corner of the land, raise the level of skill and, on 
that basis, help Soviet athletes win world supremacy in major sports in the immediate 
future.”37  Gaddis further validated the claim, contending that by the end of 1949, the 
“Soviet-American contest for Europe had become a stalemate” which caused both 
countries to seek other exploitable opportunities.38  Sport, contended Peter Beck, became 
a “high-profile battlefield” whereupon “superiority was not an abstraction, but a reality to 
be demonstrated repeatedly and conspicuously.”39  This sporting reality became even 
more significant upon the Soviet entrance to the Olympic Movement.  Several scholars 
have adequately covered this milestone in Soviet sport history, some of the best work 
done by Jennifer Parks.40 
The Soviet Union first sent athletes to the 1952 Olympics Games in Helsinki.  
Cold War connotations permeated the event to the tune of “counting medals.”  The 
United States finished atop the medal standings.  However, the 1956 Melbourne Games 
                                                
36
 Riordan, “Rewriting Soviets Sports History,” 248. 
37
 I. Novikov, “Bolshoi sport I vneshnyaya politika,” Kultura I zhizn (1949), 3, as quoted in Riordan, 
“Rewriting Soviet Sports History,” 248. 
38
 Gaddis, 122. 
39
 Peter Beck, “Britain and the Cold War’s ‘Cultural Olympics”: Responding to the Political Drive of 
Soviet Sport, 1945-58,” Contemporary British History 19, no. 2 (June, 2005), 170. 
40
 Jennifer Parks, “Verbal Gymnastics: sports, bureaucracy, and the Soviet Union’s Entrance into the 
Olympic Games, 1946-1952,” in East Plays West, 27-44. See, too, Jennifer Parks, “Red Sport, Red Tape: 
The Olympic Games, The Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952-1980” (PhD dissertation, 
University of North Carolina, 2009). 
 14 
marked a substantial victory for the Soviet Union.  American journalists calculated the 
final medal count to be 722-593 in favor of the Soviet Union.  The Soviets crowed that 
“the myth of US superiority in sports” had been “dissipated completely.”41  The Soviet 
Union viewed such athletic victories as a “victory for the Soviet form of society and the 
socialist sports system; it provides irrefutable proof of the superiority of the socialist 
culture over the decaying culture of the capitalist states.”42 
The rapid rise of Soviet success in the Olympics forced the American public into 
a “Cold War social anxiety.”43  In doing so, the United States government created what 
Montex de Oca called a “muscle gap discourse” – the focus of which was to develop an 
American sporting philosophy that denied the Soviets “easy political victories at the 
Olympics.”44  Montex de Oca contended that the American government developed a two-
prong approach to closing the “muscle gap.”  The first approach was compelling non-
governmental organizations such as the American Olympic Committee, the Amateur 
Athletic Union, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association to raise funds to finance 
the American Olympic teams.  The second approach was to design American collegiate 
athletic programs as a training ground for Olympic athletes.45  This design, created to 
directly compete with Soviet superiority at the Olympics, signified, as Montex de Oca 
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argued, that the American government under the direction of President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower viewed the Olympics as a cultural arena for geopolitical struggles.46 
In the battle of ideologies, the Soviet Union clearly maintained a lead in the use of 
sport.  The Soviet Union preserved athletic superiority through the use of state-athletes, 
thus spinning each victory into communist propaganda against the capitalist societies of 
the world. In a speech to an audience at Friendship International Airport in Baltimore, 
Republican Senator John Marshall Butler proclaimed: 
Are we in the United States – where our record of excellence in the field 
of amateur sportsmanship is a byproduct of our unique system of 
government – allowing the Soviet Union to pollute the Olympic Games; to 
use, with diabolic deceit, the spirit of sportsmanship itself as a velvet-
gloved iron fist to ruthlessly hammer out their Godless propaganda?47 
Butler was not alone in his assessment of the troublesome position the United States was 
in.48 
The first overt signs that the American Government was resisting Soviet 
ideological advances through sport came via the USA-USSR dual track meets of the late 
1950s and 1960s. Joseph Turrini argued that these dual track meets were the “most 
                                                
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Roy Clumpner, “Federal Involvement in Sport to Promote American Interest or Foreign Policy 
Objectivs, 1950-1973,” in East Plays West, 402. The full and original text can be found in U.S. 
Congressional Records, Vol. 101, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1955, 5169, 5907, 11213. 
48
 For instance see John Hoberman, Sport and Political Ideology (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas 
Press, 1984), 190-91; John Washburn, “Sport as a Soviet Tool,” Foreign Affairs 34, no. 3 (April, 1956), 
490-499. 
 16 
important and visible of the Cold War sport competitions” aside from the Olympic 
Games.49  Turrini asserted that while the events were “first and foremost athletic 
competitions,” the meets also “functioned as propaganda and foreign diplomacy tools.”50  
President Eisenhower felt that the track meets could be a “useful tool in demonstrating to 
the Soviet people the success of American capitalism and democracy.”51  
While Eisenhower applauded the use of the track meets as overt surrogate Cold 
War battlefields, he also permitted the use of clandestine operations to undermine Soviet 
sport and, in general, communism.  In his 1976 doctoral dissertation, Thomas Domer 
utilized Presidential Libraries, the National Archives, the Congressional Record, and the 
Brundage Collection to make the claim that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations tried to “take every opportunity short of direct and total subsidy to 
enhance the sports image of the United States.”52  Often, especially during the 
Eisenhower administration, private groups were intertwined with government-led 
initiatives, none more so psychologically damaging to the Soviet Union than the 
defection of Hungarian athletes after the Melbourne Olympic Games.  Toby Rider 
discussed several such state-private networks in relation to using the Olympic Movement 
as a way to resist communist propaganda.  For instance, the Hungarian National Sports 
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Federation53 derived from the flux of Hungarian migration to America that occurred in 
three phases: the 45-ers, the 47-ers, and the 56-ers.  Rider noted that the group maintained 
close affiliation to the Hungarian National Council, an outreach of the National 
Committee for a Free Europe, “an exile organization funded secretly by the U.S. 
government.”54  The support, provided via the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 
provided both funding and an office space for the group.  In turn, the National Committee 
for a Free Europe assisted in the operations of its sister groups. 
In his doctoral dissertation, Rider built on the work previously completed by 
Domer.  By using declassified sources previously unattainable to scholars such as Domer, 
Rider argued that the United States government responded to the “post-war challenge of 
Soviet sport earlier, and far more aggressively, than previously acknowledged.”55  
However, Rider asserted that the American response was not an overt overhauling of the 
American sporting system; rather, the U.S. government partook in “covert psychological 
warfare operations and overt propaganda distributed to the free world.”56 Most pertinent 
to this study is Rider’s discussion of U.S. government propaganda surrounding the 
Olympic Games.  Rider stated that “news stories, cartoons, and radio commentaries” 
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were disseminated through various methods behind the Iron Curtain.  In an attempt to 
counter Soviet propaganda, the information distributed by the American government was 
meant to depict the American “way of life” and the “benefits and opportunities afforded 
by a democratic society.”57  However, in the late 1960s, “the secret network of CIA 
fronts” began to be exposed by mainstream American media.58 
With the undoing of the clandestine operations, national policy toward the 
Olympics again turned toward broadly-based national fitness campaigns and reforms.  
Thomas Hunt argued that while Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford59 
focused on the reform needed among the country’s amateur sports bodies, the Johnson 
administration “struggled with how best to use sport as a means of influence in the 
cultural Cold War.”60  Hunt attributed Johnson’s struggles to the immense size and 
complexity of both the American government and sport system.61  American 
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preoccupation with the enduring Vietnam War surely contributed to Johnson’s lack of 
Olympic vision. 
The focus of American sport policy again turned to reform upon the election of 
Nixon to America’s highest office.  However, the process of selecting the host site for the 
1976 Olympic Summer Games thrust the Nixon administration directly into a cultural 
Cold War battle.  Cold War historian Nicholas Evan Sarantakes noted that the Nixon 
White House largely ignored Los Angeles’ bid for the 1976 through the first year of the 
process.  While Nixon penned just three sentences of support of Los Angeles to the IOC, 
then Governor of California Ronald Reagan provided a much stronger – and lengthier – 
message.  Los Angeles’ effort would have continued being ignored, argued Sarantakes, if 
not for LAOOC member Rodney Rood contacting an old colleague – H.R. Haldeman, the 
White House Chief of Staff.  Rood wrote to Haldeman upon the Soviet entry into the 
bidding contest, saying, “We are now in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union on the 
level of international politics – a confrontation to determine international public appeal 
under the guise of non-politics – the award of the Summer Olympic Games of 1976.”62  
As history now notes, the award of the 1976 Olympics went to Montreal.  Nixon and his 
staff attempted to negotiate with the IOC and international sport much as they would the 
United Nations.  Sarantakes concluded that the Nixon administration “learned that 
influencing international sport was different from the political affairs of nation-states.”63  
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If Nixon attempted to use politics to influence international sport, one of his eventual 
successors attempted to use sport to influence international politics. 
Jimmy Carter’s attempt to leverage the Olympics Games in international politics 
failed just as miserably as Nixon’s previous attempt at Olympic influence.  To show 
displeasure over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter prompted an international 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.  Sarantakes again provided an outstanding 
academic work on the topic and argued that the Olympics “turned out to be far more 
resilient than [Carter] ever imagined.”64  Carter’s administration made the same fatal 
mistake as Nixon’s administration in attempting to influence the Olympic Movement 
through proper political channels.  Sarantakes concluded that the Carter approach was 
“riddled with errors” and that the “ignorance and arrogance” of the administration 
blinded it to the fact that national Olympic committees were “independent of their 
governments in many Western democracies.65 
Little has been written on the Soviet Bloc boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympics.  To date, the only significant work to use primary sources is authored by 
Harold Wilson, Jr.  In his article, The Golden Opportunity, Wilson examined the Reagan 
administration’s attempts to influence Romania to rebel against the Kremlin’s call for 
boycott and attend the Olympics.66  In short, Reagan informed Romanian President 
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Nicolae Ceaușescu that the American government would provide favorable “trade 
clauses” to the country while renewing its “Most Favored Nation” status.67  The tradeoff 
worked, as the Romanian Olympic team proudly marched into the Los Angeles 
Coliseum, thus continuing Romania’s reputation of being the “maverick of Eastern 
Europe” and securing a major Olympic coup for Reagan and his administration. 
 
1.4 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
The 1984 Soviet Bloc boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games is a woefully 
undeveloped area of Olympic research.  There are two contributing factors for this: (1) 
previous scholarship simply summarizing the boycott was a retaliatory effort68 and (2) 
the embargo of primary sources that would validate any counter claims.  While the 
USSR’s reasoning for the boycott is difficult to dissect without access to the Soviet 
archives, a thorough exploration of American primary sources can provide a well-
rounded exploration of the American governmental understanding and approach to an 
otherwise largely ignored part of Olympic history. 
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Of those previous authors who have written on the 1984 boycott, only John 
Hoberman extended the investigation beyond the “retaliatory effort” stance.  In Olympic 
Crisis, Hoberman argues that the Soviet Bloc withdrawal was the result of anti-
communist rhetoric from Reagan, the fear of defection by star athletes, and concerns of 
security and American public dissent.69  While others besides Hoberman have speculated 
on a more substantial narrative behind the Soviet response, no research has yet been 
completed to tell such a narrative.70  That said, his work is based wholly on the use of 
historical newspapers accounts along with a modicum of his own impressive scholarly 
estimations and theories.  
This study is largely in agreement with Hoberman’s arguments.  That is, that 
Reagan’s hardline rhetoric maintained a role in the 1984 Olympics; that the United States 
government was fully cognizant of the defection issue; and that concerns of security by 
the Soviets were unwarranted while such concerns over American public dissent were 
likely well-deserved.  Indeed, Hoberman argued that the pieces of a “much larger 
mosaic” need to be assembled to complete the narrative of the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Games boycott.  This study intends to begin the process of putting the pieces of 
that mosaic together and further moving the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics away 
from a mere retaliatory story.  In order to make this argument, this research is the first 
work on the 1984 boycott to utilize the Presidential Archives of Ronald Reagan and the 
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee Archives. 
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This research contributes to the current body of knowledge in three significant 
ways.  First, it serves to fill in a large gap in the current literature of Olympic history.  No 
substantial archival work on the 1984 Olympic boycott has been completed.  This 
research fills that void.  Second, the research provides a substantial contribution to the 
area of Cold War history, specifically the sub-niche of the Reagan administration and the 
Cold War.  Aside from Hoberman’s book, no singular piece of Reagan research has 
explained the 1984 Olympic boycott as anything more than an afterthought.  However, a 
significant amount of examination has been completed concerning Reagan’s approach to 
the Soviet Union and Cold War – specifically his rapprochement beginning at the end of 
1983.  This research shows that the Olympics played a part in the motives, particularly 
Reagan’s conviction of maintaining the opportunity for compromise and quiet diplomacy.  
The Reagan administration’s handling of the 1984 Olympics exemplifies this delicate 
approach to US/USSR relations.  Lastly, this research adds to the growing body of 
literature pertaining to the role of American presidential administrations in the Olympic 
Games, specifically from a foreign and international policy viewpoint.  By studying the 
Reagan administration, this research is positioned as the most contemporary research thus 
far in the aforementioned area of presidential administrations and the Olympic 
Movement. 
 
1.5 Method and Methodology 
Archival resources principally underscored this research and, as such, will be 
presented in the form of a historical narrative.  The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 
and Archives provided the majority of the research for this project.  The archives hold the 
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papers of Michael Deaver who served as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff from 
January 1981 to May 1985.  More important to this study, he served as the presidential 
liaison for the 1984 Olympics.  Additionally, the archives also house the papers of John 
Kenneth Hill, who served under Deaver as the Federal Security Coordinator for the 1984 
Summer Olympics.  Both collections are invaluable to the completion of this research.  
Also vital to the completion of this research are the papers of Richard Pipes, who served 
as the Director of East European and Soviet Affairs for the first two years of Reagan’s 
tenure as President.  Pipes’ writing vividly details the state of US/USSR relations during 
Reagan’s hardline rhetoric. 
The voluminous Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee archives housed on 
the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) also served as a key 
repository for this research in that it provided a paper trail to compare to the documents 
found in the Reagan Archives.  While the Reagan Archives adequately show the 
decision-making at the top level of American government, the LAOOC archives display 
how the organizers took the assistance of the American government and put it into action.  
More so than anything, the Soviets voiced displeasure over the perceived lack of security 
at the Los Angeles Olympics; the records of the LAOOC demonstrate that the Soviets 
were mistaken in their concern about the issue.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
I have not attempted to use Soviet archives in this research.  However, as my 
focus is not on Soviet reasoning for the boycott, it detracts little from the overall effort.  
Thus, the premise of this research revolves around the Ronald Reagan administration and 
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its attempts to appease Soviet leaders under the guise of the White House’s new foreign 
policy towards the Kremlin.  It makes no claims or declarations about the intent of Soviet 
Union leadership to boycott. 
 As well, any research pertaining to politics should rightfully be accompanied with 
a declaration of the author’s place in the political spectrum.  This dissertation shall be no 
different.  Being born and raised in West Virginia provided for a smorgasbord of politics 
education.  The southern West Virginia coalfields – including such counties as 
McDowell, Mingo, and Logan – are largely Democratic hotbeds.  The Eastern Panhandle 
of the state, including the Potomac Highlands, is an area of large Republican support.  
The Northern Panhandle of West Virginia is split between the two parties.  Indeed, even 
West Virginia’s election history is just as fragmented as its split areas of support.  In the 
2012 Presidential election, West Virginians provided their Electoral College points to the 
Republican ticket.  However, the state’s residents elected a Democratic governor.  The 
House and Senate members from West Virginia are Democratic as well.  My childhood 
household was just as equally divided.  Raised in a small town in the Northern Panhandle 
– approximately 45-minutes away from downtown Pittsburgh – my liberal leanings 
remained a minority within the family.  I do find myself identifying more so with the 
liberal agenda and the “political left” – or, in direct opposition to Reagan – but for 
purposes of remaining open to progressive candidates from the “political right,” I remain 
– and shall remain – a registered independent. 
 Regardless of my political inclinations, any research pertaining to the 40th 
President of the United States must still manage to traverse the “Reagan paradox.”  A 
devoted New Deal Democrat until a sudden change at the age of fifty, Reagan remains 
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one of the most admired conservative Republicans in American history.  This, despite a 
parade of contradictions in what he believed in and what he acted on.  He detested the 
concept of big government; yet, he made government bigger.  During the 1980 
presidential election campaign, he harped on his belief of fiscal conservatism; yet, he 
inherited a national debt of $80 billion and managed to increase it to $200 billion in his 
eight years of office.71  The anti-abortionists revered him; yet he did little – if anything – 
to champion their cause.  Some of his more harsh critics argued that Reagan had no right 
to argue for either family stability or the church as Reagan was divorced from his first 
wife and rarely attended service.  Moreover, these same critics argued that the bitterness 
and estrangement Reagan created with his children was yet another contradiction to the 
wholesome virtues that Reagan portrayed himself to stand for. These contradictions 
caused Clark Clifford – a prominent Democrat lawyer who served Harry S. Truman, John 
D. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Jimmy Carter – to label Ronald Reagan as an 
“amicable dunce.”72  The context of this dissertation is largely void of any of these 
contradictions but, where applicable, has provided footnoted explanations on the ones 
that do exist.  As for my own beliefs regarding Reagan, the text of this research arguably 
showcases my admiration for Reagan as a public speaker and for his ability to connect 
with his audience using homespun humor and grace – a talent he brought to the White 
House after a successful career in Hollywood.  From a political viewpoint, I have 
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 Lou Cannon and Carl M. Cannon, Reagan’s Disciple: George W. Bush’s Troubled Quest for a 
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attempted to maintain a distance between my own beliefs and leanings and Reagan’s 
agenda as I discovered in his archives. 
 Lastly, any study built upon archival research is only as sound and completed as 
the archives it pulls from.  In the case of this archival research, the majority of the 
material was 29 years old – or, in other words, over the mandatory 25-year holding 
period on presidential documents and, in some cases, just approaching the holding period 
on other material deemed “sensitive.”  However, my research in the archives of the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum discovered many files and folders 
regarding to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games still classified; no researcher had yet 
requested them to be moved through the declassification process.  As well, several 
Freedom of Information Act Requests through the United States Department of State 
remain open at the time of the defense of this dissertation.  However, the requested 
documents are largely peripheral – documents pertaining to Romania and Africa – and 
detract little from my initial argument as I continue to pursue this area of research.  The 
lack of these documents may impair the length of this research, but in no way does it 
harm the integrity of my argument.  
 
1.7 Delimitations 
The focus of this study is directed between the years of 1980 and 1984.  The 
starting point of 1980 is used to coincide with Reagan’s campaign for the presidency.  It 
also marks the start of correspondence between the federal government, the LAOOC, and 
the Kremlin.  The end of this study is marked by the conclusion of the Los Angeles 
Olympics on 12 August 1984. 
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1.8 Outline of Chapters 
Following a brief introduction, Chapter 2 discusses the history of the Olympic 
Movement in the city of Los Angeles.  A series of events transpired that permitted the 
city to host the Olympics in 1984, thus allowing Reagan to use the Olympics in his new 
foreign policy with the Soviet Union.  First, the chapter provides a brief introduction to 
the 1932 Olympics held in Los Angeles.  It was on the success of these Olympics that the 
Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games was formed.  It was this 
Committee that worked tirelessly to promote the Olympic Movement in Los Angeles and 
to attempt to lure the worldwide festival back to their beloved city.  Starting in the early 
1960s, Chapter 2 examines the tumultuous history behind Los Angeles finally getting the 
Olympic Games again in 1984.  In doing so, the chapter discusses Montreal’s successful 
bid for the 1976 Olympics, Moscow’s gain of the 1980 Games, and, finally, how Los 
Angeles earned the Games for 1984 through being the only choice and how the city 
nearly lost the right to host afterwards. 
Chapter 3 follows Ronald Reagan’s 1980 Presidential campaign and his eventual 
triumph over President Jimmy Carter.  The chapter examines the differences between 
Carter’s foreign policy against that of Reagan’s proposed plans.  From there, the chapter 
will discuss how Reagan’s foreign policy assisted in the creation of his program dubbed 
“peace through strength.”  Chapter 3 presents a discussion of the early relationship 
between Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union from 1964 until his death in 1982, and President Reagan.  The correspondence 
between the two world leaders, as found in the Ronald Reagan Archives, depicts two 
 29 
countries facing a foreign policy stalemate – neither wishing to concede to the other.  It is 
with this setting that the chapter then examines Richard Pipes’ first Soviet policy for 
President Reagan.  The understanding of this policy is vital, as it stood as Reagan’s 
posture towards the Soviet Union until late 1983.  The chapter then examines how three 
events in the fall of 1983 signaled to President Reagan that American approach to the 
Soviet Union was in dire need of adjustment, thus deviating from Pipes’ Soviet strategy.  
Lastly, Chapter 3 discusses Reagan’s monumental 16 January 1984 speech in which he 
laid out his future plans for the Soviet Union, including his desire for peace, compromise, 
and quiet diplomacy as a result of extraordinary circumstances. 
Chapter 4 opens with a discussion regarding President Reagan, the Olympics, and 
cultural exchanges between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.  
Exploring these relationships is important as the Soviet Union’s shooting of KAL 007 
brought a halting crash to much of it.  Subsequently, Chapter 4 enters into a detailed 
examination of the KAL 007 incident and how it impacted both the American psyche and 
the Olympic Movement. The chapter then moves to a discussion of the Ban The Soviets 
Coalition, the Gruzia, and Olympic safety.  Formed as a way to combat Soviet 
participation in the Olympics, the Ban the Soviets Coalition was largely a pest to the Los 
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, the American government, and the 
International Olympic Committee.  The actions of the Ban the Soviets Coalition directly 
impacted guarantees of athlete safety at the Olympics, as well as the Soviet Union’s 
request to berth the ship Gruzia at Long Beach Harbor during the duration of the Games.  
The chapter also examines how the majority of Ronald Reagan’s administration was 
wholly against accommodating any Soviet requests for the Los Angeles Olympic Games.  
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In concluding, Chapter 4 examines how and why President Reagan ignored his closest 
advisors and unilaterally approved Soviet requests. 
Chapter 5 investigates the Reagan administration’s reaction when the Soviet 
Union announced its intentions to boycott the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer 
Games.  As well, the chapter examines how the success of the Los Angeles Olympics 
spurred renewed interest in the Olympic Movement from other potential host cities.  
Chapter 5 also answers a rather vital question regarding this line of research – did Reagan 
only accommodate the Soviet Union to comply with the Olympic Charter?  Chapter 5 
also includes a brief look at Reagan’s political manipulation of Romania in order to get 
the country to attend the Olympics.  Chapter 5 concludes with an explanation of how 
Reagan’s overtures at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics allowed for future positive 
relations between the President and new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
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Chapter 2 – The City of Angels 
“Yes, our athletes have a love, a happiness, and an exuberance in being 
American.  They’re as patriotic as the Pledge of Allegiance; as red, white, 
and blue as the flag.  They’re filled with the spirit of our land in all of its 
magnificent diversity, a diversity you can see even in their faces.  Ours are 
the faces of all humanity, just as our nation was built by the hopes of all 
humanity.  So, as you watch these Olympics, remember – win, lose, or 
draw – how much we have to be proud and thankful for.  After all, we’re 
Americans.”1 
 
2.1 The Battle of Los Angeles 
 That the 1984 Olympic Summer Games were held in Los Angeles was of no small 
consequence to the Ronald Reagan administration.  It provided the President the 
opportunity to quickly commence the process of achieving his newly founded desire to 
begin repairing relations with the Soviet Union.  The Los Angeles Olympics provided the 
reasoning for the two countries to communicate – even if the interaction was through the 
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee serving as an intermediary.  Fortuitously 
for Reagan, those attempting to bring the Olympic Games to Los Angeles through the 
1970s did not abandon their plans as the International Olympic Committee picked other 
world cities to host the Olympics.  Finally, in the late 1970s, a series of events occurred 
that placed Los Angeles in an opportune position to host the 1984 Olympic Summer 
Games and, thus, gave Ronald Reagan his first chance at reconciliation with the Soviet 
Union. 
                                                
1
 An excerpt from Ronald Reagan’s 17 September 1988 radio address to the nation concerning the 
upcoming Olympic Summer Games in Seoul, South Korea.  For the entirety of the speech, please see the 
Reagan Archive’s digital collection of all his radio addresses. 
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The 1984 Olympic Summer Games was not the first time that the city of Los 
Angeles bid for the right to host the festival; nor was it the first time that the city hosted 
it.  Having first hosted the Olympics in 1932, Los Angeles subsequently maintained a 
sustained history with the Olympic Movement.  However, it was not until the bidding 
sequence for the 1976 Olympic Games did Cold War undertones imbed themselves into 
the Los Angeles Olympic narrative.  The IOC’s decision to award the 1976 Summer 
Olympics to Montreal had long-lasting ramifications that permitted the Ronald Reagan 
administration to use the 1984 Los Angeles Games as a political ploy in Cold War 
relations. 
Formed in 1938 through a direct request of the United States Olympic 
Committee,2 the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games3 was organized 
by civic and Olympic leaders William May Garland and Paul Helms – both notable 
names synonymous with the Los Angeles Olympic Games.  Garland, a member of the 
IOC from 1922 to 1948, successfully secured the bid for the 1932 Games and then led the 
process of hosting a highly successful Olympic festival in the midst of the Great 
Depression.  Helms, on the other hand, is most remembered for being the baker behind 
the ‘Great Bread War’ between himself and IOC president Avery Brundage.4  The task of 
the SCCOG was quite clear: after the success of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, the 
                                                
2
 The signing of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 officially marked the creation of the United State Olympic 
Committee.  However, for the sake of clarity and consistency, the name United States Olympic Committee 
(hereafter USOC) will be used rather than American Olympic Committee. 
3
 Hereafter SCCOG 
4
 For more see Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, Selling The Five Rings: The 
International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism (Salt Lake City: University of 
Utah Press, 2004), 31-49. 
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USOC directed the Southern California group to provide continued support for the 
Olympic Movement in Los Angeles and to bid for future Games.  The group presented 
the Los Angeles bids to the IOC in 1948, 1952, and 1956.  It presented the city to the 
USOC to be its candidate city for the 1960, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1984 
Olympic Games.5  When the USOC awarded international bidding rights to Los Angeles 
for the 1976 Summer Olympic Games, then Los Angeles mayor Sam Yorty called for the 
establishment of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee.6  The purpose of the 
Committee was to lead the international voting effort, thus vesting the power to the 
LAOOC that the members of the SCCOG thought they rightfully maintained.    
 On 29 October 1962, then acting President of the Southern California Committee, 
Lee Combs, wrote a letter to IOC President Brundage.7  The subject was clear: Combs 
was not pleased with the final result of the 1964 domestic bid, the process of which 
granted American bidding rights to Detroit, Michigan over Los Angeles.  In bullet-point 
fashion, Combs laid out his concerns to Brundage – the main one being that Detroit and 
its chief representative, Douglas Roby, “had no intentions of getting the Games to the 
United States, but wanted the bidding privilege solely for personal, local, and political 
reasons in order to get sports facilities for professional purposes in their own city.”8  
                                                
5
 http://www.sccog.org/webapp/about-us 
6
 Hereafter LAOOC. 
7
 Bill Harvey, the President of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games, fell too ill to 
complete his presidential duties during this period. 
8
 Lee Combs to Avery Brundage, 29 October 1962, Avery Brundage Collection (hereafter ABC), Box 113, 
Reel 62, The International Centre for Olympic Studies (hereafter ICOS), London, Ontario, Canada. 
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Combs also professed to Brundage that the awarding of the bid to Detroit was an insult to 
such men as William Garland and Paul Helms who “worked as dedicated men for over 30 
years” in the name of the Olympic Movement.9 
 Correspondence between Combs and Brundage appears to have taken a seven-
year hiatus after the bidding contest between Los Angeles and Detroit concluded.  
Correspondence between them started again in 1969 in the middle of Los Angeles’ 
international bid for the 1976 Summer Olympics.  In a letter dated 21 March 1969, 
Combs opened with a matter-of-fact statement, expressing his concerns over the 
increasing professionalism in athletics.  Combs knew how to play to a favorite Brundage 
peeve.  Combs then moved on to the crux of his letter. Combs informed Brundage that he 
was “deeply concerned with the ‘tone,’ the personnel, and underlying purposes of the Los 
Angeles Mayor’s Committee…”10  Combs requested a personal meeting with Brundage 
in either Chicago or Santa Barbara, California to discuss the issue.11   
 As the acting President of the Southern California Committee, Combs took it 
upon himself to attempt to place the SCCOG in what he thought was its rightful place – 
at the helm of Los Angeles’ international Olympic bid.  With no apparent response from 
Brundage, Combs began to write directly to the Southern California Committee’s 
adversarial group – the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee.  Additionally, 
Combs copied each letter directly to Brundage at the La Salle Hotel near Chicago’s 
                                                
9
 Ibid. 
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 Combs to Brundage, 21 March 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS. 
11
 The Brundage Collection contains no reply to Combs’ request. 
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Monroe Harbor.  In a 15 July 1969 letter to the LAOOC president, John Kilroy, Combs 
expressed the Southern California group’s mounting concern over the 1976 Olympic 
Games, presenting to Kilroy a brief, if not a self-righteous history, of the SCCOG, which 
informed that his group had “been working on the matter [the Olympics] since 1936, the 
year when William May Garland, Paul Helms, and Ralph Chick organized it.”  Combs 
also let Kilroy know that the SCCOG maintained strong “international Olympic 
connections.”  Combs concluded an on arrogant note.  Claiming he recently had had 
lunch with Brundage at the IOC President’s request,12 he implied that he was above 
Kilroy in Olympic matters as he had been involved with Olympic affairs “since 1926” 
and that the LAOOC had “problems of which” they were “not at all aware.”13 
 On 29 July 1969, Combs responded to a letter from Kilroy. From Combs’ pointed 
words, one can infer how Kilroy responded to Combs’ earlier letter.  Combs first 
chastised Kilroy for implying in his response that Combs was nothing more than a 
“concerned citizen” and not the “acting head of the Southern California Committee for 
the Olympic Games.”  Kilroy also insisted in his response to Combs that his group, the 
Los Angeles Olympic Committee, was working closely with the Southern California 
group.  Combs vehemently argued otherwise, stating the members chosen to attend the 
LAOOC meetings were handpicked by the LAOOC, none of whom were sitting members 
of the SCCOG’s executive board.  Lastly, Combs informed Kilroy that the Southern 
California group was keeping Brundage abreast of the situation in an effort to “clear up” 
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 Nothing in the Brundage Collection exists to validate this claim. 
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 Combs to John Kilroy, 15 July 1969, ABC, Box 194, Reel 112, ICOS. 
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erroneous impressions.  Exactly which erroneous impressions Combs believed Brundage 
to be receiving were not addressed.14 
 Immediately after dispatching his letter to Kilroy, Combs prepared a missive to 
Brundage.  The purpose of the letter was two-fold: (1) to argue to Brundage that the 
LAOOC, as formed by Mayor Yorty, was not legitimate when weighed against the 
Olympic Charter and (2) to explain that cooperation between the two groups was “wholly 
unsatisfactory.”  Combs argued to the IOC President that Olympic Charter protocol 
placed the onus of building an organizing committee “on the shoulders of the National 
Committee [USOC] of the city to which the games were awarded.”15  Combs further 
argued that any right or privilege the LAOOC felt it inherited from Mayor Sam Yorty did 
“not extend to the creation of an organizing committee to conduct the Games, if awarded 
to Los Angeles.”  Combs was not only railing against the LAOOC being in charge of the 
bidding process, but was also informing Brundage that the squabbling would endure if 
Los Angeles were awarded the 1976 Summer Olympic Games.  Combs sent a copy of the 
letter to Kilroy.16 
 Unsatisfied with his effort thus far – the very next day Combs wrote yet another 
letter to Brundage.  He charged the LAOOC as being nothing short of “opportunists and 
politicians.”  Because of this, Combs reasoned, the Los Angeles group “ought not be 
permitted” to deal with Olympic matters.  Knowing the Los Angeles group would be 
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infuriated with Combs’ claim, Combs informed Brundage that he was very well aware 
that Kilroy would not be “happy with him” but that he could not “sit quietly by” and 
watch Los Angeles’ Olympic dream go its present course.17 
 Combs received a reply from the Los Angeles group on 4 August 1969.  In what 
surely implied an insult to Combs, the letter was sent by Paul Zimmerman – an advisor to 
the LAOOC. He was not a sitting member of the executive board.  Zimmerman opened 
the letter to Combs by informing him that Kilroy was currently in Europe dealing with 
“pressing Olympic matters,” lest Combs become further “hurt” by not receiving 
immediate responses.  Zimmerman related that he was “startled” that Combs “would put 
self before the success of Los Angeles’ bid by writing” as he did to Brundage.  In 
response to Combs’ disagreement over those Southern California group members picked 
to serve on the Mayor’s committee, Zimmerman professed his personal opinion that 
Combs was simply upset that he was not appointed over the others.  Zimmerman copied 
his letter to both Kilroy and Brundage.18 
It took Combs only two days to respond to Zimmerman’s charges.  Combs 
informed Zimmerman that his personal attack was “not too surprising” especially coming 
from “an employee of a corporation like the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee.”19  
Further, he charged that Zimmerman’s claim of his [Comb’s] hurt feelings over non-
appointment to the Los Angeles Committee were “ridiculous.”  In a roundabout insult, 
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Combs wrote: “without any compensation, I chairmanned an important national Olympic 
Committee when you [Zimmerman] were a young newspaper reporter for a local 
newspaper.”20  Combs continued, “The time I have spent on Olympism and amateur 
sports has been without pay – a contribution of thousands of hours and tens of thousands 
of dollars cash over the last four and a half decades. Our two situations are not at all 
comparable.”  Combs then lectured Zimmerman and the Los Angeles group in general for 
desiring to “preserve the ‘Garland Image’ as an asset in seeking the 1976 Games,” but 
doing so without inviting Garland,21 a well-respected members of the Southern California 
group’s executive board, to sit on the Los Angeles Olympic Committee.  As he typically 
did, Combs ended the letter by assuring Zimmerman that Brundage would be receiving a 
copy of all correspondence between the two groups.22 
Indeed, Combs lost little time in apprising Brundage on the developments.  True 
to his normal practice, Combs wrote to Brundage on the same day he replied to 
Zimmerman.   The fact that Brundage had yet to reply to either group  was either lost on 
Combs, or he simply did not care that Brundage appeared to be distancing himself from 
the situation.  In his 6 August 1969 letter to Brundage, Combs perhaps made his boldest 
claim during the entirety of exchanges.  He explained to Brundage that Mel Pierson, 
“who spearheaded the Mayor’s Committee about two years ago, is one of Mayor Yorty’s 
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Commissioners presently under indictment for bribery.”23  Combs concluded, “without 
changes, I don’t think the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee has enough solid 
Olympic background to qualify it to run the Olympic Games.”24  Brundage, once again, 
did not respond.  On 19 August 1969, Kilroy responded to Combs – copying Brundage – 
with a short and to-the-point letter.  In it, Kilroy simply stated, “The Los Angeles 1976 
Olympic Committee, as presently constituted, is duely [sic] authorized to represent the 
City of Los Angeles and the United States Olympic Committee in its quest for the 1976 
Summer Games.”25 
The narratives of both the LAOOC and the Southern California group drastically 
changed on 21 November 1969 when the Soviet Union decided to make a late entry into 
the bidding contest.  In a supposedly confidential report composed shortly after the Soviet 
announcement, the Los Angeles group put forth its understanding of the new Cold War 
connotations.  The report stated that the Soviet bid was “not a challenge by Moscow to 
Los Angeles alone” but a “challenge to the United States by Russia in the name of 
Moscow.”26  The Los Angeles group believed the Soviets were “exerting every 
conceivable pressure in every possible area of influence” and that “the tremendous effort” 
the Soviets put forth were “at the expense of their government.”  To Brundage, who 
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detested any mixture of politics and the Olympic Movement, the brewing political 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union under the auspices of the 
1976 Summer Games bidding process was an alarming development. 
The Soviet’s late entry into the 1976 Olympic bidding contest did not catch the 
LAOOC off guard.  The internal report declared there was a “persistent rumor,” though it 
is noted as “never confirmed,” that “Moscow might come into the picture as a staging for 
a more serious bid in 1980.”  This is not to say the group was  not worried by the 
Kremlin’s actions. Certainly, the LAOOC was aware that the Moscow bid was “totally 
political” and “inspired under the guise of International Sports.”  Regardless of Soviet 
motivation, the leader of Los Angeles’ Olympic bid understood that a Soviet bid could 
“thwart the otherwise apparent award [of the Olympics] to Los Angeles.”27  Indeed, the 
competition posed by Montreal was deemed an afterthought.  
In its internal and confidential memo, the LAOOC outlined the entirety of the 
history between the Cold War and the Olympics, as well as editorializing its own 
thoughts into the narration.  For example, the LAOOC felt the 1956 Melbourne Olympic 
Committee acted “courageously” in its refusal to allow an ocean liner to serve as official 
Soviet housing.28  On the subject of the Soviet “run out” of the 1966 Duel Meet, the 
LAOOC felt it exemplified the belief that Soviet “sport commitments and political needs 
are not separated and subject to adjustment on a case basis for what they think is their 
greatest advantage.”  Lastly, the LAOOC pondered if the true justification behind the 
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Soviet bid was due to the Kremlin being “reluctant to have the many athletes of the Iron 
Curtain countries visit the United States.”29 
The memo also included numerous impacts the Moscow bid could theoretically 
have.  Primarily, the LAOOC felt the Moscow bid “could open up the use of the sports 
media throughout the world for further political propaganda.”  Such an occurrence, the 
LAOOC felt, was “a very substantial coup.”  The LAOOC also made connections 
between the Soviet bid and the East-West Germany issue – what the group called a 
“tremendous interrelationship with the 1972 Games in Munich.”  The LAOOC fretted 
that a denial of the 1976 Games to Moscow would result in a Soviet-led boycott of the 
1972 Munich Games and “other pressures to save face with East Germany.”30  While its 
first two concerns were quite legitimate, the LAOOC also discussed possible secondary 
impacts of the Moscow bid.  In the occurrence of a Moscow loss in the bidding process, 
the LAOOC felt: 
The Russians could emphasize that the IOC, ‘composed of royalty, 
colonists, imperialists and capitalists’ (their oft-stated words), had denied 
them their rightful bid for the Summer Games and that the actions in their 
denial should be justification for their (IOC) disbandment, and call for a 
referral of the matter of the Olympic Games to an ‘International 
Democratic Council’ composed of National Olympic Committees.31 
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The LAOOC argued that “the very fact of bidding” was a “substantial plus for Moscow 
unless the bid is countered by the award to Los Angeles.”  Lastly, the memo closed the 
discussion of the USSR’s bid impact by emphasizing that “various federations and 
National Olympic Committees” created “concurrent pressures to further their own 
expansionistic aims pointing toward the direction of control of sport, television money 
and personal award.”32  
 The impact and effects of a Moscow victory were also discussed in the memo.  
Broadly, the LAOOC felt the primary objective of a Soviet victory was to “defeat and 
deny the United States in the world sports movement.”  As noted, this also included 
“control of international sports media for political purposes.”  The LAOOC foresaw a 
more apocalyptic result of an award to Moscow: the Kremlin could “suggest that other 
countries not meeting their political criteria for one reason or another should not be 
admitted for the Games.”  The LAOOC admitted this was a “wild claim” but that it was 
not out of the realm of possibilities.33  Finally, the LAOOC argued the awarding of the 
Games to Moscow could effectively destroy the IOC: 
The control of the bid by a country as powerful and as defiant as Russia 
and the continuous downgrading of the IOC by direct negotiations with 
the NOC committees and the sports federations while ignoring the IOC 
could destroy the total effect and strength of the IOC, causing its merger 
with an International Sports Council or equivalent. This is of particular 
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concern because of the advanced age of Avery Brundage, the real 
“strength” of the IOC today.34 
The Los Angeles group agreed on a two-pronged approach to counter the Moscow 
bid.  First, the group went the commonly accepted route of receiving an official 
endorsement from the President of the United States. Additionally, the group desired that 
the President write privately and candidly to each member of the International Olympic 
Committee.  Second, under the advisement of the State Department, the Los Angeles 
group endeavored in “all ways to try and obtain” the vote of those countries in Eastern 
Europe under the unwilling sphere of Soviet influence.35  That Brundage was given 
access to this information, assumingly by Combs, did not forebode a promising future for 
the Los Angeles’ Olympic aspirations. 
 In May 1970, the International Olympic Committee faced an uncomfortable 
situation: both the United States and the Soviet Union bid for the right to host the 1976 
Olympic Summer Games.  By choosing either country, was the IOC picking a side in the 
Cold War’s ideological struggle?  To avoid such an unsavory situation in both the 
Olympic Movement and international relations, the IOC opted to award Montreal with 
the responsibility of hosting the Summer Olympics in 1976.36  The decision proved to 
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alter the face of the Olympic Movement for years to come.  As well, many in the 
southern California media felt that hosting the Olympics was a colossal mistake.  A Los 
Angeles Times editorial argued that it was “foolishness for a 9-man delegation to go to 
Vienna to get the 1980 Olympic Games for L.A.” and that “a Los Angeles Olympics at 
some future time might be warranted.”  As for the 1976 festival, many Los Angelenos 
watched happily as Montreal took on the burden.37 
Shortly after the vote, a flurry of letter writing took place.  On 15 June 1970, 
Kilroy wrote to Brundage and exclaimed that the International Olympic Committee and 
its leaders failed “to impose upon themselves the same disciplines that they insist be 
imposed upon all other participants.”  He then asked Brundage how the “traditional and 
oft stated objective of the Olympic ideal be extended to and understood by youth if it is 
not understood and practiced by the Committee.”  Kilroy ended by insisting that the letter 
was written without acrimony.38 
In a 4 June 1970 letter to Al Stump of the Herald Examiner, Brundage claimed 
that the Los Angeles group’s reaction to the defeat was “disgraceful” and “as usual Avery 
Brundage” was blamed for the loss.39  Brundage further vented his feelings in a 3 July 
1970 letter to William Nicholas, the general manager of the Los Angeles Memorial 
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Coliseum Commission.  Brundage felt that the “moans, groans, howls, and wails 
emanating from the Los Angeles group” were beginning to come to an end.40  But, more 
importantly, he “resented” the Los Angeles group blaming the loss on the IOC President.  
Brundage was convinced that the failure of the Los Angeles bid was a result that the 
Americans had few friends when it came to “voting on matters” such as the Olympics – 
this, “despite the billions of aid that [America] has scattered through the world.”   
Brundage felt that the loss had much to do with the “newspapers of the world” being 
filled with the “Kent College affair and other anti-United States propaganda.”  Lastly, 
Brundage confirmed to Nicholas that he was wholly “skeptical” of the promised votes 
Los Angeles felt they were due to receive.41 
Lee Combs resumed his writing to Brundage on 16 June 1970.  He conveyed to 
Brundage that he had “long hesitated” in writing because of the “catastrophe, so far as 
Los Angeles Olympism is concerned, that occurred in Amsterdam.”42  In light of the 
struggle with the Los Angeles group and the eventual loss of the city’s bid, Combs 
admitted to Brundage that he “seriously considered whether or not [he] should attempt to 
hold together an organization which [had] been deeply torn apart.”43  Ultimately, Combs 
committed himself to doing so, but explained to Brundage his belief that too much 
damage was done to Los Angeles’ reputation because of the bickering and the Cold War.  
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Combs told Brundage he felt it would be several decades before Los Angeles would 
recover and that he – meaning Combs – would be “gone” before the Olympics ever 
returned to his beloved city.44 
Combs summarized the entirety of the situation by saying the fighting, the 
bickering, and the Cold War overtones were a “shattering experience upon Los Angeles, 
its people,” and its Olympic dreams.45  As Combs soon found out, however, the IOC’s 
decision to award the 1976 Olympic to Montreal was just the beginning for both Los 
Angeles’ Olympic dreams and an international and diplomatic struggle with the Soviet 
Union under the façade of international sport. 
 
2.2 Los Angeles’ 1984 Bid for America 
 On 23 September 1977, Michael T. Harrigan sat before the House International 
Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations.  Harrigan, the President of 
Trigon Sports and the Executive Director of the President’s Commission on Olympic 
Sports, was tasked with reporting back to then President Jimmy Carter on the most 
effective and prudent way to organize and protect amateur sports in the country.  
Harrigan’s Commission noted the same long-problematic symptoms of the country’s 
amateur sports system:  athletes utilizing their own cash for training travel, athletes 
scarcely affording the costs of getting to the Olympic festival site.46  Harrigan argued that 
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it was difficult for “any athlete that is not in school or college or who competes in a sport 
that is not part of school or college athletic programs has a tough time … making ends 
meet.”47 
 Harrigan’s speech before the Subcommittee had other agendas than simply 
providing possible solutions for amateur athletics in America.  Harrigan informed his 
listeners of the crisis being created by the intersection of the Olympic Games and 
international politics.  Moreover, Harrigan argued that “the Games may die if politics 
continue to raise their ugly spectre.”48  Though Harrigan did not quite agree with a 
prominent friend’s assessment that the “Games may be lost forever” if the United States 
did not host the 1984 Summer Olympics, he did believe – no matter how misguided – 
that “only the U.S. can turn the clock back to a Games that is free from politics.”49  
Finally, Harrigan informed the Subcommittee that the Olympic Movement needed 
leadership to survive, and that their country could provide it “in a big way by hosting the 
1984 Games.”50  Luckily for Harrigan, Montreal’s hosting of the 1976 Summer Olympics 
Games quite likely insured that Los Angeles would be the home of the 1984 Olympics. 
 The man in charge of Montreal’s Olympic bid was Jean Drapeau, the flamboyant 
Mayor of the city from 1954 through 1957 and again from 1960 to 1986.  Drapeau – of 
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French descent– became involved in the Olympic Games as early as 1966 when he led 
Montreal’s bid for the 1972 Olympic Games, which ultimately went to Munich.  The loss 
did not deter Drapeau.  Described as a man of “sober dress” and with a “neatly trimmed 
moustache,” Drapeau continued to work Olympic circles, often approaching those in 
power with the opening line, “Sir, may I talk to you about Montreal?”51  During these 
conversations, Drapeau often spoke of the “autofinancement” of the Olympic Games – 
or, his belief that the Olympic Games were completely capable of funding themselves.  It 
was partly this belief that led to his stance that all those staying in the Olympic Village 
would do so at no costs if the IOC awarded the Games to Montreal in 1972.52 
 In contrast to Drapeau’s beliefs, the Olympic Movement was struggling with the 
spiraling cots of organizing the event.  The Montreal Mayor paid no mind.  When 
Montreal was awarded the 1976 Olympic Games, he claimed that “the Olympics could no 
more produce a deficit, than a man a baby.”53  The Montreal Organizing Committee 
tabbed the estimated costs of hosting the Olympics at $310 million; a handsome profit 
was likely.  The group could not have been more in error.  A significant number of 
setbacks and cost overruns devastated Montreal’s Olympic budget.  By the time the 
Games moved onwards to 1980 and Moscow, the city of Montreal was burdened with 
debts of over $1 billion.  It took the province of Quebec  – and its tax dollars – over thirty 
years to erase the deficit caused by hosting the Olympic festival. 
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 With Moscow hosting the 1980 Olympic Summer Games, the city of Los Angeles 
focused on the 1984 festival.  It was thought that Los Angeles’ first-round ouster for the 
1976 Olympics was the result of the city’s bid committee only desiring to make its 
interest in the 1984 Games known to the members of the IOC.54  The possibility also 
existed that President Nixon informed Brezhnev that Los Angeles was not going to bid in 
earnest until the next Olympiad.55  At the American level, the United States Olympic 
Committee received luke warm interest – at best – from other cities aside from Los 
Angeles.  Atlanta provided a brief – yet underwhelming – interest in hosting, with the 
leader of the movement bellowing that the cost of bringing the Games to Atlanta would 
be between $300-400 million and that the financial crisis of Montreal would not be 
repeated, as Atlanta was “much better organized.”56  Of the other potential suitors – New 
York City, Boston, Chicago, and New Orleans – only New York City seemed prepared to 
tackle the herculean task of bidding for and, hopefully, hosting the Olympic Games.  
New York’s bid was backed by a governor prepared to provide $225 million to the 
Olympic project.  Furthermore, the mayor invigorated his constituents with his desire to 
use the Olympics Games as a springboard to provide the necessary enlargement and 
refurbishing of downtrodden Shea Stadium in Queens.57 
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 As Los Angeles and New York City geared up their bid campaigns, the leaders of 
the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games were all but claiming victory.  
Though John Argue, the lawyer overseeing Los Angeles’ bid, conceded that the Los 
Angeles group was “taking New York very seriously,” he believed that the Southern 
California city maintained a “commanding lead.”  With a Los Angeles victory predicted 
by those behind it, public concern in Los Angeles over the cost of the Olympics became a 
pressing issue.  The bid committee asserted – that even under the worst of circumstances 
– the city was likely to break even, if not turn a $200 million profit.58  Others vehemently 
disagreed.  Economic analyst Susan Fields defied the Committee, and publically argued 
that a net loss of over $336 million was likely “depending on various unpredictable 
factors, such as the uncertain costs of providing an Olympic Village to house athletes.”59  
Fields made sure to mention that the numbers, presented in 1977 dollars, “could be 
substantially higher” with inflation” by 1984.  Argue came to the defense of the Los 
Angeles Committee, correcting Fields, insisting that the Committee planned “to put on a 
Spartan, business like Olympics.”60  Further, Argues explained that the television rights 
and sales of commemorative coins were likely to provide nearly $200 million in 
revenues.61  Others intimate with the bid confirmed Argue’s statements.  Los Angeles 
Mayor Tom Bradley stated for the record that the “back to basics” approach the bid 
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committee was seeking allowed Los Angeles to “minimize overhead and turn back the 
spiral of grand shows and high deficits.”62  The Governor of California, Edmond Brown, 
noted that as long “as the proposal is sound, the real focus ought to be on the athlete and 
individual competitions and the commitment to excellence.  It’s not just something to 
make businessmen a few extra profits.”63 
 Two days before the 26 September 1977 USOC meeting to pick the American 
host nominee, USOC President Robert J. Kane made it clear that both the “proposals by 
Los Angeles and New York City” were in “excellent order.”  And, to dispel rumors, he 
insisted that New York City had not “gained the edge” over Los Angeles and that “it was 
a close horse race.”64  However, the Los Angeles Committee had reason to worry.  
During the meetings with the USOC in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the New York 
Committee invited New York Governor Hugh Carey to guarantee the USOC that 
“exclusive of any possible federal aid, New York State would erase any deficit New York 
City might sustain” if it were to host the 1984 Olympic Summer Games. Carey’s arrival 
was memorable:  arriving several hours before the Los Angeles Mayor, Carey “roared 
into town in a limousine and made a flamboyant entry to a USOC luncheon to which both 
delegations had been invited.  He was accompanied by numerous aides.”65 
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The state of New York’s pledge to the Olympics was a devastating blow to Los 
Angeles’ chances.  Governor Brown, stating his stance on Los Angeles’ Olympic bid, 
reiterated that he wanted to “conduct the Games in an era of limits, not opulence” and 
that he desired to “make sure no public funds would be pumped in.”66  Despite Brown’s 
stance, the Los Angeles Committee immediately summoned the Governor to Colorado 
Springs to – if anything – balance off the attendance of Governor Carey.  In a cryptic 
message from Gray Davis, Brown’s executive secretary, it was announced, 
“circumstances” in Colorado Springs “have changed and the governor’s presence is 
important.”67  Brown immediately chartered a private jet from Santa Maria, California 
and arrived at the USOC meeting in mere hours.  While Brown could not make the same 
financial assurances as New York, he guaranteed to the United States Olympic 
Committee that the Los Angeles bid group had the backing and blessing of the state 
government. 
Despite the vast difference in governmental support, Los Angeles successfully 
secured the American nomination and stood poised to move on to the international 
bidding phase.  New York’s desire to use the Olympics to bolster Shea Stadium may have 
caused more concern in the voting than originally anticipated.  The USOC feared that M. 
Donald Grant, the chairman of the board of the New York Mets, the principal tenant of 
Shea Stadium, “would refuse to move his team to Yankee Stadium for the year that the 
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Olympics” were to be held.68  With the national victory secured, Los Angeles Mayor 
Tom Bradley continued to press the issue of a Spartan Olympics, saying, “we have no 
intention of going into the red.  We think our revenue projections are sound and 
conservative.  We think our managerial abilities will prevent the expenditures from 
getting out of hand.”69  E. Newman Black IV, the chairman of the USOC’s site selection 
committee suggested that Los Angeles’ financial plan, and the fact that its existing 
stadium was not come burdened with potential scheduling issues, factored into the 
results, commenting that Los Angeles provided “a very low capital spending budget, 
involving its existing coliseum.”70 
 
2.3 The Only Choice 
It was an unprecedented dilemma for the IOC.  Due to the financial disaster of the 
Montreal Olympics, as well as the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Games, little 
interest prevailed from governments to host ever-expanding Games. Los Angeles and 
Tehran, Iran stood as the only cities to formally bid for the 1984 Olympic Games.  The 
underlying belief was that Tehran would have lost to Los Angeles regardless, as the 
Iranian Olympic Committee campaigned “openly for the admission of Communist China 
to the Olympic Movement and the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan).”71  
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Tehran’s desires were of small benefit, as the support of the IOC remained solidly with 
the Taiwanese Olympic Committee.  However, with Tehran’s ultimate decision to 
withdraw its bid, the International Olympic Committee had no choice but to hear Los 
Angeles’ proposal as the only remaining bid city.  Lord Killanin, who served as the 
President of the IOC from 1972 until just before the Moscow Olympics in 1980, 
reasoned: 
Whlist it is disappointing that there is only one candidate for the Olympic 
Games, it is not surprising.  Los Angeles had already made two previous 
and unsuccessful bids.  Los Angeles therefore was in a strong position to 
be awarded the Games for 1984.  Further, I have no doubt that smaller 
National Olympic Committees have been frightened by the exaggerated 
statements regarding costs.  It is important to distinguish between capital 
costs that are of lasting benefit to the areas concerned, and the running 
costs that showed a profit of $940.9 million in Munich and $126.8 million 
in Montreal.72 
However, what Lord Killanin deemed “exaggerated statements” regarding the 
financial implication of hosting the Olympic Games proved to be threats to the future 
financial solvency of each and every host city.  Despite the Cold War undertones of the 
approaching 1980 Moscow Olympics, and the tragedy that occurred at the 1972 Munich 
Olympics, many still felt that “the most immediate threat to the future of the Olympics” 
was not “politics or nationalism” but “the cost of hosting the Games.”73  However, Los 
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Angeles’ bid for the Olympic Games was on much sturdier ground than the previous 
Summer Olympics.  For example, Los Angeles planned to spend only $33.5 million on 
the entirety of their construction costs; Montreal spent $650 million solely on the 
construction of the Olympic stadium.74 
The estimated low costs to produce the Olympic Games in Los Angeles was not 
enough to quell still more vocal outcry from both the public and the Los Angeles City 
Council.  On 15 November 1977, Baxter Ward, the Supervisor of Los Angeles County, 
proposed that the county’s voters “decide whether or not to ban the use of county funds to 
finance the 1984 Olympic Games.”75  The movement was nothing more than a 
ceremonial ploy by the County Supervisor, something confirmed by John McFaden, the 
Vice President of the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games, who 
explained that the county’s vote was completely unnecessary.  McFaden further argued 
that the county was not “involved in any way, shape or form in staging the games.  As 
well, the Vice President of the SCCOG insisted that Los Angeles was not “another 
Munich; we are not another Montreal.”76 
However, Council members Bob Ronka and Joy Picus provided another question 
to the citywide referendum up for vote in June of the following year (1978).  Rather than 
simply asking Los Angeles residents whether or not county funds could be used – which 
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the Olympic bid committee had no desire to do to begin with – the Council planned on 
introducing the bill to allow the “city voters” to decide “whether the city should be 
prohibited from hosting the Olympics at all.”77  Argue, the head of the SCCOG, insisted 
that delaying a vote on the issue until June of the following year “would get in the way of 
the city’s being awarded the Games at a scheduled International Olympic Committee 
meeting in Athens” the following May.78  While holding a news conference at the New 
Otani to address the issue, Argue pledged to guarantee a fiscally responsible Olympic 
Games.  Both he and Mayor Bradley were resisting “exorbitant demands from the 
International Olympic Committee and the International Sports Federations.”  To drive his 
point home, Argue laid out the ultimatum that Los Angeles was either “going to do it in a 
financially responsible way, or not at all” and that the city of Los Angeles would “rather 
lose the Olympics than go forward on the wrong basis.”79 
Aside from the citywide referendum issue, the Los Angeles Olympic Bid 
Committee was also close to completing an “extremely detailed IOC and Sports 
Federations questionnaire” that the city was required to provide to the IOC by the end of 
1977.  In the same news conference, Argue informed those present that he planned to 
“answer some questions yes and some questions no.”  As well, the bid committee fully 
believed that the IOC and Federations were likely to ask for things the city was not 
prepared to provide, insisting on the questionnaire that because of their “first duty” being 
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to the “taxpayers of our city, we can’t give them everything they would like to have.”  As 
an example of the hardnosed attitude Los Angeles planned to put forth with the IOC, 
Argue noted that at the USOC meeting the previous September, the city “said no to a 
permanent velodrome, no to a closed swim stadium, and no to a fancier rowing course, 
and no to a practice track near the Coliseum.”80 
Los Angeles’ inflexible stance on hosting a financially austere Olympics was an 
acceptable desire by IOC standards.  However, it was the city’s intentions on how to do 
so that ratcheted the ire of the international organization.  The SCCOG presented its 
completed questionnaire to the IOC, who deemed some of the answers “arrogant – even 
insulting.”81  Specifically, the IOC abhorred the SCCOG’s forthrightness in declaring 
that the city would be “responsible for television rights” and avowed that “all television 
revenue” would be kept by the city to offset the cost of producing and hosting the 
Olympic Games.  The Los Angeles group was most peeved by Rule 21 of the Olympic 
Charter, which read:  
… cities entrusted with the organization of the Olympic Games shall be 
liable to pay to the IOC whatever sum the IOC shall have fixed … all 
sums arising out of the celebration of the Olympic Games belong to the 
International Olympic Committee.  It reserves the right opt grant a portion 
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to the Organizing Committee and to allocate a portion to the International 
Federations and the National Olympic Committees.82 
In a letter to the SCCOG, the IOC instructed the Southern California group that 
the overseers of the Olympic Movement had “the last word on television contracts” and 
that there was installed a “regular formula for splitting up the revenue, with a little more 
than one-third going to the IOC and the rest to the local organizing committee.”83  The 
SCCOG responded to the IOC, writing, “These provisions … are unacceptable to the City 
of Los Angeles. … All sums will be received and controlled by the OGOC [the 
organizing committee that will be formed once the Games are awarded] which has the 
responsibility for staging the Games.”84  To counter Los Angeles’ claims, Lord Killanin 
stated that the IOC maintained “contingency plans” if hosting the Olympics in Southern 
California became an impossibility, as well as noting that the leaders of Montreal’s 
Olympic Games vowed to host again in 1984 if “… [Los Angeles] could not.”85  Tom 
Keller, the President of the General Assembly of International Sports Federations, agreed 
with this sentiment, arguing, “there are many other cities which could handle the Games, 
and are geared for them, like Munich and Montreal.”86 
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The Executive Committee of the IOC deplored Los Angeles’ attempting to usurp 
the powers of the international organization.  As well, the Executive Committee went on 
record as being regretful that only having one candidate city was unfortunate, as it 
provided Los Angeles, in the circumstance, to be more aggressive than any other 
previous potential host city.87  Anton Calleia, the chief aide to Los Angeles Mayor Tom 
Bradley, attempted to clarify that SCCOG was not “challenging the authority of the 
international committee.” Rather, the Southern California group was simply signifying 
that the city of Los Angeles maintained no plans to “sign a blank check” in order to 
ensure the Games did not place Los Angeles in an unrecoverable debt for the foreseeable 
future.88 
All involved parties – the SCCOG, President Killanin, the USOC, and the General 
Assembly of International Sports Federations – convened for a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
meeting in Mexico City the second week of April 1978.  With the host city selection 
merely a month away in Athens, the Los Angeles group steadfastly refused to agree to 
“any conditions” that did not “give the city complete control over the “cost of staging the 
Games.”89  In a press conference after the meeting in Mexico City, Mayor Bradley cited 
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that Los Angeles representatives used the meeting to “acknowledge public cynicism and 
distrust” towards the city’s desire to conduct low-cost Olympics, as well to make sure 
that those on the outside did not compare Los Angeles’ bid to Munich or Montreal, “or 
any other city which had large cost overruns.”90  To avoid “runaway deficits,” the 
representatives of both Los Angeles and the IOC agreed on three key decisions.  First, the 
gathered representatives decided that Los Angeles would continue to maintain “veto 
power over any decision which could increase the cost of the 1984 Games.”  Second, the 
IOC agreed to let Los Angeles negotiate its own television rights as long as the city 
provided one-third of “all television revenue to the IOC.”  Lastly, Killanin agreed to 
waive a “rule assigning all proceeds from the Games to the International Committee.”  
After taking the first $1 million in revenues, the IOC would share – on a “sliding scale” – 
all additional revenues with the soon-to-be-created Los Angeles Olympic Committee.91  
With the agreements in place, Lord Killanin took the decisions back to the IOC which 
would decide the fate of Los Angeles’ bid during the May 17-18 gathering in Athens, 
Greece. 
At the IOC meeting of 17-18 May, Lord Killanin announced Los Angeles as the 
provisional host of the 1984 Olympic Summer Games.  The award, Killanin explained, 
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was “subject to the city’s entering into a contract in accordance with the Olympic rules 
and in the form prescribed by the IOC before August 1st.”92  Though the previous 
meeting in Mexico City laid the foundations of an agreement, no official contract was yet 
signed by either involved party.  Before any contractually binding agreement could be 
signed, Los Angeles Mayor Bradley was faced with the onus of getting the majority of 
eight votes he needed from the 15-member city council in order to approve the contract. 
By mid-May, Bradley – who the media argued was staking “his political reputation on his 
ability to return the quadrennial amateur sports event to its 1932 home” – had the public 
support of only six council members.93  More daunting than finding the two additional 
votes was overcoming the vehement opposition, led by council members Zev 
Yaroslavsky and Peggy Stevenson.  Yaroslavsky, aside from introducing a resolution 
forcing Mayor Bradley “to provide the council with full and complete information about 
all commitments made concerning the Games,” was also considering pushing a resolution 
that forced the Olympic issue to a public vote in November.94  With the IOC demanding 
an August 1 decision, a public vote in November signaled possible demise of Los 
Angeles’ Olympic aspirations.  Stevenson publically announced her intentions to vote 
against the Olympic contract, calling Mayor Bradley, “double-crossed by the landed 
gentry and aristocrats” of the IOC.95 
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Figure 2.1 John Argue explains to the media that the city may 
withdraw its bid for the 1984 Olympic Games.  Los Angeles Mayor 
Tom Bradley looks on.  From the Centre Daily Times, 19 July 1978. 
As early as 1 June, Councilman Marvin Braude was arguing that it was time to 
“pull the plug” on Los Angeles’ Olympic bid and formally withdraw its offer to the 
IOC.96  Even former Olympic athletics were writing off the Los Angeles bid.  Dwight 
Stones, the former world-record holder in the high jump, insisted “if they [SCCOG] think 
they can hold the Olympics in Los Angeles without it costing the taxpayers, they’re 
crazy.”97  The public – and, more importantly, the Los Angeles City Council – agreed 
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with Stones’ assessment.  After the tax revolt that was Proposition 13 passed in the State 
of California, leading to the closing of branch libraries in many cities, the cancelling of 
summer school sessions throughout the state, and the dilution of police and fire protection 
– it was highly unlikely that the Los Angeles Council would approve the Olympic 
measure.98  Sensing impending failure – and a looming deadline from the IOC – Mayor 
Bradley announced on 18 July 1978 his recommendation that Los Angeles withdraw its 
bid for the 1984 Summer Olympics.  Bradley argued that the city’s requirement to take 
on full financial responsibility for the Olympic Games was “unacceptable.”  Killanin 
unwaveringly retorted that the “IOC must protect itself for the future and not compromise 
itself with other cities.”99 
Mayor Bradley’s and SCCOG President Argue’s intent to explore ending Los 
Angeles’ Olympic aspirations turned out to be an effective strategy.  With no solid 
backup plan aside from general interest from Montreal, Lord Killanin informed the 
USOC that the deadline for the Los Angeles committee to agree to IOC conditions was to 
be extended until 21 August 1978.  Mayor Bradley and the SCCOG still hoped to install a 
private corporation to oversee the hosting of the Olympics, thus relieving taxpayers of the 
burden of paying for the Games.  President Killanin considered Bradley’s response to the 
IOC’s rejection of this stipulation “hasty.”  Argue asked for a face-to-face meeting with 
Killanin in hopes of extending the deadline even further – to 31 August 1978 – but was 
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turned away by the Irish lord, who reiterated, “Until the Games are awarded, it is 
essential to deal with the USOC and the mayor.”100 
With the deadline officially extended by the IOC, the USOC extended a helping 
hand to Los Angeles.  In a proposed partnership, the USOC agreed to assume the 
financial responsibility of the 1984 Olympics if hosted in Los Angeles.  William Simon, 
the treasurer of the USOC, reasoned that a Los Angeles Games was likely to produce a 
profit of $100 million, if not more, explaining, “it will not become another Montreal, 
which had construction costs of $1.3 billion.  Los Angeles needs only to build a 
swimming pool, velodrome and rowing course and to install a track in the Coliseum at an 
estimated price of $33.4 million.”  Because of the other athletic facilities already in place 
in Southern California, the city of Los Angeles could produce the Olympic Games at a 
cost of $183 million, as opposed to Montreal’s $1.6 billion.101  While the specifics were 
not yet finalized, Robert Kane –president of the USOC – further explained that the “plan 
would be for the City of Los Angeles to sign its contract with the IOC according to the 
rules” and “within that contract, it would be certified that the organizing committee of 
Los Angeles, in partnership with the United States Olympic Committee, would indemnify 
the City of Los Angeles.”102  As well, despite admitting that it was likely against IOC 
regulations, Kane announced that there existed “several large private corporations in the 
                                                
100
 Associated Press, “Los Angeles May Still Get Bid for the 1984 Olympic Games,” The Centre Daily 
Times, 20 July 1978. 
101
 Staff reports, “Free Ride,” The Washington Star, 30 July 1978. 
102
 Neil Amdur, “Los Angeles Given Olympic Aid Offer,” The New York Times, 29 July 1978. 
 65 
United States” willing to “underwrite the 1984 Summer Olympics in exchange for a share 
in the profits.”103 
Deviating from the Olympic Charter, Lord Killanin provisionally permitted Los 
Angeles to host the Olympics without the city’s taxpayers having to contribute pending 
an IOC mail ballot of its membership.  The USOC’s decision to intervene was paramount 
in the eyes of the IOC.  At the conclusion of an 30-31 August Executive Committee 
meeting of the IOC at the Chateau de Vidy in Lausanne, Killanin issued a press release 
that stated, “the IOC Executive Committee has unanimously recommended a postal vote 
to close on 7 October 1978, on the agreements…”104  Killanin also admitted that the 
Olympic opportunity should have been taken away from Los Angeles at the original 
deadline, but “many [executive committee] members wished to help” Los Angeles.105  
The completed IOC postal vote was overwhelmingly positive for Los Angeles: 74 ayes, 
three nays, and eight abstentions.106  Lord Killanin remarked, “Under the contract that 
has now been drawn, the city of [Los Angeles] is absolved of liability, which is handed 
instead to the USOC and the private LAOOC.  It may be a pattern for Olympic Games of 
the future.”107  Mayor Bradley was ecstatic at getting the Games back to Los Angeles for 
the first time since William May Garland and Paul Helms worked persistently to bring 
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the festival to the City of Angels in 1932.  Concerning the final approval of the IOC, 
Bradley remarked, “It is of great significance that the 1984 Olympics will come to Los 
Angeles without burdening our local citizens with huge tax bills.  Gone are the days of 
unbridled extravagance.”108 
 
 
2.4 The LAOOC and Onward 
 On 26 March 1979, Peter Ueberroth – the President of First Travel Corporation – 
received a phone call in his office.  On the other end was Paul Ziffren, a representative of 
the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee – the group formed to handle the 
logistics of hosting the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics.  The purpose of the call 
was to inform Ueberroth, after multiple meet and greets and interviews, that he was 
elected President of the LAOOC, and that Ziffren himself was named chairman.109 
 Shortly after Ueberroth’s election as President, tensions rose in Moscow.  The 
first hint of discontent was the White House’s – specifically President Jimmy Carter’s – 
defiance over the standard protocol of flying the American flag over the Moscow 
Olympic Stadium during the closing ceremonies of the 1980 Olympic Games.  Further, as 
a result of the American-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics, the U.S. government 
informed both the Soviet and the IOC that ‘Old Glory’ was not to fly “at any time during 
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the Games.”110  According to Monique Berlioux, the director of the IOC, the raising of 
the American flag – as dictated in the Olympic Charter – symbolized the closing of the 
Moscow Olympiad, and the beginning of the Los Angeles Olympiad.  Ignaty Novikov, 
the deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union and President of the Moscow Organizing 
Committee, quelled the swelling discussion by stating that American action towards the 
Moscow Olympics was likely to result in a Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Olympics.  
Novikov summarized, “we want to be present at Los Angeles, and we shall try to be 
present, not like the Americans.  But time can change a great deal.  We would like to 
think there will be good mutual understanding, after what has happened, and it will be a 
pleasure for us to participate, if we are invited.”111 
 Ueberroth quickly learned, however, that the Soviets were not always true to their 
word.  As well, the LAOOC Chief was soon to find out that the intrusion of politics into 
the Olympic Movement did not end with President Carter’s boycott movement.  Rather, 
Ueberroth’s vision for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games became dramatically 
intertwined with the soon-to-be elected Reagan administration’s desire to revamp and 
improve American-Soviet relations through a rapprochement foreign policy.  The hosting 
of the 1984 Olympic Games in the United States was to become an agent of that 
rapprochement.
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Chapter 3 – Going Red: Ronald Reagan’s Presidency 
“… and how stands the city on this winter night?  More prosperous, more 
secure, and happier than it was eight years ago.  …  And she’s still a 
beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, from all the 
pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, 
towards home.”1 
 
3.1 Carter to Reagan 
 At approximately 8:15pm on 4 November 1980, NBC News declared Ronald 
Reagan, with running mate George H.W. Bush, victorious in the 49th quadrennial 
Presidential election.  Reagan’s triumph over incumbent President Jimmy Carter was 
staggering in its numbers:  the Republican duo beat Carter by nearly 10 percentage points 
in the popular vote and decimated the former Naval Midshipman in the electorate system 
– Carter winning only 49 electoral college votes to Reagan’s imposing 489.  Carter’s 
turn-of-the-hour concession marked the worst election performance by an incumbent 
President since Franklin D. Roosevelt used his promise of a “new deal” to secure a 
resounding 18-percent margin of victory over Herbert Hoover.  Further, less than five 
percent difference prevented all of Carter’s few-and-far between “blue states” from 
turning red in the historic landslide, not only slighting Carter’s campaign, but also 
exemplifying the American public’s desire for a categorically different direction for the 
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“city upon a hill.”  Carter’s election thrilled foreign countries just as equally.  In a 
“humiliating and frustrating episode” for the Carter administration, the Iranians released 
American hostages minutes into Reagan’s presidency.2  The release of the hostages on 
the morning of Reagan’s inauguration was yet another embarrassing blow to the Carter 
administration.3 
The outgoing President’s blunders and dangerously ill-conceived notion of 
American public despondence was a critical factor in not only Carter’s election loss but 
also more so in Reagan’s dominating victory.  The Carter era coincided with stagnant 
wages, double-digit inflation, poor benefits for non-union workers, and an increasing 
number of lost jobs.  Carter informed the American people that the nation’s problems 
were of their own making – that a “crisis” reflected an “erosion of confidence” that struck 
“at the very heart and soul and spirit of the national will” which threatened “to destroy 
the social and political fabric of America.”4  On the other side of the spectrum stood 
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Reagan.  Born to an alcoholic, shoe-selling father5 in 1911 Illinois, Reagan derived from 
his mother an uninhibited nature of optimism and a “talent for happiness.”6  It was if 
Reagan was a “real-life Gatsby,” whom Fitzgerald declared preserved an “extraordinary 
gift for hope.”7  Reagan often exploited this characteristic as an attack against Carter 
during the 1980 presidential campaign.  During a speech in Kokomo, Indiana, Reagan 
explained that during his travels across America he “found a longing among our people 
for hope, a longing for a belief in ourselves and the vision that gave birth to this nation. 
… Jimmy Carter would have us believe that this dream is over … or at least in need of 
some kind of drastic change.”8 In direct contrast to Carter’s melancholy attitude, Reagan 
thoroughly believed that America had a “rendezvous with destiny.”9  Reagan exited his 
eight years in office a “mythic figure,” his legacy running “continuously in everyone’s 
home movies of the mind.”10  Reagan critic Haynes Johnson articulated that Reagan was 
“cocky without arrogance, wisecracking, and fun-loving” and that he “appeared to 
embody what the country identified as American virtues: informality humor, patriotism.  
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He had played the part so well so many times [in Hollywod] that it was hard to separate 
role from reality.”11  Two events in during Reagan’s terms further concreted his mythic 
position in American annals.  The assassination attempt just nine weeks after his 
inauguration elevated “Reagan into a place in the affections of his fellow citizens that he 
never lost during his years as president.”12  The other – happening four months later – 
was his firing of 11,600 air traffic controllers for walking from their position in strike.  
Johnson argued that “it was such a move of boldness and decisiveness that he was 
henceforth seen not as an engaging actor playing a president but as the kind of leader the 
country longed for and thought it had lost: a strong president, willing to take unpopular 
risks to achieve what he believed to be in the best public interest.”13 
After graduating from Eureka College with a degree in economics, Reagan 
worked as a sports broadcaster before moving to Hollywood where he appeared in over 
fifty films, including King’s Row, Bedtime for Bonzo, and Knute Rockne – All American 
(for which he forever earned the nickname “the Gipper”).  Reagan’s term as the President 
of the Screen Actors Guild during the era of McCarthyism left two ineradicable 
impressions on the New Deal Democrat: taxes were much too high and “communists 
were a real and determined threat to liberty.”14 
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 Reagan’s campaign strategy was largely based on three core concepts: (1.) the 
idea of “peace through strength” in regard to the Soviet Union; (2.) a widely-stated 
promise of a 30-percent income tax cut, a prerogative of Reagan’s “supply side 
economics” belief; (3.) a move to ensure governmental policies integrated “traditional 
and commonsense values.”15  Carter’s camp, realizing that Reagan was finding 
unexpected success, utilized the media to highlight many of Reagan’s political gaffes.  
For example, Carter grilled Reagan in the media for declaring that the American 
economy was in the midst of a depression, stating that it exemplified just “how little he 
knows.”16  In typical Reagan style, the Presidential candidate turned a Carter offensive 
into a memorable campaign moment when he responded: “A recession is when your 
neighbor loses his job.  A depression is when you lose yours.  And recovery is when 
Jimmy Carter loses his.”17 
 However, perhaps Reagan’s most crowning achievement during his time in office 
was not the effect of “Reaganomics” on the economy, but his management of the Cold 
War.  From Reagan’s election in 1981 until late 1983, the administration espoused a 
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definitive hardline stance on all matters communist.  No longer would American foreign 
policy be based on “soft” ideas such as human rights – such as it was under Carter – but it 
would move back to the core tenants of the Cold War: strength and power.18  This is no 
more evident than in Reagan’s desire to regroup the nation’s military to match the 
strength of the Soviets’ military might.  Moreover, Reagan returned to the Cold War 
policies of “us versus them,” “good versus evil,” and “democracy versus communism.”  
Moderated under the Carter administration, the hardline rhetoric used by Reagan again 
reawakened Cold War anxieties in the Soviet Union.19   
 
3.2 The Early Brezhnev Correspondence  
 Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union from 1964 until his death in 1982, became a member of the Central Committee in 
a time that ultimately hardened him.  From 1934 to 1939, Joseph Stalin conducted the 
‘Great Purge.’  Its terror reached its climax in 1936 and 1938 when “1.6 million people 
were arrested, and up to 3.6 million individuals were in prisons, labor camps, and internal 
exile settlements.”20   
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Stalin’s purges did not exclude the Communist Party itself.  Seeking those that 
had committed crimes against the state – a rather ambiguous charge – Stalin ordered 
nearly 40 percent of the Communist Party members arrested.  Most of the 1934 delegates 
to the Seventieth Congress Party were shot.  Further, “of the 139 members of the 1934 
Central Committee, 110 were killed or driven to suicide.”  Soviet historian John 
Thompson states that the empty seats left behind by Stalin’s purge were “quickly filled 
by a rough, less-educated, ambitious new generation willing to knuckle under Stalin.”21  
Of these new Congress members stood Brezhnev.  The new Soviet leader, catapulted into 
power after the removal of Nikita Khrushchev, is portrayed as the “blandest and most 
one-dimensional of all Soviet leaders.”22  Brezhnev was equally unsure of himself.  He 
criticized himself for having never dealt with foreign policy, stating, “ … here I am, 
sitting in the Kremlin and looking at the world only via papers that reach my desk.”23  It 
was a peculiar lack of confidence for a man whose lapels were filled with medals from 
his service in World War II.  Brezhnev, then 35, found himself on the front lines at 
Dnepropetrovsk when the Germans launched their attack in August 1941.  After being 
forced to retreat after ten days of resistance, Brezhnev stayed with the troops and further 
assisted in their evacuation across the Dnieper River.  He also saw later action in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.24 
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It was this upbringing in the Communist Party that Brezhnev communicated with 
Reagan.  The embittered relationship between Brezhnev and Reagan assisted in the 
materialization of a foreign policy stalemate between the two leaders.  It was this 
stalemate that largely persisted – even as Soviet leadership was continuously in flux – 
until Reagan’s change of heart in late 1983.  Brezhnev was the first of the two to put pen 
to paper.  The letter, received by the White House on 6 March 1981, opened: 
I consider it necessary to turn to you concerning the most vital problems 
that are raised by the present international situation.  I suppose you are 
aware that the Congress of our Party, which recently took place in 
Moscow, devoted paramount attention to the analysis and evaluation of 
the international situation; as well as to the practical conclusions stemming 
from this.  The question was, what should be done in order to preserve 
peace and to ensure for present and future generations the most basic right 
of each person – the right to life.  This is the essence of the decisions that 
were taken, which will determine the foreign policy course of the Soviet 
Union in the years ahead.25 
Further, the letter touched on the Soviets creating “numerous proposals for reducing the 
threat of war and for increasing international security.”  Brezhnev noted the vital 
necessity of a “safe, peaceful future” and that the Soviet Union was continuously creating 
“new, large initiatives” in order to “restrain the arms race, deepen détente, [and] 
strengthen peace.”26  Alexander Haig, Reagan’s Secretary of State, felt Brezhnev’s letter 
did not “signal any modifications” of the Soviet system and that it only served as 
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“another step in the ongoing Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign” to further 
contrast what the Soviets felt as American “footdragging” in repairing East/West 
relations.27  As well, the administration considered the letter as a Soviet attempt to put the 
“U.S. on the spot” and served as an opportunity for the Kremlin to achieve peace talks on 
their own terms.28  The socialists newspaper, Pravda, succinctly summed up the Soviet 
position on attempting to place the Reagan administration in a precarious situation, 
writing, “the captains of Western policy will sooner or later have to heed the inexorable 
realities of our time, the might community of socialist nations and the movement of 
peoples for social progress and national independence which is gathering momentum.  
No one is going to turn back the wheel of history.”29 
 Reagan had no reason to believe that the “wheel of history” was turning towards a 
worldwide socialist revolution.  Not believing a revolution was on the verge of taking 
place, Reagan felt no pressure to enter peace talks hastily, thus negating his strategy of 
“peace through strength.” The President’s response to Brezhnev’s first entreaty was as 
direct and unforgiving as his foreign policy.  Reagan argued that the elements of “mutual 
confidence and trust” were missing because of the “policy and actions of the Soviet 
Union.”  In particular, Reagan insisted that the “… USSR’s unrelenting and 
comprehensive military build-up over the past decade” and the “Soviet Union’s pursuit of 
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unilateral advantage in other parts of the world and its repeated resort to the direct and 
indirect use of force” were the sole harbingers of discontent between the two countries.30  
Reagan’s letter made it clear that the “prospects for improved East-West relations … will 
primarily [be] a function of Soviet restraint.”31  Additionally, Reagan, without 
provocation in Brezhnev’s letter, addressed the brewing issue of the Polish Solidarity 
Movement.  Directly after informing the Brezhnev that a major source of international 
tension was due to the continued Military presence in Afghanistan, the President warned 
him that any “Soviet intervention in Poland would have a profoundly negative and lasting 
impact on US-Soviet relations and on the East/West relationship in general.”32  In 
closing, Reagan suggested a “traditional meeting” at the upcoming United Nations 
gathering and marked it as a chance to “deepen” the “bilateral dialogue” between the two 
countries as well as using it as a measuring stick for the future of building a “better and 
happier relationship.”33 
 The growing rift over which country was at fault for the volatile state of affairs 
continued to grow as letters changed hands through the summer of 1981.  The Reagan 
administration received on 15 October 1981 a reply from Brezhnev regarding a 22 
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September 1981 letter from Reagan.34  In the letter, Brezhnev quickly called it 
“regrettable” that Reagan again attempted to deflect the entirety of the blame for the 
tension between the two superpowers on the Soviet Union.  Brezhnev was also agitated 
by Reagan’s insistence that the relationship could only improve after Soviet behavior 
changed, writing, “ … to proceed on this premise is to steer clearly the whole matter 
toward a deadlock.”  Brezhnev countered Reagan’s belief that a Soviet change in 
behavior was needed in order to restore trust and confidence by arguing that the Soviet 
Union was not the sole country with “serious and legitimate objections … with the 
United States and its policy.”35  Further, Brezhnev reasoned that the American 
government lacked any moral or ethical authority to decry Soviet actions when the 
American government itself “… perceives its interests everywhere and in everything.”  
Brezhnev continued, informing Reagan that only once the United States abandoned its 
“double standard” would there be an opportunity for the “stabilization of the world 
situation.”36  Lastly, the letter indicated an unsettled feeling on the Soviet part towards 
Reagan’s “incessant campaign” regarding the “so-called Soviet military threat.”  
Brezhnev argued that these “fantastic fables” had traces of reality, saying that a belief 
that any country can be victorious in a “nuclear duel” was nothing more than a 
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calculation of “insanity.”  Brezhnev signed off on the letter only after wishing the 
exchanges to serve as a medium for “establishing a better understanding on the key issues 
of Soviet-American relations.”37 
 In his 17 November 1981 reply, Reagan immediately rebutted Brezhnev’s 
claim that Soviet actions should have no bearing on US-Soviet relations, writing: 
Your letter of October 15 makes it clear once again how profound are the 
differences in our respective assessments of the causes of the major 
sources of tension in the world.  I find it difficult to accept your 
declaration that Soviet actions in other parts of the world must have no 
bearing on our relations.  Soviet actions are having a direct and adverse 
impact on American interests in many parts of the world.  As I said in my 
letter to you of September 22, Soviet resort to direct and indirect use of 
force in regional conflicts is a matter of deep concern to us as is the 
continued build up of military strength beyond the need for self defense.38  
Reagan then entered a discussion regarding Soviet action in Afghanistan and Soviet 
concern over possible American interference in Cuba.  Reagan assumed that the Soviet 
Union shared the desire for a “non-aligned, independent Afghanistan, free of any foreign 
military presence and guaranteed against any outside interference.”39 To that end, Reagan 
argued the only obstacle constricting such a reality was the “complete withdrawal of 
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Soviet forces … at the earliest possible date.”40  In what amounted to a brief window of 
reconciliation, Reagan calmed Brezhnev’s suspicions of an American invasion of Cuba 
by assuring the Soviet leader that the United States did “not seek to interfere with Cuba’s 
independence” nor was the country currently “interfering in Cuba’s internal affairs.”  
However, Reagan did foreshadow coming American foreign policy interventions, when 
informing Brezhnev that he did “find entirely unacceptable Cuba’s unremitting efforts to 
export its revolution by fomenting violent insurgencies and terrorism against legitimate 
governments in Central America.”41  At the end of the letter, Reagan again placed the 
onus of world change on the Soviet Union, charging “if the Soviet Union is prepared to 
move forward in these areas of genuine concern to the United States and its Allies, you 
will find me a ready partner.”42 
 Reagan’s National Security Council assured the President that his letter allowed 
the Soviets to have a “clear understanding” of the American approach.  Further, the 
letters clarified the “specific concerns” the administration held, as well as attesting to the 
ideal that improved relations were based only on “Soviet actions, not words, over the 
coming months.”43  It was insisted, however, that despite Reagan’s best attempts, the 
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Soviet Union still considered “terms that require Moscow to change its foreign policy” 
wholly unacceptable.44 
 Brezhnev fully validated the National Security Council beliefs in his 1 December 
1981 reply.  After two opening paragraphs espousing finding “common ground” and 
“eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons,” Brezhnev scolded Reagan, writing, “… 
frankly, the considerations advanced in your letter on specific issues are, to put it mildly, 
very far from the objective reality.”  Reagan’s argument from his first letter to Brezhnev 
concerning the Soviet Union’s “unrelenting military build up” was, to the Soviet leader, 
an incident of “double book-keeping whereby in counting the Soviet arms in question 
their numbers are made to look many times higher, and – conversely – when it comes to 
the US, such numbers are drastically understated.”45  In an effort to snub Reagan’s 
conviction that Soviet action was stalling reconciliation, Brezhnev informed the President 
of the USSR’s withdraw “from Central Europe [some] 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks, 
while the US, on the contrary, added tens of thousands of men to its troops in Europe.”  
Brezhnev, insinuating that Reagan lived in a world of fantasy, stated that those numbers 
presented the “actual state of affairs in real life.”46  It was Brezhnev’s first attempt of 
countering Reagan’s claims with substantiated facts.  In doing so, it led Brezhnev to 
propose to President Reagan a vital question regarding the shaky components of world 
affairs: “ … the question is which side is lacking in constructiveness and practical 
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steps?”47  Secretary of State Haig considered Brezhnev’s choice of words the “harshest 
Presidential level communication” received from the Kremlin in “recent years.”  As well, 
the State Department analyzed the letter as “uncompromisingly tough in rejecting” the 
American desire for Soviet change.48   
As well, Brezhnev’s approach to the rapidly evolving situation in Poland caused 
great alarm to the State Department.  In the same memorandum to the President, Haig 
suggested several unilateral actions the administration could take against the Kremlin in 
order to “deter the Soviets from brining about a major escalation” or to “impose punitive 
sanctions against Moscow following direct Soviet intervention.”49  Of the suggestions 
prompted to the President, the most broad consisted of a sweeping economic sanction 
against the USSR.  The State Department desired to “impose a total trade embargo, expel 
all Soviet commercial representatives, ban all Soviet fishing in U.S. water, discourage 
tourist travels to the USSR, suspend Aeroflot service to the U.S. and end Soviet maritime 
access to U.S. ports, suspend negotiations on economic matters, and pressure U.S. banks 
to curtail credits.”  Finally, the State Department urged the President to “carry through” 
with his “threats,” and not take any “flabby actions.”50 
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 Following Brezhnev’s fundamental question, the letter correspondence between 
the two leaders transitioned into a regular exchange regarding the Poland situation, the 
plight of seven Christians who sought refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow, the 
crisis in Lebanon, and human rights as a whole.  Reagan failed to mention any potential 
sanctions or actions against the USSR for its participation in the Poland movement.  The 
letters arriving from Brezhnev continued to prod the United States to take a share of the 
responsibility for the current state of world affairs.  One such letter in late 1982 
concerning the massacre of Palestinians in West Beirut, in which Brezhnev apportioned 
“a certain share of the responsibility to those who could but did not prevent what has 
been committed by Tel Aviv,”51 was yet another example of the Soviet leader producing 
clear references of where he thought the Americans were lacking in rectifying the world 
political order. 
 Reagan’s correspondence with the Soviet leadership was most certainly not a 
laissez-faire affair.  Even with the drafts of responses going through multiple departments 
and multiple hands, a central strategy directed the general thrust of the communication 
towards the Soviet Union.  Richard Pipes, the former director of Harvard’s Russian 
Research Center from 1968 and 1973 – and a member of Reagan’s National Security 
Council as the Director of East European and Soviet Affairs – was the chief author of 
Cold War strategy and policy.  Born into an assimilated Jewish family in Poland, Pipes 
went on to earn his PhD from Harvard University.  Pipes’ first foray into American 
political work was during his tenure with “Team B,” a constructed group of civilian 
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experts and retired military officers whose task it was to evaluate and analyze the threats 
posed by the Soviet Union to the United States.  As indicated by Pipes’ later writing, 
“Team B” found that the Central Intelligence Agency’s understanding of Soviet 
intelligence vastly underestimated Soviet military power and largely misinterpreted 
Soviet strategic policies.  After a brief stint in academe, Pipes transition into his role on 
the National Security Council, holding the position of Director of East European and 
Soviet Affairs.  His innate distaste for the spirit of détente was not lost on Reagan who 
largely would have agreed when Pipes argued that détente was “inspired by intellectual 
indolence and based on ignorance of one’s antagonist and therefore inherently inept.”52  
It was with this background and belief that Pipes authored one of the seminal building 
blocks for the Reagan Doctrine. 
  
 
3.3 Pipes’ Reagan Soviet Policy 
In October of 1981, in the midst of Poland’s Solidarity Movement, National 
Security Council member Richard Pipes presented to the Reagan administration a major 
paper detailing the foundation and ongoing construction of Reagan’s Soviet policy.  
Pipes’ policy for Reagan hinged on four key propositions, including Pipes’ belief that 
communism was “inherently expansionist” and that the only way to tide such expansion 
of communism into the free world was to either assist in collapsing the ideology or, “at 
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the very least,” to thoroughly reform it.53  In regards to collapsing the ideology, Pipes 
believed that the “Stalinist model on which Soviet Communism … is based” was on the 
precipice of a catastrophic failure brought on by multiple economic failures and 
“difficulties brought about by overexpansion.”  As well, Pipes argued that the eventual 
successors of Brezhnev were likely to split into “conservative” and “reformist” factions, 
“the latter of which” were likely to “press for modest economic and political 
democratization.”  Finally, the last proposition of Pipes’ paper noted that the best course 
of action for the United States was to “promote the reformist tendencies in the USSR” by 
either “encouraging pro-reform forces inside” the country or, conversely, increasing the 
consequences for any Soviet imperialism.54 
After presenting his scheme, Pipes laid out his overall argument and, thus, 
Reagan’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future: in order to 
regain superiority in the Cold War, the United States needed to “exploit not so much” its 
own strengths, but the Soviet Union’s weaknesses.  Pipes argued that “frustrating [the] 
adversary’s strategy and turning it against them” was an “imaginative, realistic, 
sustainable counter-strategy” that would sufficiently neutralize “the aggressive designs” 
of the USSR.  In what served as Pipes’ rationale for his strategy, he explained what he 
considered an unobjectionable truth about the Soviet Union, and Communism in general: 
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The Soviet Union decidedly is not the “vanguard of history.”  Rather, it is 
a misbegotten experiment based on nineteenth century ideas and Russian 
historic experience that bears little relationship to contemporary reality, 
and would long have been relegated to history books were it not for Soviet 
bayonets and tanks.  Communism has been unable to realize a single one 
of its stated objectives.  Its symbol is the sealed frontier guarded by 
security personnel to ensure that no one escapes.  No nation has freely 
adopted Communism; every nation on which it has been imposed has 
striven at the first opportunity to be rid of it.  Communism is a pre-historic 
relic.55  
After stating what he believed to be the universal truth about the Soviet Union, Pipes laid 
out the specifics of Reagan’s political strategy for the Communist world.  Primarily, 
Pipes urged the need for an “economic grand strategy” that allowed for maximum 
“political leverage” for the West and inflicted “anti-reformist” elements in the East.56  
Pipes failed to make any suggestions on how to develop such an economic strategy.  
Before the release of Pipes’ paper, however, the Reagan administration implemented the 
“peace through strength” initiative.  In doing so, the administration indirectly declared 
“economic warfare.”  That is, by forcing the Soviet Union to compete with the American 
military buildup, the Reagan administration was forcing Moscow to stress its economic 
abilities to the brink.  Even if Pipes had declared a concrete economic strategy against the 
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Soviet Union, the White House, in favor of the measures already implemented, would 
have likely ignored it.  To that end, Pipes and the administration largely agreed that the 
“theorists of détente” were largely misguided in “improving the performance of the 
Soviet economy as long as it adheres to the Stalinist model.”57 
 Secondly, Pipes suggested the encouragement of dissent within the USSR, 
especially among those groups “that strive for greater democracy and human rights.”  To 
do so, Pipes championed the deployment of propaganda and ideological warfare arguing, 
“propaganda will move to the forefront and become the single most effective instrument 
in our struggle Soviet expansionism.”58  The message to deliver to those behind the Iron 
Curtain, Pipes argued, should “not seek to sell the United States and our way of life.”  
Pipes felt doing so was wholly unnecessary, as the citizens of Eastern Europe already 
possessed a “rose view” of the American condition and actually considered the prospect 
of doing so “insulting” to the recipients of the propaganda.  Rather, Pipes insisted that the 
material “perform the function of a non-existent Soviet free press and inform Soviet 
citizens of the failures and misdeeds of their own government, of which they are the 
principal victims.”59  
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 Thirdly, Pipes recommended that the Reagan administration “actively resist 
Soviet imperialism outside the Soviet Bloc.”60  Of Pipes’ proposed ideas, the suggestion 
of interfering in countries such as “Angola or Cambodia” is the one most evident in 
Reagan’s foreign policy.  Pipes immediately advocated for a “transfer of arms” to those 
countries fending off a Communist revolution, and that such action be completed in a 
“clandestine fashion.”  It was also made explicitly clear in the paper that unless the “vital 
interests” of the American Republic was endangered, that there was no need “to send 
U.S. combat troops to contain Communist aggression.”61 
 Pipes concluded his manifesto by summing up the “underlying morality of 
Communists.”  In doing so, Pipes argued that it was defined as: “When I am weak, I 
appeal to the sense of fairness because this is your principle; when I am strong, I appeal 
to power because that is my principle.”62  Reagan immediately indicated his agreement 
with Pipes’ paper and quickly began to incorporate Pipes’ thoughts, beliefs, and 
arguments into his own public rhetoric.  For example, a June 1982 speech in Westminster 
Hall in London bore witness to Reagan orating: 
In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right.  We are witnessing today a great 
revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are 
conflicting directly with those of the political order.  But the crisis is 
happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of Marxist-
Leninism, the Soviet Union.  It is the Soviet Union that runs against the 
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tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its 
citizens.  It also is in deep economic difficulty … While we must be 
cautious about forcing the pace of things, we must not hesitate to declare 
our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them.  
The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure 
of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, 
universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop 
their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful 
means.  This is not cultural imperialism, it is providing the means for 
genuine self-determination and protection for diversity.63 
Pipes’ writings and beliefs on the Soviet Union – and communism as a whole – played a 
powerful and deciding factor in the creation of National Security Decision Directive 75 
and the formation of The Reagan Doctrine. 
 
3.4 NSDD 75 & The Reagan Doctrine 
 Reagan’s abhorrence of communism was not a political façade – it was a deep-
seeded and personal disavowing of all that the socialist order embroiled.  It was his 
anticommunism belief that drove Reagan into politics in the first place.  As the President 
of the Screen Actors Guild during the McCarthy era, Reagan became entangled in the 
fight over the communist influence in Hollywood.  As President of the Screen Actors 
Guild, Reagan at one time “spent seven months … meeting communists and communist-
influenced people across a table in almost daily sessions.”64  In was in these sessions that 
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the nucleus for Reagan’s distrust for the communist culture was cultivated, writing in a 
1960 letter to Playboy publisher Hugh Hefner: “I, like you, will defend the right of any 
American to openly practice and preach any political philosophy from monarchy to 
anarchy.  But this is not the case with regard to the communist.  He [a communist] is 
bound by party discipline to deny he is a communist so that he can by subversion and 
steal impose on an unwilling people the rule of the International Communist Party which 
is in fact the government of Soviet Russia.”65  Reagan came to believe that the Soviets 
faced “serious political … deficiencies that could be used to the West’s advantage.”66 
During the 1980 campaign, Reagan espoused his beliefs about the ideological weaknesses 
and his view of the absurdity of communism, arguing: 
The greatest fallacy of the Lenin-Marxist philosophy is that it is the “wave 
of the future.”  Everything about it is a primitive as tribal rule; compulsion 
in place of free initiative; coercion in place of law; piracy in place of trade, 
and empire building for the benefit of a chosen few at the expense of the 
many.  We have seen nothing like it since feudalism.67 
 Reagan’s election as President provided a new beginning in Cold War relations – 
a prospect the Soviets were quite aware of.  Shortly after the 1980 election concluded, the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service was providing the White House with continuing 
updates on the position of various Soviet leaders.  For instance, Soviet Premier Nikolay 
Tikhonov argued that the Soviet relationship with the United States could improve only 
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on the basis of “equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and not causing harm to the 
security” of either country.68  General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, at a Kremlin dinner 
speech on 18 November 1980, remarked about Reagan’s victorious campaign: 
Much in the development of the international situation will, of course, 
depend on the position of the United States.  A new president has now 
been elected there.  I shall not dwell on what was said by him and his 
supporters and opponents in the heat of the election struggle.  I can only 
state with full responsibility that any constructive steps by the U.S. 
Administration in the field of Soviet-American relations and urgent world 
problems will meet with positive response on our part.69 
In its indirect appeals to President-elect Reagan, the Politburo did nothing but attempt to 
elongate the long-held stance of détente.  The desire of “noninterference in internal 
affairs” and “equality” was nothing more than a carry over of the longstanding American 
approach to Cold War affairs.  Reagan’s campaign and tenure as California governor 
made it overwhelmingly clear that maintaining the status quo of détente was simply not 
going to happen once his administration took over Washington.  Reagan held a wildly 
differing view of how the Cold War was supposed to end in the absence of détente: “we 
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win, they lose.”70  In order to obtain this ideological victory over the Soviet Union and 
the socialist order, Reagan and his administration enacted policies and initiatives that 
became known as The Reagan Doctrine. 
 The impetus of The Reagan Doctrine was NSDD 75, largely drafted by Richard 
Pipes and built upon the foundation he crafted in his earlier Soviet strategy paper that 
Reagan drew anti-communism rhetoric from.  The basis of NSDD 75 was rather straight 
forward: “U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external 
resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of 
Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, 
outstanding disagreements.”71  Specifically, NSDD 75 focused on two major tasks for the 
United States to undertake.  First, NSDD 75 aimed: 
To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing 
effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international 
arenas – particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical 
regions of priority concern to the United States.  This will remain the 
primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.72 
Not only did concepts of NSDD 75 aim to confront and challenge communism in 
those areas on the verge of coming under the Soviet sphere of influence, it aimed to 
stimulate change within the Soviet Union itself: 
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To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change 
in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic 
system in whish the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually 
reduce.  The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in 
the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take 
into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its 
capacity to engage in aggression.73 
Functionally, NSDD 75 aimed for the United States to “modernize its military forces – 
both nuclear and conventional – so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. 
administration is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military 
posture.”74  As well, it was deemed vital that the “U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its 
commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and 
friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist 
Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special 
targets of Soviet policy.75  Further, it was determined in NSDD 75 that American policy 
would “seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients.  
It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links 
between them and the Soviet Union.  U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage 
democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these 
countries.”76 
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 Reagan wasted little in incorporating elements of The Reagan Doctrine into 
American government policy, for example, his “peace through strength” initiative.  
Reagan largely shunned the belief that peace was nothing more than the lack of war.  He 
also rejected the idealist philosophy that peace was a policy, arguing, “… peace is a goal, 
not a policy” and that “lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it 
doesn’t describe the steps we must take nor the paths we should follow to reach that 
goal.”77  Reagan’s “peace through strength” initiative focused on not only building the 
American military into an overwhelming power, but also conveying an unrelenting 
assurance that such power would be used if necessary.  Reagan backed his pledge of 
using force if necessary as early as the campaign for 1980, saying, “no one wants to use 
atomic weapons, but the enemy should go to sleep every night in fear that we could use 
them.”78 
 The Reagan administration felt that while the Soviets constructed a military 
superpower, the United States built down – the result of which was a “dangerous military 
imbalance.”79  Reagan declared America’s military depletion a “window of vulnerability” 
and argued, “that the truth of the matter is that on balance, the Soviet Union does have a 
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definite margin of superiority.”80  In his effort to increase American military strength, 
Reagan proposed the largest peacetime military budget in the country’s history.  The 
Reagan administration allocated an astonishing $33.8 billion in extra military budget 
funding and proposed an additional 7 percent per year increase in military spending 
during their first term in the White House, totaling over one trillion dollars.  The 
unprecedented amount of funding backed the military’s strategic forces, combat 
readiness, force mobility, and general needs.81  As well, the surge of finances into the 
military budget allowed for the construction of several thousand combat aircraft, the 
construction of nearly 600 Naval ships, and the development of the B-1 stealth bomber 
that President Carter cancelled during his administration.82  The immense military 
buildup did not, however, serve as a vehicle to reverse by force Communist control of 
Eastern Europe.  Rather, conservatives argued, an unrivaled American military would 
devalue the Soviets’ main strategic asset in the Cold War.  Additionally, by matching 
Soviet military might, the American government would be in a capable position to focus 
on “political, economic, and spiritual” conversations and compromises with the Soviet 
Union.83  More importantly: forcing the Soviet Union to match growing American 
military might was capable of forcing the collapse of an already fragile Soviet economy.  
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In March of 1983, President Reagan took his “peace through strength” initiative 
and desire to fiscally collapse the Soviet Union a step even further. On 23 March 1983, 
after a consultation with his Joint Chiefs of Staff, Reagan announced his decision to 
“embark on a long-range research-and-development effort to counter the threat of Soviet 
ballistic missiles and to make … nuclear weapons … impotent and obsolete.”84  The 
beginning of the effort was born on 31 July 1979 during Reagan’s visit to the NORAD 
headquarters near Colorado Springs, Colorado.  During a discussion with General James 
Hill, Reagan was dismayed to learn that there was nothing that could be done to stop a 
nuclear missile fired by the Soviet Union.85  Even with Reagan’s rapid military growth, 
the fate of the world still rested on the laurels of Mutually Assured Destruction – or, the 
immediate firing of American nuclear missiles once a Soviet first strike was verified to be 
airborne.  Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative – or “Star Wars” – was the most far-
reaching and expensive portion of Reagan’s “peace through strength” movement.  No 
longer would Mutually Assured Destruction drive the Cold War.  Reagan was now 
proposing a system that would shoot down incoming Soviet missiles and “thus protect the 
United States from a nuclear attack.”86  Even if “Star Was” was a fabrication of scientific 
nonsense, the Soviets were sufficiently impressed “by U.S. technological capabilities.”  
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986, 
recalled that the Soviet leadership viewed Reagan’s SDI initiative was a “real threat” as it 
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had the potential to render the entire Soviet nuclear program useless.87  Indeed, the 
Moscow newspaper Izvestiya admitted that Reagan’s proposed SDI program was likely to 
“impose on us an even more ruinous arms race.”88 
Reagan also stayed true to his desire to reverse Soviet expansionism as outlined in 
NSDD 75.  By the 1980s, the United States had grown concerned about the ongoing 
expansion of Soviet influence in the Caribbean.  The President had growing concerns 
regarding the Caribbean since attending a conference in Barbados in late 1982.  Shortly 
after, in a March 1983 address, Reagan proclaimed: “the rapid buildup of Grenada’s 
military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country of under 
100,000 … The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as a 
power projection into the region.”  A bloody coup by the People’s Revolutionary 
Government in Grenada in October 1983 reaffirmed Reagan’s belief, and was viewed by 
Reagan as a direct Marxist threat to both American security and interest.  On 25 October 
1983, approximately 2,000 United States armed forces launched a campaign against the 
soldiers of the Marxist regime who had staged the earlier coup.  The military campaign 
lasted three days before American superiority in numbers, power, and technology 
overwhelmed the revolutionaries.  The Grenada operation was of vast significance to the 
Reagan Doctrine – it served as the first American “effort to restore democracy to a 
communist country.”89 
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President Reagan sought to exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet Union through 
the political, economic, and military strength of the United States.  However, a series of 
events in late 1983 led Reagan to give a nationally televised address that seemed to 
counter everything the President had done in his first three years in office to bring the 
ultimate demise to the Soviet Union.  The speech, it seemed, indicated that Reagan had 
“blinked first” in the Cold War conflict.   
 
 
3.5 Morning In The Soviet Union 
Political scientist Beth Fischer argued that a series of three events in the fall of 
1983 signaled to President Ronald Reagan that American approach to the Soviet Union 
was in dire need of change, or else nuclear war would inescapable.90  The experience of 
the three events led Reagan to alter his Soviet policy in January of 1984, providing the 
administration a unique opportunity to employ the Olympics use as mediator in bettering 
American-Soviet relations. 
In the early morning of 1 September 1983, Korean Airlines flight 007 departed 
New York and, after a short layover for fuel in Anchorage, departed for its final 
destination, Seoul.  In a disastrous mistake, the pilots of the aircraft incorrectly set the 
plane’s automatic navigational system causing the aircraft, unknowingly to the crew, to 
veer over three hundred miles into Soviet airspace.  In a case of cruel luck, hours before 
the passenger airliner entered enemy airspace, the Soviet Union was tracking an 
American intelligence plane which was operating near the current flight path of KAL 
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007.  The Kremlin was dismayed as KAL 007 – believing it to be the same American 
intelligence aircraft – neared the sensitive Soviet military base near Vladivostok.  A 
Soviet fighter jet scrambled to intercept the out-of-place jet.  All efforts to identify the 
aircraft failed, including the Soviet pilot firing warning shots, dropping flares, and 
attempting to make radio contact with the astray pilots of KAL 007.  Acting on the orders 
of the Kremlin, the Soviet pilot – Lieutenant Colonel Gennadi Osipovich – fired upon 
KAL 007, killing all 269 people on board, including 61 American citizens.  Reagan 
immediately christened the Soviet action an “act of inhuman brutality.”91  Four days after 
the incident, Reagan spoke to a shocked and outraged nation: 
But, despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, and the 
evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the truth.  They have 
persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft.  Indeed, 
they have not even told the Russian people that a plane was shot down.  The 
Soviet Government calls the whole thing an accident.  I call it murder.92 
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Figure 3.1 - Reagan delivering his speech regarding KAL 007 to the 
nation. Photo courtesy of the Ronald Reagan Archives. 
 
Privately, the President was “deeply disturbed that the Soviets could make such an 
error.”93  Reagan concluded that the shooting down of KAL 007 illustrated how 
dangerously close the world was to the nuclear precipice.  The Commander-in-Chief 
questioned if such “mistakes could be made by a fighter pilot, what about a similar 
miscalculation by the commander of a missile launch crew?”94  The implications 
surrounding the KAL 007 tragedy resulted in Reagan questioning the validity and 
likelihood of an accidental nuclear war. 
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 A little over a month later, on 10 October 1983 – and with KAL 007 still a painful 
memory – the President settled in at Camp David to view a copy of ABC’s made-for-
television movie “The Day After.”  The film depicted the daily lives of those living in 
Lawrence, Kansas and followed these people as a nuclear exchange between the Soviet 
Union and the United States destroyed the town and the surrounding area.  Fischer 
remarked that “The Day After” was most certainly was not the first film to illustrate a 
nuclear holocaust – but it was the first to do it in such a graphic nature, as well as 
providing it in an anecdotal form which allowed for familiarity with the townspeople.95  
The Washington Post described the film as a “horrific vision of [a] nuclear holocaust.”96  
Others felt that the movie was making much too big of an advertising and political 
statement.  The Campaign Against Nuclear War, a group based in the nation’s capital, 
was pleased to feel that ABC was “doing a $7 million advertising job” for the group’s 
contentious issue.  Representative Edward T. Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat, firmly 
believed that the movie was bound to be “the most powerful television program in 
history.”97  The film creators’ political stance was not difficult to find as the end of the 
movie provided a printed message, white on a black background, that read: “It is hoped 
that the images of this film will inspire the nations of this earth, their people and leaders, 
to find the means to avert the fateful day.”98  The movie did, indeed, inspire such hope.  
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Shortly after the first national broadcast took place on 20 November 1983, “hundreds of 
citizens” of Lawrence itself “conducted a candlelight vigil after the broadcast, gathering 
outdoors beneath a full moon on a crisp night to hear local leaders plead for nuclear 
disarmament.”99 
The film certainly would have affected Reagan regardless.  But, with his recent 
thoughts about how an accident could cause a nuclear holocaust – much like an accident 
caused KAL 007 – the President was doubly inflicted by the film, writing: 
In the morning at Camp D[avid].  I ran the tape of the movie ABC is 
running Nov. 20.  It’s called “The Day After” in which Lawrence, Kansas 
is wiped out in a nuclear war with Russia.  It is powerfully done, all $7 
million worth.  It’s very effective and left me greatly depressed.  So far 
they haven’t sold any of the 25 ads scheduled and I can see why … my 
own reaction: we have to do all we can to have a deterrent and to see there 
is never a nuclear war.”100 
In the movie, Reagan witnessed, “in agonizing and explicit detail the effects” of a nuclear 
attack.101  He viewed citizen of Lawrence, Kansas being “vaporized or burned alive by 
the firestorm on screen” including one woman looking down “to see her legs engulfed in 
flames that quickly consume the rest of her.”  Further, the movie depicted the “ravages of 
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radiation sickness from nuclear fallout” with the end result being “virtually everybody in 
the movie” either dying or clearly going to die.102   
Reagan used the movie to argue against those in the Pentagon who “claimed a 
nuclear war was winnable.”  In short, Reagan felt those members of the administration 
were “crazy.”  Reagan again declared that the world was on a nuclear precipice.103  The 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) provided the Reagan administration the 
opportunity to speak to the nation directly after the movie.  Secretary of State Schultz 
explained that the film was a “vivid and dramatic portrayal of the fact that nuclear war is 
simply not acceptable” and that the administration was very much focused on getting 
President Reagan and Soviet leaders together for talks aimed at reducing nuclear arms to 
ensure that such a devastating nuclear event never occurred.104 
However, the KAL 007 incident clearly did not involve nuclear weapons – it 
merely invoked a fear in Reagan concerning “what could be.”  As well, “The Day After” 
was a fictional depiction of a nuclear holocaust.  However, in early November of 1983, 
the Reagan administration endured the most significant threat of an all-out nuclear war 
since the Cuban Missile Crisis.  It completed the chain of events that ultimately led 
Reagan to soften his bellicose approach to American-Soviet relations and, thus, to a 
foreign policy-shifting speech that announced a search for rapprochement with the 
Kremlin. 
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 On 8 November 1983, Yuri Andropov – then still the director of the KGB – sent 
urgent cables to his agents in Western Europe.  The purpose of the message was to 
inform the agents in the region that their KGB colleagues responsible for monitoring 
American military bases in Germany reported U.S. armed forces being placed on high 
alert.  This occurred on the heels of Andropov believing military movement between the 
United States and its NATO allies codenamed “Able Archer 83” was the first sign of an 
imminent first nuclear strike from the American government.  The KGB chief’s beliefs 
were highly misplaced, though one cannot fault his assumptions.  In actuality, “Able 
Archer 83” was nothing more than a large-scale military exercise designed to simulate 
the command and communication procedures if the Soviet Union instigated a nuclear 
war.105  The Kremlin viewed it, however, as the United States obscuring Western 
preparations for a first strike.  The size of the operation shocked the Soviet Union; it 
stretched from Norway to Turkey and westward to the Atlantic.106   
The American administration was aware that the exercise could push the 
limits of an already tense relationship with the Soviet Union. It was noted that: 
The original plan for the 1983 exercise called for Weinberger [the U.S. 
secretary of defense], members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supreme 
commander of NATO, and, in its very first discussion stages, even 
[President] Reagan and [Vice President George] Bush, to participate in 
this sophisticated test of nuclear attack procedures.  According to Robert 
McFarlane, who had succeeded William Clark two weeks earlier as the 
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White House national security advisor, this part of the “war game” was 
scaled down and most of the top-ranking civilian and military officials 
were taken out of the exercise because of concern about the high state of 
Soviet nervousness.  Nevertheless, the exercise was still more realistic 
than in the past.107 
Soviet leaders faced a critical decision:  they could either wait for the United 
States to launch its missile and then immediately respond with their own launch or, 
conversely, the Soviets could make a preemptive strike based on the assumption that 
“Able Archer’s” movements predicated a planned American launch.  Moscow responded 
by “upgrading the alert status of twelve of its nuclear-capable fighter aircraft and by 
ordering Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland to prepare for a retaliatory nuclear 
strike.”108  The Soviet Union decided to wait until a Western launch before retaliating.  
“Able Archer 83” officially concluded on 11 November and, thus, so did “the most 
dangerous moment that the world lived through since the Cuban Missile Crisis.”109 
 The Soviet response to “Able Archer 83” shook Reagan, who called it a “nuclear 
near miss.”110  As well, the President was still reeling from his viewing of “The Day 
After” and the Soviet actions in the KAL 007 incident.  Put together, the events and the 
“genuine anxiety” Reagan felt regarding how a simple miscommunication – a 
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misunderstanding from either side – could result in all-out nuclear war caused the 
President to reevaluate his approach to not only superpower relations, but also the very 
basis of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.  His hardline stance on the 
Soviet Union was the root of the Kremlin’s mistrust; it was this mistrust that caused 
“Able Archer 83” to bring the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust.  There was a 
palpable chasm of misunderstanding and miscommunication between the two world 
superpowers; it was this misunderstanding and miscommunication that assisted in the 
loss of 269 souls abroad KAL 007.  Lastly, Reagan’s ghastly visions of a nuclear winter 
descending upon his United States of America shook him to the core.  The speech 
introduced “striking changes to U.S. policy”111 and, at face value, portrayed Reagan as a 
President poised to charter a new course on American-Soviet relations built upon a 
foundation of “cooperation and understanding.”112 
 
3.6 Reagan’s 16 January 1984 Speech 
 On 16 January 1984 at ten in the morning, President Reagan spoke to the world 
from the East Room of the White House.  The purpose of the speech was to introduce 
striking changes in American policy towards the Soviet Union as deemed necessary by 
the President after the events of the preceding months.  In a change of operating standards 
within the administration, Soviet experts rather than Reagan’s regular speechwriters 
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largely wrote the speech.113  As well, the Reagan administration went through the 
procedure of notifying world leaders of the contents and scope of the speech before the 
live television address.  For example, three days before giving the speech, Reagan wrote 
to Robert Muldoon, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, to inform that the 16 January 
speech would “reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and 
realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable 
long-term relationship.”  Reagan assured the Prime Minister that the speech would make 
“clear” his “sincere desire to improve East-West relations.”114  
 Even as various world leaders received the letter providing a forewarning of the 
address, the Reagan administration was internally debating the context and specific 
composition of the speech itself.  Approximately a week before the speech was to be 
delivered, Donald Fortier – who served as Reagan’s Deputy Assistant to the President 
with responsibility for policy development115 – worried that the speech conveyed a sense 
of reassurance to the Soviet Union, but did so in “a rather simple way.”  Fortier urged 
Robert McFarlane – the recipient of his analysis – to aid the President in forming a 
speech that impressed both domestic and foreign audiences with its “thoughtfulness,” 
while avoiding the impression that the speech was aimed towards an “electoral 
                                                
113
 Fischer, 32. 
114
 Ronald Reagan to Robert Muldoon, January 13, 1983, folder “Presidential Address, US-Soviet 
Relations – Background,” box 32, John Matlock Files, RRL. 
115
 Fortier served in this capacity under the auspices of the National Security Council. 
 108 
audience.”116  Fortier also felt that speech lacked detailed explanations of what both 
countries were required to do to “seize the opportunities” of peace and compromise and, 
by changing the speech from “goal” oriented to “tasks” oriented, a entirely different – 
more direct – message would be sent to both the Soviet Union and the world at large.117 
 Reagan’s speech focused on what the United States and the Soviet Union had in 
common; the administration felt that, for far too long, the Cold War was waged only 
because of a fundamental understanding in the vast differences between the two 
countries.  The President insisted, “neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the 
differences between our two societies and our two philosophies.  But we should always 
remember that we do have common interests.”118  Most important among these common 
interests, Reagan believed, was peace.  Reagan continued, arguing, “reducing the risk of 
war – and especially nuclear war – is priority number one.  A nuclear conflict could well 
be mankind’s last.”  The President spoke of the “dangerous misunderstandings” between 
the two countries – most recently evident in Soviet panic over “Able Archer 83” – and 
argued that the “gap in Soviet and American perceptions” of each other’s actions greatly 
increased the likelihood of a nuclear conflict.  Reagan no longer viewed Soviet 
expansionism and military strength as the greatest threat to East-West relations; it was 
now war.  Because of this, the American government sought “cooperation and 
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understanding.”  Reagan continued, “We must establish a better working relationship.  
One marked by greater cooperation and understanding. [We should] rise to the challenges 
facing us and seize opportunities for peace.” 
Two of Reagan’s three strategies for realizing cooperation and understanding with 
the Soviet Union later played a monumental part in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics 
becoming intertwined with the administration’s foreign policy.119  Reagan first declared 
an immediate need for improved dialogue between the two superpowers, insisting “we 
must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as constructive as possible,” and that, “we 
seek genuine cooperation, [and] cooperation begins with communication.”  Further, 
Reagan made the case that “the fact that neither of us like the other’s system is no reason 
not to talk.”  Second, Reagan sought any measures that could build confidence between 
the two countries.120 
Reagan’s fellow Republicans largely praised the speech while it was widely 
panned by the Democratic Party – especially those seeking the Democratic nomination 
for the approaching Presidential election.  George McGovern, a Democratic presidential 
candidate, declared, “Reagan is a good television performer, but a television production 
is not a good substitute for sound foreign policy.”  Senator Christopher Dodd, a Democrat 
from Connecticut, felt that the timing of the speech was peculiar, arguing, “coming as it 
did at the opening of the Presidential election year, one’s attention is immediately 
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diverted from the substance of the speech to its political background noise.”  On the other 
side of the aisle, Republicans declared the speech flawless in its “balance between 
sounding conciliatory and challenging.”  Further, Republican Melvin Price of Illinois 
boasted Reagan’s remarks as a “great speech that touched on the main thing that people 
are thinking about.”121  As well, the international community welcomed Reagan’s change 
of stance.  For example, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada remarked “there does 
seem to be a different tone coming out of Washington,” and “[we certainly] welcome the 
commitment that President Reagan made in his speech … a commitment to genuine 
dialogue between East and West … this is welcome news, and we really hope the Soviet 
Union responds in kind.”122 
Early indications from the Kremlin provided little hope for the Prime Minister’s 
desire that the Soviet Union respond “in kind.”  Roughly four hours after Reagan’s 
speech, the Kremlin dismissed it as “propaganda,” maintaining that, “behind the 
loquacious rhetoric about adherence to limiting the arms race and love of peace, was, in 
effect, the known position of the United States administration.  The whole speech is 
keynoted by the thesis about the need for the United States to build up its strength.  All 
this shows that there is no indication of any positive changes in the Reagan 
administration’s approach to the solution of problems of limiting and reducing arms, first 
of all nuclear ones.”  Believing the speech to be nothing more than election year 
posturing by the American Chief, the Kremlin noted, “we are not giving up on the 
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Reagan administration … we are dealing with things that are not possible to wave 
away.”123 
The speech was a clear detour from President Reagan’s earlier harsh and 
unforgiving stance against the Soviet Union and the communist world.  While Reagan 
portrayed his belief that a pragmatic shift in relations was needed to secure the world 
from nuclear disaster, the Soviets believed the speech to be nothing more than Reagan 
attempting to win over moderate-to-conservative Americans frightened by Reagan’s 
fanatical views on Cold War policy.  As well, the ongoing planning and organizing of the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games stood as another anomaly to Reagan’s 
previous approach to the Soviet Union. 
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Chapter 4 – A Red Carpet for the Soviets 
“I have seen what men can do for each other and to each other.  I’ve seen 
war and peace, feast and famine, depression and prosperity, sickness and 
health.  I’ve seen the depth of suffering and the peaks of triumph.  And I 
know in my heart that man is good; that what is right will always 
eventually triumph; and that there is purpose and worth to each and every 
life.”1 
 
4.1 Reagan and the Olympics 
 Ronald Reagan was no stranger to the mingling of sport and politics prior to the 
buildup of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.  Indeed, during the battle for the 
presidency in 1980, Reagan often used President Jimmy Carter’s decision to boycott the 
1980 Moscow Olympics as an example to magnify Carter’s weak understanding of 
international politics and mishandling of a policy-shifting epoch.  However, Carter was 
quick to discern that Reagan was a staunch supporter of the boycott effort prior to 
utilizing it as campaign ammunition to lure voters to the Republican ticket.  In his 1980 
Presidential nomination speech, Carter remarked: 
When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, we moved quickly to take 
action.  I suspended some grain sales to the Soviet Union; I called for the 
draft registration and I joined wholeheartedly with the Congress and with 
the U.S. Olympic Committee and led more than 60 other nations in 
boycotting the big propaganda show in Russia – the Moscow Olympics.2 
                                                
1
 An excerpt from Ronald Reagan’s 4 November 1991 speech at the dedication of his Presidential Library 
and Museum.  For the entirety of the speech see, Peter Hannaford and Charles Dobbs, Remembering 
Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Regency Publishing, 2000), 152-53.  The last sentence of the above excerpt is 
carved into Reagan’s headstone at his final resting place overlooking the rolling hills of Simi Valley, 
California. 
2
 Taken from Jimmy Carter’s remarks while accepting the Presidential nomination at the 1980 Democratic 
National Convention in New York on 14 August 1980.  For the entirety of the speech, please see The 
American Presidency Project at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44909. 
 113 
Carter then publically addressed Reagan’s “flip-flopping” on the Olympic matter, 
concluding that: 
The Republican leader [Reagan] opposed two of these forceful but 
peaceful actions, and he waffled on the third.  But when we asked him 
what he would do about aggression in Southwest Asia, he suggested 
blockading Cuba.  Even his running mate wouldn’t go along with that.  He 
doesn’t seem to know what to do with the Russians.  He’s not sure if he 
wants to feed them or play with them or fight with them.3 
Carter’s accusations were not far-fetched.  It was noted that on 8 April 1980, Reagan 
informed the American Society of Newspaper Editors that he “could not bring himself to 
support a government order to a private citizen not to travel abroad.”  Two days later, 
Reagan reversed himself.  At a news conference in Pittsburgh, Reagan announced that “I 
support the boycott today, I supported it yesterday and I supported it when the President 
first called it.”4  In defense of his wavering, Reagan expressed sympathy for the athletes 
who would be harmed by Carter’s executive decision, saying he found himself “worrying 
about the young people who’ve worked so hard, who’ve trained hard.”5  In a separate 
interview, Reagan insisted that he could leave the attendance issue “to the athletes 
themselves” and that he did not “believe our government should be in the position of 
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saying you can’t have a visa, you can’t leave the country or go.  There’s something about 
our government telling our people that can’t leave our shores that I can’t buy.”6 
 During his own Presidency, Reagan faced a time of change within the Soviet 
Union.  Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1964, suffered a fatal heart attack on 10 
November 1982.  As the Communist leader, Brezhnev was largely favorable to the 
Western world.  He is partly credited with the advent of détente.  As well, he generally 
improved East-West relations through the inclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 
Helsinki Accords, and the installation of a direct telephone line between the White House 
and the Kremlin.  Brezhnev’s passing would not be the last Soviet leadership death in the 
lead-up to the 1984 Olympic Games.  Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri Andropov, the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee from 12 November 1981 succumbed to total renal 
failure on 9 February 1984.   
The election of Andropov shortly after Brezhnev’s death was cause for concern in 
the West as Andropov was the first KGB agent to ascend to the leadership of the 
Communist world.  His ruthlessness against those who dissented was legendary.  He was 
calculating and in complete control.  Alexander Yakovlev – later an advisor to Mikhail 
Gorbachev – felt that, out of all the Communist leaders, “Andropov was the most 
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dangerous … simply because he was smarter than the rest.”7  In the West, Andropov’s 
legacy was largely that of planning the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and as the man 
who “substituted the KGB for the Communist party in governing the Soviet Union.”8  
It was ultimately Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov’s successor, who parlayed 
with the Reagan administration and the LAOOC in the Olympic boycott mêlée after 
Reagan’s change of heart towards the Communist world.  Serving from 13 February 1984 
until his death on 10 March 1985, Chernenko allowed for the continued escalation of the 
Cold War after the rapid evaporation of détente during the Andropov years.9  Reagan’s 
four years in office saw three Soviet leaders die in office.  Reagan’s belief that all three 
were “tough, old-line Communists addicted to Lenin’s secular religion of expansionism 
and world domination” made any potentially progressive talks difficult.  When pressed 
on not yet visiting or hosting a Soviet leader in 1984, Reagan quipped: “How am I 
supposed to get anyplace with Russians if they keep dying on me?”10 
Nevertheless, the leadership of the Soviet Union continuously in flux with the 
deaths of its leaders, the Reagan administration continued to seek ways to improve US-
Soviet relations.  In early 1983 – shortly after Reagan’s substantial foreign policy speech 
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in January – Secretary of State George Shultz substantiated to Reagan that “bilateral 
dialogue with the Soviets” maintained an ever-increasing importance in the nation’s 
“overall strategy.”11  There was reason to hope, Shultz felt, for a “more stable” US-Soviet 
relationship because the foundation was beginning to develop.12  Indeed, even as Shultz 
wrote his recommendations to Reagan, several bilateral agreements between the United 
States and the Soviet Union were already agreed to or being considered.  In February of 
1983, the two countries agreed on Pacific maritime boundaries as well as regulating the 
Law of the Sea in respect to deep seabed mining.  As well, the Soviet Union and the 
United States agreed on the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York City, and 
several agreements on cooperation in the field of energy.13 
Cultural exchanges – especially after Stalin’s death in 1953 – continued to be an 
initiative welcomed by both countries.  The leadership of the Soviet Union after Stalin’s 
death crafted a program of cultural exchanges that saw a stream of Soviets artists, 
athletes, musicians, and dancers visit and perform in the West.  An official agreement on 
cultural exchanges between the two countries was reached in December 1957.  
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Following the official agreement came even further cultural exchanges: students, 
teachers, movies, and television programs.14  The ongoing cultural exchanges between 
the Soviet Union and the United States came to an abrupt halt on 1 September 1983 when 
the Soviet Union shot down KAL 007 over the USSR’s Sakhalin Island.  Shortly after, a 
planned Soviet basketball tour against seven American colleges was cancelled when all 
seven institutions vehemently argued against competing with the Soviets.15  Bill Wall, 
the President of the United States Amateur Basketball Association, stated that despite 
believing that politics had no place in sport, there “was no option other than calling off 
the series because of the outrage and demand of the U.S. public.”  Further, the LAOOC 
announced that the Soviet Union decided against sending its team to the pre-Olympic 
rowing and canoeing competition to be held in the United States just a few weeks later 
“due to [the] existing conditions.”16    The end of the exchanges floored the United States 
Olympic Committee’s Executive Director Donald Miller, who remarked, “It’s a sorry 
state of affairs that we do not have men with enough intellect to develop a foreign policy 
with some meat in it, but go back to the same thing again and again.  Isn’t there more to 
our foreign policy than amateur sports?”17 
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Despite the savagery of the incident, the Reagan administration eventually 
realized it to be an excellent opportunity to display the President’s new willingness to 
reach compromise and diplomacy with the Soviet Union.  But first, the administration 
faced a monumental struggle in appeasing American thirst for a swift and tactical 
response to the Soviet action. 
 
 
4.2 The Olympics and KAL 007 
 The Soviets made their specific requests in turn for their guaranteed attendance at 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games prior to the KAL 007 incident – that is, the right 
for Aeroflot flights to land at Los Angeles International Airport and to stop at Cuba en 
route, the docking of a Soviet vessel at Long Beach Harbor, and an unprecedented 
amount of security at the Olympics.18  Even in early 1983, Peter Ueberroth – the 
President of the LAOOC – claimed to believe that the Soviets would be in attendance 
“without question.”19  The Soviets generally muted their criticism of Los Angeles’ smog, 
crime, costs, and lack of transport.  There was no reason to believe that the Kremlin’s 
bellicose statements regarding American society – and Los Angeles’ Olympics planning 
in general – were anything more than the usual Cold War posturing.  
 Amid these easing tensions Ueberroth attended Spartakiad – an enormous Soviet 
domestic sporting festival – in the summer of 1983.20  Ueberroth, and the entire 
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International Olympic Committee, were largely pleased with the proceedings – especially 
the Soviet agreement to sign a $3 million contract for television coverage of the 
upcoming Summer Olympic Games.  With the threat of a Soviet retaliatory boycott an 
ever-present source of discussion, Ueberroth confirmed that he and Soviet sport leaders 
“discussed everything from transportation to security, to officials, to housing, to every 
part of the Games.  We are proceeding to work close together for a solution of problems.  
To my knowledge, there is no official request from the Soviet organizing committee that 
has not yet been met.”21  As well, Ueberroth suggested that a boycott of the 1984 
Olympic Games was not going to happen, after discussing it “in a sense” with the Soviet 
leaders.  He explained that both involved groups agreed, “The 1980 U.S. boycott of the 
Moscow Olympics was an incorrect political tool that was improper.”22 
 Marat Gramov, the leader of the Soviet’s State Sports Committee, was less 
conciliatory in his remarks regarding the potential of a Soviet Olympic boycott, stating: 
Los Angeles has many problems.  We are concerned mainly about three 
things – security, transportation and the small number of foreign referees.  
Los Angeles decided not to spend money to bring referees from other 
countries.  We are worried about that.  In America, to win the Olympics is 
a national priority, even if by foul means.  The problem of the referees 
sharpens the problem.23 
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The Moscow government’s daily Izvestia portrayed for Moscow readers that Los Angeles 
was a city “plagued by murders and deadly smog”24 – this despite Kremlin trepidations 
being alleviated.  There also existed substantial concern over the LAOOC’s ability to 
provide adequate facilities for the athletes.  For instance, Soviet leaders proclaimed that 
the promises from the LAOOC were “clearly just a smokescreen of promises and 
assurances.”  It was argued that the gymnasts performing at the Olympics “have no 
tunnel to walk through … but would have to walk several hundred yards under the open 
sky” both before and after their routines.25 
 The Soviets also complained about the commercialization of the Olympic Games.  
It was felt that the LAOOC was “perverting the Olympic ideals” and that “American big 
business [had] seized control of the Games.”  This was no better symbolized, the Soviets 
argued, then by the control of the Los Angeles Olympics by “millionaire Peter 
Ueberroth.”26  The Soviets still brought forth more concerns.  In mid-June of 1982, Sergi 
Pavlov – the chair of the Soviet National Olympic Committee – claimed that the Reagan 
administration had not yet “given written guarantee that the Olympic Charter” would be 
obeyed during the Los Angeles Olympics.27  Pavlov continued that Soviet participation 
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was only possible on the condition that “the necessary guarantee[s] are not only provided 
by the U.S. government but also undeviatingly observed.”28 
 The quarantine of Soviet visitors in America also bothered the Kremlin.  Many 
places in America were off limits to any visiting communist.  Disneyland, for example, 
was location non grata to those visitors from the Eastern Bloc.  It was noted by the 
Soviets that “only Rhode Island is wide open.”29  Soviet complaints were largely 
unsubstantiated as three years of work was already completed by the United States 
Department of State by the time the Kremlin voiced its displeasure to the media about 
further constraints on Soviet travel within the country.  This point of contention from the 
Soviets was incongruous, as the Kremlin was well aware of the work being done to lessen 
travel restrictions.  In an undated letter,30 the US Department of State explained: 
The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel 
restrictions for foreigners in 1941.  After attempts to secure the abolition 
of travel controls and closed areas in the Soviet Union, the United States 
reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on 
January 3, 1955.  Since then, the United States has on many occasions 
proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions.  The 
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United States avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its offer to abolish 
or reduce travel restrictions or closed areas on the basis of reciprocity.31 
The map of closed areas had not been revised since 1967, and there had been “substantial 
changes in the areas which” the American government wished to provide “access to [for] 
Soviet travelers.”32  The work of the Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet 
Affairs33 was a response met to “match the reductions in percentage of closed territory 
made by the Soviets in 1978.”34  Despite Soviet claims to the contrary, the United States 
wished to “emphasize again that its firm preference [was] to abolish all restrictions on 
free travel, and repeat its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any 
proposal to this end.”35  The United States followed through with its desire.  In a 25 
November 1982 telex to the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, Serguei 
Pavlov – the President of the USSR Olympic Committee – wanted further information 
“regarding [the] restriction of Soviet tourists wishing to attend [the] 1984 Games.”36  The 
Department of State informed William Hussey, the Director of International Relations for 
the LAOOC, that the “[United States government has no plans or intentions of imposing 
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a quota on Soviet tourism during the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.  Standard visa 
application and review procedures for Soviet nationals will be in effect.”37 
 The Soviets were not the only one hurling complaints and accusations.  Los 
Angeles police chief Daryl Gates released an “unvarnished” report “alleging the 
existence of a Soviet plot to disrupt the 1984 [G]ames with criminals and terrorists 
disguised as Russian Jewish immigrants.38  Specifically, the report authored by the Los 
Angeles Police Department suggested: 
Due to the advanced state of forensic psychology and psychiatry in the 
Soviet Union, many knowledgeable people are of the opinion that the 
Soviets are selecting dangerous criminals and sending them to the United 
States as refugees via the Jewish Immigration Quota … Intelligence agents 
and spies are infiltrating in the same way.39 
The Jewish community responded with swift and harsh criticism of the police chief.  
Peter Ueberroth lambasted Gates for expressing an unfounded concerned that could cause 
“a whole damper [to fall] on our committee’s relations with the Soviets.”40 
International Olympic President Juan Antonio Samaranch came to the defense of 
the LAOOC three days after Gramov’s remarks.  Samaranch assured the New York Times 
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“I know Soviet Union, and I know sports in this country, and I know the word boycott 
does not exist in this country.”41  Of all the remarks made, the most questionable was that 
of Ueberroth declaring that not one Soviet request had gone unmet.  To this point, it was 
simply not true.  The federal government had not yet approved Soviet flights.  The local 
port authority had not yet received approval to allow a Soviet vessel to dock at Long 
Beach Harbor.  And, finally, the funding for unprecedented security had not yet been 
secured – nor the manpower – from either the state or federal government.  The downing 
of KAL 007 made meeting those tasks even more difficult.  If Reagan was indeed set on 
bettering relations with the Soviet Union as outlined in his 16 January speech, the 
proceeding months of Olympic planning would test his personal and his administration’s 
resolve. 
 Only hours after the attack on KAL 007 took place, Reagan received a memo on 
official White House letterhead signed by “Jus.”  Calling the President by his first name, 
the colleague wrote: 
This is no time for sanctions; no way you can get even on this dastardly 
act.  Let the act itself stand as the punishment.  Make use of this tragic 
incident, it substantiates everything you have been saying all these years 
about the Russians – that they are bastards and sons of bitches not to be 
trusted, and that we must increase our military strength or they will 
continue such reckless abuses.42 
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All told, by noon on 2 September – less than 24 hours after the KAL 007 incident – the 
White House received 1,900 telephone calls, and 1,800 telegrams and mailgrams.43  
Anne Higgins, serving as the Director of Reagan’s Office of Correspondence, was 
responsible for organizing the incoming calls and letters and passing along the most 
pressing to the President.  The first telegram she presented to the President grasped the 
solemnity of the matter immediately.  The telegram, written by the parents of Irene 
Steckler – a passenger aboard KAL 007 – argued that the deaths of Steckler, and her 
husband Stuart, “were the result of the Soviet Union violating every concept of human 
rights” and that it was “an act of murder that cannot remain unpunished.”  A swift and 
firm response to the Soviets was not an act of personnel revenge for the distraught 
parents.  Rather, they asked that Reagan’s reaction “deter the Soviet Union from further 
committing such wanton murder.”44 
 Another prominent telegram was received from John Noble of Muncy, 
Pennsylvania.  Noble began with no pleasantries to the President, starting, “ … having 
been a prisoner of the Soviets for 10 years, I want to encourage you to take the firmest 
possible stand against the Soviets for their latest act of inhumanity in shooting down a 
civilian airliner.”45  Remembering his experience as a Soviet prisoner, Noble insisted to 
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Reagan that “only the strongest retaliation will be understood by the Godless 
communists.”46 
 Not all American citizens called for the “strongest retaliation” possible from 
Reagan.  Some calmly asked the President how he could “justify selling grain to 
murdering Russians” and that the United States could not “sit back silently for the sake of 
foreign exchange.”47  Others upset by the American government providing grain to the 
Soviets insisted that they would be willing to “pay $4 for a loaf of bread” if the grain deal 
came to a screeching halt and further retaliation fell upon the Soviet Union.48  Others 
provided an even further detailed analysis of how Reagan should react to the Soviet’s 
actions.  Douglas and Cathy Albrecht insisted that Reagan close all “Aeroflot offices in 
the U.S.” and expel all “Soviet personnel” and cancel all “Aeroflot landing rights under 
the U.S. jurisdiction” with the caveat of permitting declared emergency landings.49  The 
suggestions continued.  The “immediate revocation” of the “hundreds of licenses issued 
to Soviet fishing vessels entitling them to the privilege of fishing within” 200 miles of the 
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United States was another argument offered.50  As well, other potential repercussions 
included the “halting [of] U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union … with an eye toward 
finding alternative buyers to protect [American] farmers” and to “immediately cancel all 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural exchanges.”51 
 For the time being, the American government was vastly more concerned about 
gathering the facts and creating a plan of action.  An official response to the attack on 
KAL 007 would come soon enough.  Even more troubling for the administration was a 
history of the same behavior from the Soviets.  It was noted by William Clark – one of 
Reagan’s national security advisors – that the Soviets maintained a “long history, 
beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders” and that they 
also maintained a “policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have 
lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down.”52  Clark’s main cause for 
concern was an appropriate response to the disaster.  He was sure that the “decision to 
attack the airliner was made at a very high level” in the Kremlin – it was no accident.  
Clark warned “in past cases where the Soviets … committed egregious crimes they and 
their apologists … attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the force away from 
their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies.  Unless we take the offensive they 
will try to put us on the defensive.”53  Clark implored the President to reach a response 
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that signified “meaningful actions without making it appear that we [the United States] 
are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself.”54 
 Only hours after the incident occurred, Secretary of State Shultz supplied 
President Reagan with a list of diplomatic responses the American government was 
already implementing.  Shultz explained to Reagan that the “U.S. response must involve 
both steps in our bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and sustain a 
strong international response.”55  Despite there being several “gaps in knowledge of the 
events leading up to the attack,” Shultz informed Reagan that the American government 
had already dictated to the Kremlin that it was ending any future discussion on the 
“planned extension of the bilateral agreement on cooperation in transportation.”56  
However, it was a specific “initiative” that Shultz suggested that would prove to have 
grave implications for the LAOOC’s planning process, as well as providing President 
Reagan with the opportunity to deal “in good faith” with the Soviet Union as his new 
foreign policy dictated.  Shultz further informed Reagan: 
We are urgently considering steps to organize and support international 
action against Soviet civil aviation interests, particularly Aeroflot 
international operations and flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet 
Union.  For example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country 
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agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flights plans for a specified period.  
We would pursue actions of this kind within organizations such as the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, but much work will also have to 
be done in bilateral consultations with other nations.  In this connection, 
we are studying ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet 
attack by private organizations, such as the International Pilots 
Association.57 
 The Soviet side of the story was vastly different than the American version.  
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko provided to the State Department the Soviet 
explanation of KAL 007.  Gromyko stated that the “plane did not have navigation lights, 
did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the radio control service.”58  
As well, Gromyko insisted that the jets of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Defense system “tried 
to give … assistance in directing [KAL 007] to the nearest airfield … but the intruder 
plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its 
flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan.”59 
 The story as told by TASS to the Soviet people altered widely from the American 
perspective as well.  The news service claimed that the “frantic anti-Soviet hysteria 
around the disappearance of the South Korean aircraft that carried out a provocative 
flight over Soviet territory … is taking on increasingly unbridled and coarse forms.”  
Further, TASS insisted: 
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The coordinated and deliberate character of both the provocative flight 
itself and the broad anti-Soviet campaign subsequently unleashed by the 
U.S. administration is worthy of attention.  It is evident that the ‘incident’ 
was prepared in advance and that – judging by what followed – it was 
expected.  It is also indicative that the first report about the disappearance 
of the aircraft came from the CIA.60 
The Soviets also complained bitterly about the Reagan administration’s “crusade against 
Socialism” and its clearly “calculated” attempts to “raise a new wave of anti-Sovietism 
and anti-Communism by any means and discredit the Soviet Union.”  The Soviets 
considered it nothing short of American “propaganda.”61  Indeed, American media 
coverage of the KAL 007 incident was, in some aspects, sensationalist.  Time Magazine, 
for example, portrayed on its 12 September 1983 cover three Soviet fighters exploding 
the passenger aircraft in midair.  The actual attack was less brutal, though no less 
terrifying.  The investigation into KAL 007 concluded that after the missile exploded on 
KAL 007, the passengers had upwards of 12 minutes to don oxygen masks before impact 
into the ocean.  They were conscious throughout the ordeal.62 
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Figure 4.1  -  Time Magazine’s depiction of three Soviet fighters 
shooting down KAL 007 was a prime example of “American 
propaganda” that the Kremlin was upset about.  The cover is part of 
the Smithsonian Institute’s digital collections.  
 The Soviet response was an angry retort focused on answering Reagan’s 
comments made earlier the same day.  The President sat before the cameras for a national 
television office at nine in the morning, censuring the Soviets for not admitting to the 
atrocity: 
But despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, 
and the evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the 
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truth.  They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the 
Korean aircraft.  Indeed, they have not even told the Russian people that a 
plane was shot down.  The Soviet Government calls the whole thing an 
accident.  I call it murder.  Let me repeat the stark words of the Soviet 
pilot himself after signaling that his missile warheads were locked on the 
airliner: ‘I have executed the launch.  The target is destroyed.  I am 
breaking off attack.’63 
The shooting down of KAL 007 was just one piece of the puzzle that shifted 
Reagan’s beliefs on how to shape foreign policy with the Soviet Union.  In just over a 
month from his address on KAL 007, Reagan had a private viewing of the apocalyptic 
“The Day After.”  The nuclear scare as a result of ‘Able Archer 83’ was still two months 
away.  But, even in the first week of September 1983, Reagan’s address hinted at the 
possibility of a more reconciliatory approach to the Soviet Union.  Near the end of his 
address, Reagan made the plea that: 
Realism and strength are essential.  But, if we are to succeed in our long-
term effort to bring the Soviets into the world community of nations, we 
must also talk to them.  We must tell them what the world expects from 
them: The world expects their cooperation in building a safer place to 
live.64 
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 The Kremlin’s further response to Reagan’s television appearance was no less 
hostile, calling it an “aggressive, hateful speech and that, again, any United States’ proof 
was “just another fabrication.”65  More damaging to the Los Angeles Olympics than 
Reagan rhetoric was the President’s swift and decisive action against the Soviet Union 
and Aeroflot.  In his speech, Reagan noted that his administration was “suspending 
negotiations on several bilateral agreements” that were under consideration prior to the 
incident.66   
Reagan’s actions were even more severe than those the speech outlined.  In a 
personal letter to the Civil Aeronautics Board, Reagan wrote: 
The Soviet attack on Korean Air Line Flight 7 on Sept. 1, 1983, which 
results in the loss of 269 innocent lives, calls for a united, firm, and 
measured response from the international community.  Toward this end, I 
have initiated a number of measures in coordination with other nations … 
to insure that measures are taken against the Soviet Union to secure 
appropriate redress for this tragic loss of lives and property.  I … have 
determined that it is in the essential foreign policy interest of the United 
States to take resolute action against the Soviet air carrier Aeroflot.  I have 
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determined that it would be appropriate to reaffirm the suspension of 
Aeroflot flights to and from the United States.67  
Rather than simply restricting Soviet airlines from entering American airspace, the 
President opted to forbid U.S. carriers from booking connecting flights with Aeroflot – 
even those away from American soil – and to sever any and all ties with the Soviet 
company.  Further, Reagan ordered the closing of Aeroflot offices in both New York and 
Washington, D.C. and stipulated that the Soviet employees of both offices be expelled 
from the country.68  White House spokesperson Larry Speakes announced that the 
President planned to continue enforcing the sanctions “for a period of time, in part 
dependent upon the extent to which the U.S.S.R. demonstrates its willingness to honor 
essential standards of civil aviation, makes a full account of the downing of the airliner, 
and issues an apology as well as compensation to aggrieved parties.”69   
 The barring of Soviet aircraft from American airspace raised other issues.  For 
instance, nearly a year before the KAL 007 incident, the Los Angeles Organizing 
Committee reached a deal with the East German airline Interflug to fly a Berlin-Ganer-
Los Angeles route to transport athletes and cargo.  Further, the security for the flights was 
to be provided by both the LAOOC and the regional Airport Authority.  Questions were 
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sure to proliferate about the legality of other communists controlled countries landing 
their aircraft at Los Angeles International for the Olympics.70 
Outrage over the Soviets’ action drew public response from America’s allied 
countries.  In England, the Times of London newspaper noted  “public revulsion” over the 
Soviets.  The Daily Mail dubbed it nothing short of a “massacre in the sky.”  Paris 
television made KAL 007 the lead story.  The disaster dominated the main newspaper 
headlines for several days.  Quotidien de Paris ran the headline “USSR Owes 
Explanation to the World.”  Rome’s  Il Tempo called the incident “a deliberate mass 
murder.” Oslo’s Dagbladet considered it “coldblooded murder.”71  The French 
government wished to “study Reagan’s proposals” and opted to “see what might emerge 
from” the scenario.  As well, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe said it was 
important “for humanity to find a way of responding which will prevent such a thing 
from ever happening again,” but deferred any discussion on whether London would halt 
Aeroflot flights and argued that any such treatment should be “taken collectively, not just 
on the basis of one nation’s decision.”72 
Reagan’s resolution on Aeroflot operations in the United States clearly obstructed 
the preparations being completed by the LAOOC.  In a 9 December 1983 memorandum, 
                                                
70
 Meeting notes, “East German INTERFLUG Airline meeting with Los Angeles Airport Authority,” 8 
December 1982, folder “Government Relations – State Department,” Box 64, LAOOC Records, CEYR 
Library, UCLASC. 
71
 Memorandum, Foreign Media Reaction to the Downing of KAL Flight # 007, Charles Z. Wick to All 
Cabinet Members, 2 September 1981, folder “Korean Plane Incident (1),” Box 45, Michael Deaver Files, 
RRL. 
72
 William Drozdiak, “Allies Shy Away From Curbs on Aeroflot Flights,” The Washington Post, 7 
September 1983. 
 136 
Richard Levine – a member of Reagan’s National Security Council – wrote that because 
of the “President’s KAL decision” all “Soviet proposals” regarding Aeroflot flights and 
vessels in Long Beach Harbor were to be rejected by both the State Department and 
“other concerned agencies.”73  
Shortly after Reagan’s decision, the Soviets attempted to circumvent the 
American government entirely.  Soviet requests for special Aeroflot flights to the United 
States and the berthing of a ship were forwarded directly to the LAOOC.  The LAOOC 
then forwarded the request on to the White House.  In effect, the LAOOC was acting as a 
middleman for the Soviets.  Kenneth Hill – the Federal Security Coordinator for the 1984 
Olympics – wrote to Reagan’s Chief of Staff to express concern over the issue: 
Several officers at State have expressed skepticism with the proposed 
procedure of having these requests filtered through the LAOOC.  They 
were not objecting to the fact that you would be making the final decision, 
only that the interjection of the LAOOC circumvents normal established 
procedures.  They correctly indicated that the LAOOC would be, in effect, 
a broker for the Soviets and would not necessarily have the best interests 
of the U.S. Government at heart.  The concern the LAOOC has over 
whether the U.S.S.R. will boycott or not, manifests itself in their doing 
everything possible to placate the Soviets.  Consequently, one must remain 
wary of the LAOOC’s motives.74 
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In a 23 December 198375 memorandum to Michael K. Deaver –  Reagan’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff and the official White House Liaison to the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympics – it was noted that “Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los 
Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the 
US Government.”  Further, Derwinski was greatly concerned that the Soviets were 
attempting to bypass Reagan’s stance on Aeroflot flights as a result of KAL 007 by 
seeking to get “clearance” directly from the LAOOC.76  To that end, Derwinski wished 
for Deaver to inform the LAOOC that “the [State] Department” would “accept only those 
Soviet … requests that are submitted in these official channels” and that it would “not 
accept requests submitted through the LAOOC.”  Finally, Derwinski wanted to inform 
the LAOOC that such requests were “properly government-to-government matters” and 
that the Los Angeles group needed to decline any requests to “act as a middleman” for 
the Soviets.77 
Deaver’s role in the Reagan administration went much deeper than just being 
Deputy Chief of Staff.  It is said that Deaver was the “modern-day equivalent of a 
courtier to the king.”78  The Deputy Chief of Staff was small and quiet but maintained an 
intense passion for his work and for Reagan, whom he worked for in various capacities 
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for nearly twenty years by the time Reagan entered the Oval Office. Deaver “revered 
Reagan and … drew intense pleasure from working for him.”79  After two decades of 
serving Reagan’s political needs, Deaver inherently knew what the President valued, 
what he wanted, and how he desired to get there.  Born on 11 April 1938 in Bakersfield, 
California, Deaver had a long association with President Reagan dating back to 1967 
when he joined Governor Reagan’s staff as the coordinator of state administrative 
activities.  Within Reagan’s White House administration, Deaver was considered a 
“conciliator, a facilitator and a bearer of vital messages to the president.”80  That is likely 
an understatement for what Deaver really was to the President.  One commentator was 
more correct in deciphering the relationship, arguing that Deaver was a “shadow, a 
surrogate son, a confidante and comforter for the President.”81  Deaver was an “uncritical 
admirer of Reagan” and seemed to operate “without an existence of his own” as if he 
thought “in terms of Reagan … [not] in terms of Mike Deaver.”82  Near the end of the 
1980 Presidential campaign, Deaver turned to another campaign worker and informed 
how he accomplished a successful relationship with the soon-to-be-President, saying, “I 
am Ronald Reagan.  Where do you think he got most of those ideas over the years?  
Every morning after I get up I make believe I am him and ask what should he do and 
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where should he go.”83  The advice that Deaver doled out became highly valued by the 
President.  Deaver also had the penultimate blessing of Nancy Reagan, whose opinion of 
people President Reagan prized more than anything.84  After Deaver succumbed to 
pancreatic cancer in 2007, the former First Lady recapped that Deaver “was the closest of 
friends to both Ronnie and me in many ways, and he was like a son to Ronnie.  We met 
great challenges together.”85 
 Deaver was certainly a man of intense influence as the Soviet Union Olympic 
matter began to come to a head.  However, other members of the Reagan administration 
saw the potential damage that not working with the Soviets could create just as well.  
Robert McFarlane, writing directly to the President, stated: 
While our intelligence community believes that the Soviets want to 
participate, there is a distinct risk that if we fail to suspend our sanction 
and some of our normal restrictions on Soviet officials in order to permit 
them to support their team on a non-discriminatory basis, they will refuse 
to come and charge us with reneging on commitments to deal with 
participants on an equal basis.  Given the high profile of the Olympics 
throughout the world, our decisions have the potential to create a major 
public stir if they are seen as unfairly handicapping Soviet participation 
and thus precipitating a Soviet refusal to attend.86 
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The issue of allowing Aeroflot flights to enter American airspace for the Olympics was 
not the only ailment facing the LAOOC.  Indeed, the unfortunate incident did eventually 
help lead President Reagan to a friendlier stance towards the Soviets.  But that was still 
nearly four months away.  In the time preceding Reagan’s 1984 January reversal, the 
LAOOC and the American government faced challenges from both the Soviets – who 
still desired to berth a vessel for the Olympics and from a group named the Ban The 
Soviets Coalition.  It was this group that led to other difficulties, including the Soviet 
demand to place extra financial and manpower emphasis on protecting the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympic Games. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 The Ban The Soviets Coalition (BTSC), The Gruzia, and Olympic Safety 
 In a 16 December 1983 memorandum to Michael McManus, Jay Moorhead87 laid 
out the scenarios, background, and needs for the White House to fulfill the Soviet 
requests.  First and foremost, Moorhead asked that the “Soviets requests … be viewed as 
consistent with the Olympic Charter” and that “any country making a similar request to 
the U.S. government … be handled in the same way as the Soviet request.”88  Moorhead 
also informed McManus that the President’s administration had to understand that any 
policy enacted that restricted the use of the “Soviet ship and airplanes” would likely 
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“create a negative environment for the LAOOC and the U.S. government” and, in doing 
so, “create the possibility of an Eastern Bloc boycott.”89  Doing what was necessary to 
accommodate Soviet requests, Moorhead argued, would show a “U.S. willingness to 
abide by the Olympic Charter and facilitate the logistical support of foreign Olympic 
teams.”  However, Moorhead made one point to McManus that cut to the root of the Los 
Angeles Olympic problem.  Moorhead felt that “U.S. policy regarding the Olympics 
(including the Olympic Family) and U.S. State Department policy regarding the Soviets 
should be viewed as two distinct policies.”90  Moorhead was arguing that the shooting 
down of KAL 007 was a State Department problem – not an Olympic problem.  
Moorhead saw no reason why the KAL 007 incident should have a bearing on the 
planning and hosting of the Los Angeles Olympic Games.  
Further, in a 23 September 1983 letter from Derwinski to Lawrence 
Eagleburger,91 it was noted that the California legislature passed a “resolution urging 
President Reagan and Congress to bar the Soviet from the 1984 Olympics” as a measure 
of punishment for the shooting of KAL 007.92  Derwinski urged Eagleburger to help steer 
the State Department toward abiding by the Olympic Charter, similar to what the 
LAOOC was resigned to doing.  That is, for Los Angeles to host the Games, both the 
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LAOOC and the American government had to “abide by the International Olympic 
Committee rules and bylaws.”93  In doing so, Derwinski asked Eagleburger to lead the 
charge to separate sport and politics and to “not bar Soviet or other athletic participants 
otherwise eligible to enter the United States for the Olympics.”94   
With the American government not budging from its convient Olympic Charter 
stance, those American citizens against Soviet participation in the Olympic Games were 
forced to show the Russians that they would not be welcomed on American soil.  
American dissent was evident to the Russians when Soviet-flagged cargo ships were 
boycotted – sometimes on the verge of violence – at harbors as a way for American 
citizens to voice their dissatisfaction over the Gruzia potentially docking in Long Beach 
Harbor for the duration of the Olympics  
 The docking of the Soviet vessel at Long Beach Harbor inherently created loftier 
logistical complications than the acceptance of Aeroflot flights into Los Angeles 
International Airport, particularly as the ship was scheduled to “arrive in port [between] 
July 15-20 and remain there” until the Olympic flame was extinguished above the Los 
Angeles Coliseum.95  With berths for 480 passengers, the vessel became a hotbed of 
discussion with American government officials, particularly on the subject of providing 
adequate security for those aboard and protecting American interests from possible high-
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tech espionage operations originating from the ship.  The White House was informed that 
“state and all concerned agencies, including Coast Guard [representatives from] the port 
security committee” were adamantly “opposed to any port call by a Soviet vessel, 
passenger or otherwise, during the Olympics that would involve the vessel berthing in 
Los Angeles/Long Beach for an extended period of time.”96  This position changed little 
since 1982, when James D. Phillips, the Director for Communications and UNESCO 
Affairs, informed William Hussey of the LAOOC that, according to the Pentagon, the 
docking of a Soviet vessel set a “bad precedent for other countries who may make similar 
requests and [would undermine] the fraternal interaction which is part of the Olympic 
Village concept.”97  As well, Phillips argued that the ship created “national security 
considerations in the region which would pose obstacles for a [United States government] 
approval of the request.”98 
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Figure 4.2 – Upset Americans protested the arrival in Los Angeles 
Harbor the Soviet freighter Novokuibyshevsk.  From The Los Angeles 
Times, 7 September 1983. 
Indeed, the securing of the Soviet ship was going to be both a logistical and financial 
nightmare.  This was no more apparent than seven days after KAL 007 was shot from the 
sky.  The Soviet cargo ship, Novokuibyshevsk, was forced to anchor in a channel just 
short of the Los Angeles Harbor “after a telephone threat was made against the ship in the 
wake of the Soviet attack on a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 that killed 269 people.”99  
Kenneth Cho, one of the many protestors of Korean descent, argued that, “like a grown 
adult who plays with a 3-year-old, the Soviets … attacked a defenseless jet plane, and 
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they should be punished.”100  Valdis Pavlovskis, the president of the Baltic American 
Freedom League, swept up in the “groundswell of anger and disgust in [the] country” 
over the attack on KAL 007, announced his organization would “not rest until President 
Reagan” banned “all Soviet goods from our shores, and closes the Soviet Consulate in 
San Francisco.”101  The Baltic American Freedom League later called the Soviet Union 
an “outlaw nation” and organized a semi-successful vodka boycott throughout the United 
States.102   
 With the assistance and protection of the United States Coast Guard which 
declared a 100-yard “safety zone” around the vessel, Novokuibyshevsk steamed into Los 
Angeles Harbor.  However, the problems were not yet over.  The harbor’s longshoremen 
– citing concerns of personal safety – refused to unload the ship’s cargo of lumber and 
vodka.  Amid the protestor’s signs – some of which read “Communists Make Lousy 
Neighbors” and “Damn Russian Savagery” – Sergeant Robert Leventhal of the Los 
Angeles Harbor Department made it clear that it was likely the vessel would have to 
leave the “wharf without being unloaded.”103  The protection of the vessel, its cargo, and 
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its crew required the services of dozen of armed police officers and several Coast Guard 
and Harbor Patrol boats.104 
 After an eight-day ordeal, the protestors finally claimed victory.  With its lumber 
and vodka still aboard, the Soviet vessel departed from Los Angeles in search of a 
friendlier port.  The ordeal further underscored the need for tight security at the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympic Games.  As well, it helped to drive attention to another pressing issue 
that both the Reagan administration and the LAOOC were facing – the Ban the Soviets 
Coalition. 
In response to the shooting of KAL 007, four California businessmen, led by 
David Balsiger, formed the Ban the Soviets Coalition105 on 26 September 1983.  In his 
autobiographical sketch, Balsiger refers to himself as an “investigative researcher and 
author of 18 non-fiction books.”106  His creation, the BTSC, was a right-wing faction 
composed largely of evangelical Christians and East European émigrés.  It was a small 
but vociferous group.  Balsiger, currently serving as an advertising executive who 
previously campaigned unsuccessfully for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
felt that the Olympics were a chief part of Soviet foreign policy, culture, and society.  
The BTSC’s goal to stop the Soviets from coming to Los Angeles would be considered a 
damaging blow to Soviet prestige and honor. 
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Balsiger started a media onslaught.  Resurrecting the ghastly images of KAL 007, 
Balsiger argued, “those who say we would be punishing the Soviet athletes for something 
they didn’t do have completely forgotten that 269 civilians aboard Flight 007 were 
punished with death for something they didn’t do.”107  The BTSC’s activities quickly 
gained the attention of the LAOOC and Ueberroth.  Responding to the Coalition’s desires 
to ban the Soviets from the Games, Ueberroth reiterated that the LAOOC remained 
“opposed to any efforts to punish athletes for political purposes” and that “history has 
proven that the use and abuse of athletes for political purposes only hurts young 
individuals rather than achieving any political gain.”108 
Balsiger and his group also obtained the assistance of California Senator John T. 
Doolittle, who Balsiger announced as a “national co-organizer” in a 19 October 1983 
press release.109  Senator Doolittle successfully sponsored a resolution in the California 
Legislature that asked President Reagan and Congress to “take appropriate actions to ban 
the Soviets from the 1984 Olympic Games.”110  On the passage of the resolution, 
Balsiger remarked, “Considering that California is the host state of the 1984 Olympic 
Games, it took tremendous courage by Senator Doolittle and his colleagues to pass this 
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resolution which we hope will become the model for other states.”111  However, the 
assistance from the California state government rapidly eroded.  Shortly after approving 
the resolution, the same lawmakers revoked it, arguing that they were “unaware of the 
proposed sanctions against the Soviet Union” written into the document.112  Balsiger 
considered the backtracking legislature “sucked into becoming Soviet apologists at the 
beckoning of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee.”113 
 Failing to succeed at the state legislative level, Balsiger turned his attention to 
writing letters to those in the federal government.  In one such letter to Kenneth Hill – the 
Federal Security Coordinator for the Los Angeles Olympics – Balsiger explained: 
Our Coalition efforts are focusing on getting the Soviets to voluntarily 
withdraw from the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, as well as encouraging 
the International Olympic Committee to ban them to prevent any potential 
outside acts of violence and terrorism that could injure or kill innocent 
athletes and spectators.  Based on reliable information, we are concerned 
about the distinct possibility that the Soviets will inspire and orchestrate 
various terrorist activities both during and after the Games.114 
Balsiger contended that the “various terrorist activities” would likely be carried out by 
the “5,000 KGB agents and operatives” that would be descending on “Southern 
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California disguised as Olympic spectators, with assignments to include spying, 
subversion, and recruitment of agents to buy, steal, or search out U.S. high technology 
secrets.”115  Balsiger ended his letter by criticizing American foreign policy for letting 
the Soviets succeed “in keeping Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty from covering the 
Sarajevo Games” and for “now [being] ready to grant unrestricted travel privileges to 
Soviet Olympic journalists, most of which are actually KGB agents wanting open access 
to high tech manufacturing areas of Southern California.”116 
 To achieve its goal, the BTSC announced a petition campaign to get 1,000,000 
signatures from American citizens who wholly supported the idea of banning the Soviets 
from the Los Angeles Olympics.  One month after the petition drive began, the BTSC 
had obtained only 10,000 signatures.  Realizing that the swell of public opinion, partially 
roused by the BTSC, was not sufficient to topple Olympic plans, Balsiger again turned 
his indignation to those in the White House.  Writing to Michael Deaver – Reagan’s 
Deputy Chief of Staff – Balsiger claimed that the “ethnic, religious, political, social, 
education, and veterans organizations” that made up the BTSC maintained “a sphere of 
influence that extends to 30 to 40 million people – the good people of America who still 
believe that principle and the value of human life takes precedence over sporting 
events.”117  Balsiger then got to the thrust of his letter, foreboding: 
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Needless to say, nearly all of our Coalition support groups are the same 
groups that made the difference in Ronald Reagan’s going to the White 
House in 1980.  They not only voted for him but were the activists who 
worked to turn the votes out for him at the polls.  These groups supported 
Mr. Reagan because of his strong anti-Communist stand, his conservative 
platform, and his firm position on moral, family, and Judeo-Christian 
issues … However, if our Coalition, its support organizations, and the 
millions of Americans supportive of our “ban the Soviets from the 
Olympics” are totally ignored and alienated by the White House, there will 
be a significant loss of support for the President’s reelection among those 
grass-roots movers and shakers that really made it happen in 1980 and can 
make it happen again in 1984.118 
Deaver took his time in sending his reply to Balsiger and the Coalition.  Largely 
ignoring the BTSC’s concerns, and completely avoiding the veiled threats regarding 
Reagan’s reelection as President, Deaver remained steadfast that the Olympic Charter 
was the deciding factor in American relations with the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the 1984 
Olympics, writing: 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the body which governs all 
Olympic activity, awarded the 1984 Summer Olympic Games to Los 
Angeles on the condition required by the International Olympic Charter 
that all national participants recognized by the IOC be admitted to the 
Games.  Should the United States, as host government, bar any team from 
participating, it could no longer be the host … I can assure you that 
Federal officials plan to be completely even-handed in dealing with all 
participating teams, neither giving special treatment to nor imposing 
special conditions on any team … We are currently studying the question 
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of travel by Soviet journalists in areas we have designated as closed to 
travel by Soviet official personnel in light of Olympic hosts commitments 
as well as of policy and security considerations.119 
 
Figure 4.3 - Highwayman Willie Nelson was but one of high-profile 
Americans who took a stance against potential Soviet participation in 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.  His shirt reads "Let The 
Russians Play With Themselves." 
The Reagan administration had no recourse in quelling the BTSC.  Protected by 
Constitutional rights, Balsiger and his group were free to demonstrate and protest as they 
pleased.  The BTSC, deemed a “group of nobodies” by Ueberroth, started mailing leaflets 
and letters directly to Gramov, the leader of the Soviet’s state sports committee in 
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Moscow.  As Ueberroth later recalled, “the literature used inflammatory language and 
promised to greet the Soviet athletes with anti-Soviet demonstration.”  Further, “one 
handout … graphically depicted an American eagle clawing the back of a Russian 
bear.”120   The BTSC claimed it was only the “first of several aggressive actions” and 
that the group planned to continue its attempt to “directly and indirectly influence the 
Soviets to scuttle their Olympic participation plans.”121  Balsiger claimed that he was 
attempting “to tell the Soviets that they’re not really welcome here but if you do come, 
don’t blame us if you reap the whirlwind.”122   
 
Figure 4.4 - David Balsiger was the face of the Ban The Soviets 
Coalition, a collection of people dubbed by Peter Ueberroth as 
"nutty."  From the USA Today, 1 May 1984. 
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Balsiger and the BTSC’s brash statements were worrisome for both the Reagan 
administration and the Soviet Olympic delegation.  Soviets concerns over the actions of 
the Coalition only increased when Balsiger announced that his group planned on aiding 
Soviet defectors during the Olympics.  The BTSC planned to post “between 25 and 50 
billboards around the city, written in Russian and German, touting a toll-free telephone 
number for defectors to call.”123  The Coalition claimed to have hundreds of safe houses 
around Los Angeles where defectors could be “sprinted away until a press conference” 
was organized.  As well, Balsiger claimed that members of the BTSC “infiltrated the 
LAOOC at the lower levels” where they could easily contact “Eastern-bloc athletes, 
spectators, and, to a lesser degree, journalists and security officers.”124  With the uproar 
over their cargo ship still a vivid memory, the Soviets requested an unprecedented 
amount of security to protect the ship and its athletes, but also to actively assist in 
avoiding Soviet defections to the West. 
While the Reagan administration would soon prove to be more than hospitable in 
providing adequate security for the Soviet vessel, there were plans already in place to 
insure the safe and dignified treatment of any Eastern-bloc athlete wishing to defect.  No 
such mention of these established procedures were public knowledge to the Soviets.  In a 
State Department memo, Chief William DeCourcy noted that: 
                                                
123
 Marshall Ingwerson, “Security at ’84 Games: the defection brouhaha,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
30 April 1984. 
124
 Ibid. 
 154 
We believe a State Department representative should be present during 
any interrogation or de-briefing of a potential defector or asylee in 
conjunction with the Olympics.  This would allow the State Department to 
determine whether or not we have an interest in a particular case and to 
protect those interests at a very early stage.  This would also allow us to 
make an independent assessment of the situation in an expeditious manner 
and to relay information to the decision makers in the State 
Department.125 
As the Olympics neared, further details were provided to those working the Games.  
Specifically, it was instructed that “upon arrival [of the defector], the FBI should be 
notified” and “defectors are given a high priority and an agent” would respond nearly 
immediately.  As well, it is highlighted that “under no circumstances should a defector be 
released to a representative of his country.”126 
 Special interests groups also wrote to the LAOOC to insist that the organizing 
committee not infringe on the rights of athletes who desired to seek information 
regarding political asylum.  In one such case, Agrupación Abdala – an anti-communist 
organization of primarily Cuban-born students founded in the United States in 1968 with 
chapters at several universities across the United States – wrote to the organizing 
committee to voice its concerns.  Eduardo Navarro, the Attorney at Law representing 
Abdala, asserted that “experience has shown that frequent asylum requests have been 
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made by Cuban athletes during visits abroad.”127  Navarro then extended the concerns of 
Abdala: 
The Cuban exile community is very concerned not only for the safety of Cuban 
athletes but also for potential infringement on their right while in the U.S. to seek 
information regarding political asylum request and the honoring of such requests.  
Specifically we would like to know whether any organization or agency to your 
knowledge or under your control has made or is in the process of making any 
agreement with the Cuban government, or any other government or agency acting 
in its behalf, for the purpose of attempting to regulate said requests for political 
asylum.128 
 While the Kremlin had its own concerns over Eastern European and other athletes 
under the Soviet sphere of influence seeking political asylum, a more overt issue at the 
moment was the safety and security of the Gruzia while docked in Long Beach Harbor.  
After the situation regarding Novokuibyshevsk, any concern emanating from the Kremlin 
was valid.  The Gruzia was originally scheduled to utilize Berth 53 at Pier 2.  The Coast 
Guard quickly rescinded these accommodations, arguing that Berth 52 was “easier to 
protect seaward, and probably more easily protected landward as well.”  Further, the 
Coast Guard felt that Berth 52 was capable of being “completely isolated from other, 
ongoing commercial activities.”129  Security personnel remained an issue.  The Coast 
Guard recommended a security force comprised of members of the Long Beach Police 
                                                
127
 Eduardo J. Navarro to Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, 18 March 1983, folder 
“Government Relations – State Department,” Box 64, LAOOC Records, CEYR Library, UCLASC. 
128
 Ibid. 
129
 Memorandum, John M. Ordway to Remains Classified, n.d., folder “Soviets-Aeroflot and Gruzia,” Box 
7, John Kenneth Hill Files, RRL. 
 156 
Department, a SWAT team, and Coast Guard patrol boats.130  The additional manpower 
to adequately secure the Gruzia was likely to be in excess of “$250,000 for a 30 day 
stay.”131  While the LAOOC was open to handling the additional expenses, the Reagan 
administration used the opportunity to provide the funding for the necessary security to 
the protect the Soviet Union and its interests at the Olympic Games.132  Reagan’s 
willingness to fund the security operations to protect Gruzia and Soviet athletes was yet 
another visible sign of his desire to reach rapprochement with the Kremlin. 
 
4.4 Reaching Compromise and Quiet Diplomacy 
In a 31 January 1984 official action memorandum for the President, McFarlane 
outlined all the Soviet Olympic requests for the President’s final decisions.  The opening 
of the memorandum explained to the President that all involved governmental agencies 
arrived at a consensus regarding the Soviet issue.  First and foremost, McFarlane stated, 
“granting the requests for Aeroflot flights would require suspending application of 
sanctions applied to the Soviets following the KAL shoot-down.”133  Additionally, 
McFarlane instructed the President that all involved agencies agreed that the Soviet 
requests raised “national security concerns.”  
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Despite the apprehensions, the inter-agency consortium agreed on two substantial 
decisions.  First, McFarlane expressed to the President that “all agencies recommend” 
that the Aeroflot flights “be granted for the specific purpose of bringing the Soviet 
‘Olympic family’ to Los Angeles, but without the right to land elsewhere in the U.S. or to 
carry third-country passengers.”  Second, the multitude of governmental agencies had no 
objections to “brief calls” by a Soviet vessel to “deliver and, subsequently, pick up 
equipment and passengers.”134  McFarlane informed Reagan that the agencies were 
“strongly opposed to allowing the ship to stay at the pier in Long Beach Harbor during 
the Games, primarily because of the potential for electronic eavesdropping.”  McFarlane 
provided Reagan with a counter-point to the Soviet requests, correctly stating that “no 
other country” had been granted “permission to keep a ship in port during the Olympics, 
and so long as we allow no one else in port during the Olympics … we should be able to 
defend refusal of this request as non-discriminatory. Although the Soviets are likely to 
press the point, we believe that permission should not be granted.”135 
Directly after McFarlane presented his case, four recommendations were 
presented to President Reagan to either approve or disapprove with a simple checkmark 
and his initials.  Reagan’s decisions on these recommendations undoubtedly indicate that 
“compromise and quiet diplomacy” weighed favorably in his thinking regarding Los 
Angeles Olympic matters.  The recommendations, provided in their entirety, along with 
Reagan’s decisions and hand-written notes are as follows: 
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That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which 
every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, 
unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.136 
Reagan check-marked and initialed “OK.”  However, those with knowledge of the 
Olympic Games will certainly be aware that McFarlane’s first recommendation is loosely 
bound to the Olympic Charter in regard to the non-discrimination of any country or 
athlete.  Reagan had already publically declared his intentions of following the Olympic 
Charter throughout the planning stages of the Los Angeles Olympics.  Thus, it would 
have been highly unorthodox for Reagan to veto McFarlane’s first recommendation.  
Reagan also approved McFarlane’s second recommendation, which read: 
That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team, 
but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate 
stops in the U.S.137  
Reagan’s approval of Soviet athletes being allowed air voyage to Los Angeles via 
Aeroflot, despite the international sanction in place as a result of KAL 007, was a prime 
example of his deploying “compromise and quiet diplomacy” with the Soviet Union.  
Reagan’s decision on McFarlane’s third recommendation called for further cooperation 
with the Soviet Union.  The original third recommendation read: 
That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the 
Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is 
granted to other countries.138 
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Reagan did not approve the recommendation as written.  In his handwriting, Reagan 
edited the proposal to read: 
That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the 
Games, but not and to remain at the pier during the Games subject to the 
establishment of all possible measures designed to minimize intelligence loss, 
unless and that such privilege is granted to other countries.139 
Reagan’s decision – and subsequent edits to the recommendation – went against the 
advice of his administration as outlined in the introduction to the action memorandum.  
With the caveat of providing measures to counter intelligence loss, Reagan provided yet 
another compromise to the Soviet Union.  Reagan’s decision denied the requests made by 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Coast Guard, and local Los Angeles 
law enforcement to reject the Soviet ship a stay in the Long Beach.  
Despite the trepidations of his administration, Reagan made every possible effort 
to assure that the Soviet Union’s requests were addressed and in large measure satisfied.  
However, Reagan’s response to McFarlane’s fourth recommendation is perhaps the most 
telling political action taken by the President to illustrate his aim for “compromise and 
quiet diplomacy” through the lens of the Olympic Games.  The final recommendation of 
the memorandum read: 
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That the LAOC[sic] be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests 
through normal diplomatic channels.140 
Reagan check-marked and initialed “no” on the recommendation.  While Reagan 
provided no explanation, his decision to allow the Soviet Union to deal directly with the 
LAOOC rather than through “normal diplomatic channels,” such as the State Department, 
says much about the sense of trust Reagan was attempting to build with the Kremlin.  
Reagan further cemented his desire to reconcile with his signing of National Security 
Decision Directive Number 135141 approximately two months later.  The main object of 
NSDD 135 read: 
The United States desires the complete success of the 1984 Summer 
Olympic Games and seeks to ensure the full and equitable participation of 
all accredited members of the Olympic Family in accordance with 
Olympic rules and applicable laws of the United States.  We will also 
ensure the safe passage of Soviet Aeroflot flights to and from our country 
and the visit of the Soviet vessel Gruzia to the Long Beach Harbor area.142  
Reagan’s friendly signals were not without stipulations.  In the case of Aeroflot flights, it 
was required that the aircraft “be subject to boarding for Customs and other inspections 
as a condition for entry to the United States” and that “US Escort crews for each Aeroflot 
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flight” to “ensure Soviet compliance with all US routing procedures.”143  In the case of 
Gruzia, it was to be treated as a “commercial … not a public vessel” and “subject to 
boarding and searches at such times as necessary by the Coast Guard or other 
authorities.”144  As well, “radio transmission from the Gruzia” was to be highly 
prohibited while it was “berthed in Long Beach Harbor.”145 
 On 14 March 1984, Deaver wrote to Ueberroth to deliver the news.  Deaver 
started the letter notifying it was written on behalf of President Reagan, and that he 
wanted to “reiterate the United State Government’s firm commitment to the complete 
success of the 1984 Summer Olympic Games to be held in Los Angeles.”146  Deaver then 
informed Ueberroth that he was “pleased to inform … that the United States Government 
is agreeable to a reasonable number of Olympic-related charter flights by the Soviet 
airlines ‘Aeroflot’ and to the berthing of the Soviet passenger vessel ‘Gruzia’ in Long 
Beach Harbor during the Games.”147 
Even with the quite understandable stipulations attached, Reagan’s compliance 
marked a significant change in position.  Reagan’s decision to allow Aeroflot flights, the 
berthing of a Soviet vessel, including supplying the necessary funding to maintain its 
security, and allowing the LAOOC direct communication with the Soviet Union went 
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wholly against the wishes of several of his closest administration figures, thus further 
accenting his quest for compromise, understanding, and quiet diplomacy with the Soviet 
Union after years of extended defiance, mistrust, and misunderstanding between the two 
world superpowers.  However, the Reagan administration’s dealings with the Olympic 
Games – and conceding to Soviet demands – stood in evident contrast to Reagan’s long-
held beliefs regarding the Soviet world.  And, it should be recognized that Reagan 
returned to a harsh view of the Soviets after the Olympic Games were concluded.  Near 
the end of his Presidency in May 1988, Reagan spoke: 
Freedom is the right to question and change established ways of doings 
things.  It is the continuing revolution of the marketplace.  It is the 
understanding that allows us to recognize shortcomings and seek 
solutions.  It is the right to put forth an idea, scoffed at by the experts and 
watch it catch fire among the people.  It is the right to dream – to follow 
your dream or stick to your conscience even if you are the only one in a 
sea of doubters.  Freedom is the recognition that no single person, no 
single authority or government, has a monopoly on the truth, but that 
every individual life is infinitely precious, that every one of us put on this 
world has been here for a reason and has something to offer.148 
Without directly condemning the Soviets, Reagan implicitly made it clear that the Soviet 
Union lacked the basic rights and freedoms found in the West.  Reagan’s unfettered post-
Olympics rhetoric reached its apex at Berlin’s Brandenberg Gate three years after the 
Soviets announced their ultimate boycott of the Olympic Games.  In hindsight, it is clear 
that despite Reagan’s earlier remarks on 16 January 1983, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic 
                                                
148
 Robert C. Rowland & John M. Jones, Reagan at Westminster: Foreshadowing the End of the Cold War 
(College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2010). 
 163 
Summer Games remained an extreme anomaly in Reagan’s overall approach to the Soviet 
Union.  After years of doing all that he could to do bring harm to the Soviet Union 
politically and economically, the President suddenly conceded to all the demands 
requested by the Kremlin in order for the Soviet Bloc to attend the international sporting 
festival. 
 There are two likely scenarios that explain why Reagan’s decision regarding the 
1984 Olympics largely go against the tide of his anti-communist beliefs.  First and 
foremost, the Olympic Charter fundamentally dictates that neither country nor athlete can 
be discriminated against.  More importantly, the Olympic Charter also states that there is 
to be absolutely no political interference within the Olympic Games.  Despite the 
altruistic rhetoric of the Charter, the Reagan administration’s eventual intrusion into 
Romanian politics in order to secure the country’s attendance at the Olympic Games 
shows a general lack of caring for the Olympic Charter by Reagan and his men.  A more 
likely explanation for Reagan’s about-face in Soviet Union foreign policy was his sincere 
desire to witness California – the state that he governed prior to becoming President – 
host a successful Olympic festival after Jimmy Carter’s Olympic boycott movement of 
1980 and the financial disaster of the 1976 Montreal Olympics.  It was, ultimately, 
Reagan who, as Governor of California, provided much more support for Los Angeles’ 
bid for the 1976 Olympics than had President Carter at the time of the bid process. Wrote 
Reagan: 
Thanks to its topography and climate, California has long been an 
international sports center.  Los Angeles has the facilities and experience 
necessary for mounting a global athletic event of the scale of the 
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Olympics, and it has the population and resources to insure its success.  
We Californians are fully cognizant of the honor that would be accorded if 
Los Angeles is selected as the setting for the International Games, and 
sincerely hope you will extend this honor and responsibility to Los 
Angeles.149  
Regardless of President Reagan’s reasoning, his handling of the Soviet demands provided 
the opportunity for the ideals of the Olympic Movement to rise above the Cold War 
ranker and rhetoric.  However, it was now the Kremlin’s turn to accept Reagan generosity 
and attend the Olympics.
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Chapter 5 – And The Games Go On 
“Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between 
our two societies and our philosophies, but we should always remember 
that we do have common interests and the foremost among them is to 
avoid war … If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be 
peace.  Together we can strengthen peace … and know in doing so that we 
have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, 
indeed, of people everywhere.  Let us begin now.”1 
 
 
5.1 Awaiting Soviet Response 
 The Reagan administration laid the groundwork for the Soviet Union to attend the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games.  Reagan permitted the entry of Aeroflot 
flights into Los Angeles despite the strict sanctions developed over the Soviet downing of 
KAL 007.  A Soviet vessel was allowed to dock at Long Beach Harbor despite public 
outcry and governmental hand wringing over the possibility of Soviet espionage systems 
operating from the bowels of the ship.  Finally, an unprecedented amount of security was 
projected to protect Soviet athletes from such radical groups as the Ban The Soviets 
Coalition.  The Reagan administration could only wait and see if the Kremlin accepted 
Reagan’s olive branch and attend the Los Angeles Olympics. 
 Indeed, much was being said about the potential of a Soviet boycott.  International 
Olympic Committee President Juan Antonio Samaranch was satisfied in his belief that 
there would not be another political disturbance during the Los Angeles Games, saying 
that the Soviet “sports leaders have shown extraordinary leadership to date in not mixing 
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sports and politics.”2  Vladimir Mikoyam, the press officer of the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington, D.C., mirrored this sentiment, informing the public that the “boycott rumors 
are false.  The Russian people … do not mix sports with politics.”3  However, when the 
Soviet Central Committee named Oleg Yerimishkin as the official Soviet Olympic 
attaché and submitted his credentials to Washington, they were shocked when his visa 
was denied on the grounds that he was a known KGB agent.  Ueberroth remarked on the 
situation: 
Most committee officials thought it should not have been at all surprising 
or shocking that the Soviets, who have been expressing such concern 
about security, would want to have an experienced security man in charge 
of their preparations.  After all, the Israelis and Turks also had intelligence 
men deeply involved in the preparation of their teams.4 
Despite the blunder on the part of the State Department, there remained optimism 
that the Soviets would still attend the Olympic Games – especially after receiving 
unilateral approval of their requests by the Reagan administration.  In some cases, it was 
thought the Soviets would attend not because of Reagan’s overtures, but because  “no 
Strasbourg goose intended to yield foie gras suitable for royal tables was ever force-fed 
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more copiously, or more carefully, than the Soviet athletes.  If he does not win the gold 
medal, or score right up there, it is simply a failure of Russian biology.”5 
Marat Gramov, the chairman of the Soviet Committee for Physical Culture and 
Sports, however, mounted a campaign of “Russian railing” over the barring of the 
Olympic attaché, as well as saying that the Olympic were generating nothing but “anti-
Soviet propagandistic hysteria” in the Western world.6  The tensions between the two 
countries reached a climax in early April of 1984 when the Soviet National Olympic 
Committee called for “an emergency meeting of the International Olympic Committee” 
to review what it called “gross violations” of the Olympic Charter.7  The Soviets 
continued to complain that their athletes were likely to be “persuaded to defect” and that 
Los Angeles was a “center of crime and pornography unsafe for Soviet citizens.”8  As 
well, the Kremlin remained insulted over Yermishkin’s denied visa, arguing that the State 
Department was “refusing entry to those they considered undesirable.”  And, finally, the 
Soviets remained convinced that “various reactionary political, émigré and religious 
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groups had teamed up to organize provocations and even to physically victimize Soviet 
officials and sportsmen.”9 
Gramov continued to claim that a Soviet boycott of the Games was unlikely, 
arguing that the Soviets were “not going to boycott the Olympic Games” and the main 
concern of the Kremlin was “the creation of normal conditions for Soviet athletes and 
strict compliance with the rules of the Olympic Charter.”10  Despite his claims to the 
contrary, Gramov announced the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Games on 8 May 
1984.  The official Soviet proclamation began: 
The National Olympic Committee of the USSR made an all-around 
analysis of the situation around the Games of the 23rd Olympiad in Los 
Angeles and studied the question of the participation of the Soviet sports 
delegation team … the National Olympic Committee of the USSR voiced 
serious concern over the rude violations by the organizers of the Games of 
the rules of the Olympic Charter and the anti-Soviet campaign launched 
by reactionary circles in the United States with the connivance of the 
official authorities.11 
The Soviet press release continued, saying, “the cavalier attitude of the U.S. authorities to 
the Olympic Charter, the gross flouting of the ideals and traditions of the Olympic 
Movement are aimed directly at undermining it.”12  The final Soviet declaration on the 
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boycott issue was both historic and abrupt: “in these conditions the National Olympic 
Committee of the USSR is compelled to declare that participation of Soviet sportsmen in 
the Games of the 23rd Olympic in Los Angeles is impossible.”13 
 The official Soviet announcement was released through TASS at 10:00 am 
Eastern Standard Time.  Only hours after the Soviet boycott was announced, IOC 
President Samaranch met with President Reagan in a previously scheduled meeting.  The 
President handed Samaranch a letter to hand-deliver to Chernenko, then Soviet Premier.  
Reagan attempted to sway Chernenko on the issue of attending the Games, writing: 
I have personally assured President Samaranch and Mr. Peter V. 
Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, 
that the government of the United States is thoroughly committed to 
upholding the Olympic Charter and fulfilling its responsibilities as the 
host nation of the Games of the XXIII Olympiad.  I know that you share 
my enthusiasm for this great sporting event, and I am looking forward to 
seeing all the outstanding athletes of the world marching behind their flags 
in Los Angeles on July 28.  I consider sport to be one of the finest 
opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand 
each other.  The American people look forward to serving as hosts for the 
Olympic Games and to providing an hospitable climate in which the 
athletes can perform to the best of their abilities.14 
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Figure 5.1 - President Reagan meets with IOC President Samaranch. 
Peter Ueberroth sits to the left of Samaranch. Deputy Chief of Staff 
Michael Deaver is to Reagan’s right. From the Los Angeles Times, 8 
May 1984. 
The letter was clearly a formality at this point.  Despite Reagan accommodating each and 
every one of their requests, the Soviets decided not to attend the Olympics largely based 
on the issues of security and safety.  Years later, Vitaly Smirnov, one of the two Soviet 
members of the IOC, reminisced: 
By 1984, we were at liberty to express an opinion to a degree … My 
opinion was that we should go to Los Angeles.  I said, ‘If we don’t go, 
we’ll win nothing.  If we want to achieve the political effect of sporting 
success, we should send our athletes.’  I have to say that in Russia, the 
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security scare was genuine.  Even my mother said to me, ‘Why are you 
going to America?’  Yet, I still believe we ought to be there.15 
The U.S. State Department quickly countered the Soviet decision.  John Hughes, 
speaking on behalf of the State Department, argued, “Our conscience is very clear … the 
United States clearly regrets the Soviet disregard of public opinion around the world, and 
the charges made in the TASS statement are utterly without merit.”16  Michael Deaver 
solidified these claims in a letter to Peter Ueberroth that informed “details of [the] 
arrangements” regarding Aeroflot flights and other Soviet requests “were conveyed to 
Soviet Olympic and Soviet Government officials on several occasions in March and 
April, 1984.  These Soviet officials were also invited to discuss further any specific 
questions or problems the Soviets might have about these arrangements.  They expressed 
none.”17 
 Reagan, meeting informally with the White House press corps, provided his 
reaction to the Soviet withdrawal, saying: 
Well, now, I am not supposed to answer any question here in this photo 
opportunity, but I think I can’t let that go by with saying that, like so 
many, I have a great feeling of disappointment.  I’m sorry that they feel 
that way, and I think it’s unfair to the young people that have been waiting 
so long to participate in those Games.  And it ought to be remembered by 
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all of us that the Games more than 2,000 years ago started as a means of 
bringing peace between Greek city-states.  And in those days, even if a 
war was going on, when an Olympic year came, they called off the war in 
order to hold the Games.  I wish we were still as civilized.18 
Secretary of State George Shultz largely agreed with Reagan’s thoughts on the matter, 
writing: 
We had, in fact, bent over backward to meet all Soviet concerns and had 
developed a plan for 17,000 people to be involved in Olympic security.  
We were prepared to spend up to $50 million to assure security, $1 million 
of which was for the Soviet delegation, including $500,000 to be certain 
that the Soviet ship that was to house their officials and supporters would 
have the utmost security.  The Soviets knew all this.  Nevertheless, 
claiming inadequate security for their athletes, they announced that they 
would not attend the Olympics … We knew security was not the problem: 
the Soviet action was their way of retaliating against Jimmy Carter’s 
decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow … The Soviet 
statement implied that Moscow hoped to heighten tensions and hurt 
President Reagan’s chances for reelection.  That didn’t pan out for 
Moscow.19 
                                                
18
 Informal Exchange With Reports on Soviet Withdrawal From the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, 9 May 
1984, Online Digital Collection, RRL.  For the entirety of the exchange, please see 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/50984f.htm.  It needs to be noted that Reagan’s 
recollection of ancient Greece and the Olympics is not wholly accurate.  In an oft-claimed myth, it is stated 
that the ancient Greeks proceeded to call a truce during the Olympic Games, thus effectively suspending all 
wars.  Reagan’s belief in this myth was slightly off base.  The ancient Greeks never stopped the wars – 
fighting continued throughout the Olympics.  However, the Olympic “truce” guaranteed only the safe 
passage for both athletes and spectators traveling to and from Olympia.  For an outstanding history of 
Greek athletics, including information on the ancient “Olympic truce,” please see Rachel Robinson, 
Sources for the History of Greek Athletics (Ares Publishers: Chicago Ridge, Illinois, 1980). 
19
 George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Deal (New 
York City: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993). 
 173 
The continued media campaign on the American side further commented that the 
government had done everything possible to avoid such a boycott scenario, including 
fulfilling Soviet demands.  Michael Deaver, in a letter to LAOOC President Peter 
Ueberroth, explained that the American government kept in constant contact with the 
Soviets in order to dispel any myths or misunderstandings the Kremlin maintained about 
the hosting of the Los Angeles Olympic Games.  Deaver detailed to Ueberroth in the 
letter that on 27 April 1984, Ed Derwinski met with Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov “to 
give the Soviet Government official and direct assurances of what we were prepared to 
do for Soviet visitors.”  It was highlighted to Isakov that “several of the proposed actions 
constituted major exceptions to the procedures normally followed for Soviets nationals – 
procedures which are instituted by the U.S. Government in reciprocity for Soviet 
restrictions on Americans in the USSR.”20  Ueberroth was aware of the work the 
American government did to meet the demands of the Los Angeles Olympic Games.  In a 
letter to Secretary of State George Shultz after the ceremonies concluded at the Los 
Angeles Coliseum, Uberroth praised that the work of the White House and the 
Department of State “set a policy guideline for others to follow.”21 
While it is difficult to single out individuals for praise in what was 
essentially a “team” effort, I do particularly wish to mention Ed Derwinski 
… who together with staff members John Kimball and Susan Clark 
provided sensitive political estimates and advice as needed; established a 
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network of Olympic Contact Officers at Foreign Service Posts on whom 
we could rely for assistance around the clock; provided essential back 
stopping against Soviet moves to encourage more nations to join the 
boycott; and last July established an Operations Center in Los Angeles to 
ensure that the Department could respond on the spot to pertinent 
problems.22 
In public, the story was much the same: the Soviet decision was inexplicable.  In a 
press guidance sheet regarding the Soviet boycott, White House administrators were 
given speaking points to the most likely questions to be asked.  Regarding general 
comments on the Soviet announcement, the official stance of the White House remained: 
We regret that the Soviets have chosen to make a decision for which there 
is absolutely no justification.  It has disappointed hundreds of millions of 
people around the world.  President Reagan had committed the United 
States to live up fully to its obligations under the Olympic Charter as host 
country.  The vague allegations contained in the Soviet statement provide 
absolutely no support for charges that the United States has not met is 
obligations.23 
The White House was to hold firm that the Soviet charges were “wholly without 
foundation,” commenting that, “in recent months, we have made exhaustive efforts to 
meet Soviet concerns about their participation in Los Angeles, and we have met those 
concerns.”24  Indeed, Reagan had unilaterally approved the entry of Aeroflot flights and 
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the docking of a Soviet vessel, as well as authorizing a staggering sum of money to fund 
the security forces needed to protect Soviet athletes and interest.  Because of this, the 
White House argued, “the Soviets have not been hindered by the United States or 
hampered from participating freely in the Olympics.”  As well, members of the 
administration received instruction to remind the media of the other steps required to 
approve the Soviet requests, such as authorizing “entry of Aeroflot and shipping 
personnel in advance of the Games to do preparatory work” and undertaking “full 
responsibility for security of the Soviet ship at a preliminarily estimated cost of 
$500,000.”25  Lastly, the White House desired to emphasize that agreeing to Soviet 
requests was part of a greater goal of improving Cold War relations.  On this topic, the 
general discussion points read: 
It is not new for the Soviets to have done something that disappoints and 
shocks millions of people all over the world.  We will continue our efforts 
to put relations with the Soviet Union on a more constructive basis for the 
long term.  We hope they will respond.  If they do not, it will be because, 
as with their decision to walk out of the Geneva Arms Control Talks, they 
have chosen the path of self-isolation and raising tensions.26 
The Soviet decision not to attend the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games placed 
the onus of examination on the Olympic Movement.  Political intrusions on the Olympic 
Games were not new occurrences.  The 1936 Olympics were largely a festival for Nazi 
propaganda.  In 1956, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon all boycotted the Games in protest of the 
                                                
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
 176 
Israeli-led takeover of the Suez Canal.  At the same Games, Spain, Holland, and 
Switzerland declined to attend in an act of solidarity against the Soviet’s wanton invasion 
of Hungary.  In 1972, Palestinian terrorists massacred Israeli athletes in order to make a 
political statement.  In 1976, several African nations boycotted after failing to get New 
Zealand expelled over its association with the apartheid system in South Africa.  
However, as noted by The Christian Science Monitor’s Larry Elridge, “ … now that the 
major powers are getting into the act … one can’t help wondering where it will all 
end.”27  If the process of political implications continued to intrude on the Olympic 
Movement, Eldridge questioned if the Games could “survive” being treated as a “political 
ping-pong ball.”28  David Casstevens, of the Dallas Morning News, largely concurred 
with Eldridge.  In an “open letter” to Chernenko, Casstevens concluded that, “the 
Olympics have become little more than a showcase for nationalistic bluster and political 
strife.  The Games may not be worth saving.  They’re certainly not worth begging you, 
Mr. Chernenko, to reconsider.”29 
The Soviets continued to insist that the decision not to attend was based on 
“inadequate security arrangements” and the U.S. Government’s continued encouragement 
of “extremist organizations to create unbearable conditions for Soviet athletes.”  The 
Central Intelligence Agency disagreed with that sentiment.  Along with several 
individuals from the State Department, the CIA concluded that the Soviets planned to 
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boycott regardless of what Reagan approved, “partly in retaliation for the American 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Games.”30  Meanwhile, others in the administration felt that 
Reagan’s generosity and approval of all Soviet requests placed the Kremlin in a 
compromising situation.  By attending the Games, the Soviets could have been helping 
the President’s reelection effort.”31 
Nonetheless, the speculation of the Olympic Movement’s demise was altogether 
misplaced.  Hours before the Opening Ceremonies of the Los Angeles Olympic Games, 
President Reagan addressed American athletes at 1:52pm Pacific Standard Time at 
Heritage Hall on the campus of the University of Southern California.  In his address, 
Reagan explained, “I want you to know just how proud all of us are to have you 
representing us.  And when you see us out on the stands waving Old Glory, you know 
that we’re waving it for you.”32  Reagan continued: 
… this year’s Fourth of July celebrations were extraordinarily joyous 
occasions.  There is a new patriotism spreading across our country.  It’s 
affection for our way of life, expressed by people who represent the width 
and breadth of our culturally diverse society.  And the new patriotism is 
not a negative force that excludes, but a positive force, an attitude toward 
those things that are fundamental to America, that draws together our 
freedom, our decency, our sense of fair play as a people.  In so many 
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ways, you represent this new spirit.  I know I speak for all your fellow 
citizens – no matter what political persuasion, no matter what race or 
religion, no matter if poor, middle class, or affluent – when I tell you that 
you are our team.33 
Reagan concluded his speech by reprising one of his most recognizable film roles during 
his years in Hollywood – legendary Notre Dame All-American George Gipp.  He asked 
the American athletes to set their “sights high, and then go for it” and do it “for 
yourselves, for your families, for your country – and will you forgive me if I just be a 
little presumptuous – do it for the Gipper.”34  After his speech, the President traveled to 
the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum to open officially the Los Angeles Olympics.  In 
doing so, Reagan became the first American President to do the honor.  Afterwards, the 
President traveled to his ranch in Santa Barbara, California for a three-week vacation. 
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Figure 5.2 - President Ronald Reagan officially opening the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympic Summer Games with wife Nancy at his side.  From 
the Official Report of the XXIIIth Olympiad. 
 Without the Soviet and East German athletes in attendance at the Olympics, 
American athletes won an enormous number of medals – just as the Soviets did when 
American athletes were not competing in Moscow four years earlier.  The Americans 
especially dominated the swimming competitions.  The men’s team won nine of the 
fifteen gold medals while the women won eleven of the fourteen.  In total, the United 
States won a combined 174 medals, 83 of them being gold. 
 Aside from being yet another political intrusion on the Olympic Movement, the 
Los Angeles Games played a much more important – and pivotal – role in Olympic 
history.  After being the only city to bid for the right to host the 1984 Olympics, Peter 
Ueberroth and his Committee were able to turn a profit off of hosting the Olympics – the 
first in modern history.  The Olympic torch relay alone netted $10.9 million after 
telecommunications company AT&T provided a “substantial sponsorship fee covering all 
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costs.”35  The finances from the torch relay were then donated to the YMCA, Boys Clubs 
of America, Girls Clubs of America, and the Special Olympics.36  As well, the city of 
Los Angeles was left with millions of dollars’ worth of new and majorly upgraded 
athletic facilities.  Several of these facilities directly influenced major colleges and 
universities, such as the velodrome at California State College and the Olympic swim 
stadium at the University of Southern California.  But, what interested other cities the 
most was the profit turned.  Three months after the closing of the Games, Ueberroth 
announced that the Olympics made a profit of $215 million.  As he noted, “the surplus 
shocked the world.”37  And, despite the Soviet-led boycott, 140 nations participated at 
Los Angeles – the most to that point in the history of the Olympic Games. 
 The success – and profit earned – spurred a rejuvenated interest in hosting the 
Olympic Games.  In 1986, the IOC was able to pick from six cities.  The list of hosting 
aspirants continued to increase.  Eleven cities vied for the right to host the 2004 
Olympics.  Despite the growing profits and popularity of the Olympics, it became 
abundantly clear by the perceived failure of the Soviet-led boycott that these intrusions of 
foreign policy and relations on the Olympic Movement mattered little in world affairs. 
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5.2 On Reagan, Foreign Policy, and the Olympics 
 It is now clear that President Reagan made the decision to approve all Soviet 
requests for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics despite preexisting sanctions that normally 
would have denied such ventures.  However, much of the media coverage – and some of 
the rhetoric emanating from the other governmental departments – argued that much of 
the work being done by the White House and the President complied with the Olympic 
Charter.  It was a sound – and convenient – way to explain why Reagan was 
accommodating the Soviets so shortly after the Kremlin ordered KAL 007 shot out of the 
sky.   
However, Reagan’s decisions and actions immediately following the Soviet 
boycott announcement lead one to believe that he and his administration cared little, if at 
all, for the Olympic Charter.  Rather, if the Kremlin could not be brought into discussions 
regarding better relations with the West, Reagan would use the allure of the Olympics to 
try to better relations with those smaller Communists countries, and those countries on 
the verge of coming under the Soviet sphere of influence.  On 22 May 1984, Robert C. 
McFarlane wrote to President Reagan to get final approval on the letter to be sent to 
Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu.  In his confidential letter to the President, 
McFarlane explained that the letter was designed “to encourage Romanian Olympic 
participation by stressing, in part, the progress achieved in various areas of the bilateral 
relations” between the two countries.  And, with Romania being the only Warsaw Pact 
country yet to officially join the Soviet Union in its boycott, it was another chance to 
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prove to the Kremlin that the White House was prepared to pursue better diplomacy and 
relations with the Communists world.38  In the letter, Reagan wrote: 
Our governments have consulted regularly on important multilateral issues 
such as various problems at the United Nations, the CDE conference in 
Stockholm, INF, the Middle East, and Southern Africa.  We have also kept 
your able representative in Washington, Ambassador Malitza, informed on 
our continuing efforts to improve relations with the new leadership of the 
Soviet Union.  We believe it is essential to the maintenance of peace and 
security that we remain in close contact with the Soviet leadership, and 
that the important negotiations in which we were engaged … We welcome 
Romania’s support for these negotiations and hope that they can be 
resumed soon and without preconditions.39  
Reagan could very well have written the same letter to the Kremlin.  The shooting down 
of KAL 007 brought an abrupt end to several bilateral agreements between the United 
States and the Soviet Union – one being, for example, cultural exchanges.  If the Soviet 
Union was not yet ready to enter reconciliatory discussions with Reagan, he was certainly 
going to approach those other Communist countries that still had something to gain by 
attending the Olympics as way to show the Kremlin – and the whole Communist world – 
that there was a way for democracy and Communism to coexist.  Reagan’s letter 
concluded: 
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Regarding the Olympics we are hosting in Los Angeles this summer, I 
wish to inform you that Soviet concerns about the safety of their athletes 
and other participants are groundless.  As you may know, I have 
personally assured the International Olympic Committee that the U.S. will 
live up to the Olympic Charter.  The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing 
Committee, in close coordination with local, state and federal authorities, 
is working with the utmost diligence to ensure that all legitimate 
requirements for the comfort and safety of visiting athletes are fully met.  
It is our hope that the Romanian Olympic Committee will concur in this 
and that the Romanian Olympic team will have the opportunity to 
participate in the Games this summer.40 
Peter Ueberroth and the LAOOC were eager for Romania’s attendance as well.  
Ueberroth was also keenly aware that Romania was under tremendous pressure from the 
Kremlin to toe the party line and participate in the Soviet-led boycott.  In a press release 
for newspaper distribution, Ueberroth informed that he believed, “despite assurances to 
the contrary … that intense pressure continues to be applied on other countries to join the 
Soviet boycott.  If Romania and other countries pull out of the Games and cite the same 
reason as the other Eastern bloc nations, the world sports community will know that the 
Soviet Union has violated its hands-off pledge and is obviously intent on its 
unconscionable drive to damage the Olympic Movement.” 
In a 25 May 1984 letter to Secretary of State George Schultz, Ueberroth stated 
that “at a meeting of Eastern bloc sports officials in Prague early today, Romania stood 
tall in defense of the truth and reconfirmed its intention to participate in our Olympic 
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Games.  While all the other nations repeated the hollow allegations made so often in the 
last two weeks by the Soviet Union, Romania defended the efforts of the Los Angeles 
Olympic Organizing Committee.”41  Ueberroth continued: 
This was a courageous act that we praise and support.  Through Olympic 
channels, we are redoubling our efforts to provide encouragement and 
assistance to the Romanian National Olympic Committee.  All of us at the 
LAOOC hope that our government will take similar action in recognition 
of this bold and symbolic stroke of independence made by Romania.  Mr. 
Secretary, kindly offer them every possible support and assistance.42 
Reagan and Secretary Shultz offered plenty of political support in the President’s 
attempt to lure Romania to the Games and prove to the Eastern Bloc – specifically the 
Kremlin – that continued opportunities for diplomacy and cooperation were still “alive 
and well” in the Cold War despite Reagan’s initial political stance on Communism.  In 
exchange for Romania’s attendance at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, Reagan was 
prepared to give a year extension to Romania’s “Most Favored Nation” status, as well as 
“extending the bilateral commercial agreement” for another three years.43  The 
arrangements in turn for Romanian participation continued.  Once Ceausescu announced 
his intentions for his country to be at the Olympic Games, his case in the American 
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Export Administration Review Board “was earmarked for special presidential 
attention.”44 
Romania was not the sole country on the receiving end of Reagan’s attempt to 
bring countries to the Olympic Games.  In a memorandum from Jay Moorhead to 
Michael Deaver, Moorhead provided a large list of countries yet to provide any answer 
on whether or not they intended to participate in the Los Angeles Olympics.  It was noted 
that the White House was contemplating “making personal visits to their embassy in 
Washington or to the U.N. Mission in New York.”45   
However, it was another memorandum between Moorhead and Deaver that 
pointed towards a more telling strategy, particularly concerning African nations.  
Moorhead provided Deaver a comprehensive list of all the countries in Africa that 
maintained an eligible National Olympic Committee.  Using an asterisk to “denote first 
priority countries,” Moorhead marked: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Cameroon.46  Of 
the four main priority countries, Nigeria and Senegal attended while Ethiopia and 
Cameroon did not.  The selection of first priority countries was no coincidence; all 
maintained an ongoing struggle to fend off the influences of communism within their 
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borders.  In a 14 February 1984 address to the Boston World Affairs Council, Secretary 
Shultz explained the American government’s stance on the communist encroachment of 
Africa: 
There is no excuse for 40,000 Cuban combat troops – trained, equipped, 
financed, and transported by the Soviet Union – to be inserting themselves 
into local conflicts, thereby internationalizing local problems.  This 
Soviet/Cuban meddling has no precedent; it distorts Africa’s 
nonalignment; it injects an East-West dimension where none should be, 
making fair solutions harder to achieve.  We do not view Africa through 
the prism of East-West rivalry.  On the other hand, Africa does not exist 
on some other planet … We are not the gendarmes of Africa.  But to stand 
by and do nothing when friendly states are threatened by our own 
adversaries would only erode our credibility as a bulwark against 
aggression not only in Africa, but elsewhere.  Therefore, we have been 
ready, together with others, to provide training and arms to help our 
friends defend themselves.47 
Shultz also informed in his speech that President Reagan had proposed the Economic 
Policy Initiative for Africa in which he asked Congress for a five-year, $500 million 
guarantee to fund the program.  Schultz explained the functioning of the program, saying: 
“the program will offer tangible support for those countries prepared to undertake the 
policy reforms needed to improve productivity.  We will not allocate these funds in 
advance, but rather we will respond to constructive reforms where and when they are 
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undertaken.”48  Shultz did not expand on what sort of reforms the American government 
envisioned, but it is likely that it was left open-ended for the government’s own purposes. 
 Indeed, the Reagan administration very clearly offered Romania enticing political 
and economic assistance to gain the country’s attendance at the Los Angeles Olympic 
Games.  There is reason to believe that certain African nations were on the receiving end 
of diplomatic entreaties from the Reagan administration as well.49  The White House, for 
example, had been working with several African countries in the years preceding the Los 
Angeles Olympics in hopes of bettering trade relations.  In a memorandum to Richard 
Allen, Charles Wick – the head of the United States Information Agency, explained: 
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny (President of the Ivory Coast) is the 
most successful and eloquently outspoken prophet of capitalism and 
opponent of Soviet expansion in the continent.  He has met with every 
President since Eisenhower, with the exception of Carter … We are today 
misperceived in Black Africa as being pro-apartheid as a consequence of 
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our efforts to reassure South Africa as we pursue the goal of independence 
and free elections in Namibia.  The misperception can damage our military 
ties in East Africa and our economic ties with Black Africa and has 
already widely benefited psychologically Moscow’s hope to lead the 
continent toward a communist future.50 
Zick’s thoughts echoed the concerns that Allen – Reagan’s Assistant for National 
Security – submitted to Secretary of State Alexander Haig only two months earlier.  
Allen insisted to the Secretary that “there are strong reasons for sending a high-level trade 
mission to Africa.”51  Further, Allen explained to Haig: 
Nigeria has recently announced a $150 billion 5-year development plan in 
which emphasis will be given to agriculture, construction, and energy.  
Clearly, U.S. technology can make significant contributions and help 
reduce our $9.8 billion annual trade deficit with Nigeria (larger than our 
deficit with Japan!).52 
As well, Allen informed that the “undertaking” of a “number of substantial projects using 
capital which is accruing from a fast developing natural gas and petroleum industry” in 
Cameroon led to the inevitable opportunity “for U.S. companies to become established at 
an early point in the accelerated progress of this rich nation.”53  Allen and Zick’s early 
work regarding the African nations maintained the chance to be opportune as the post-
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Olympic boycott effort constructed by the Reagan administration focused on several of 
the same countries. 
The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa54 remained vigilant of the USSR’s 
boycott efforts and how it could harm the Olympic aspirations of several African 
countries.  The Secretary General of the SCSA, Amadou Lamine, crafted a letter to the 
Los Angeles Organizing Committee to explain the SCSA’s fundamental belief in the 
Olympic Movement, discoursing: 
… in this turbulent world characterized by violence and areas of tension 
which portend an apocalyptic future, Olympism is, in our opinion, one of 
the rare domains in which there still can be found a glimmer of hope for a 
world of peace, friendship, and brotherhood and a ray of light to shine 
over the humankind reconciled with itself.55 
Lamine explained that the SCSA deplored the decision by the Soviet Union to boycott the 
1984 Olympics and that the “Olympics without the participation of the Soviets and East 
Germans … run the risk of not achieving its objectives in terms of sport performances 
and stakes and this, notwithstanding their universal character which will be eroded 
because of the absence of a large fraction of the Olympic Family.”  In closing the letter, 
Lamine asserted that the SCSA deduced that “Africa intends to participate massively in 
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these Games barring any imponderable which may crop up between now and the date for 
the closure of the registration.”56 
Reagan’s excursions into both Romania and Africa points to an overall lack of 
care for following the rules of the Olympic Charter.  Throughout the struggle to meet all 
Soviet requests, the White House continually promised to abide by the Olympic Charter 
and that all requests were to be granted because of it.  Reagan’s main concern was 
granting the requests as a way to start the process of bettering the long deteriorated 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist 
world.  This is, of course, not wholly against the Olympic Charter.  Reagan was more 
than amicable regarding providing the same rights to other countries as he was granting 
to the Soviets.  However, providing Romania with favorable trade and export conditions 
in turn for their promise to attend the Olympic Games is a definitive mix of politics and 
the Olympic Games and, thus, a gross violation of one of the main tenants of the the 
Olympic Charter.  Reagan and his administration could not feign ignorance about the 
boundaries that were crossed – it was nothing less than a rationalized disregard for the 
operating rules and standards of the Olympic Games. 
Despite approving the Aeroflot flights, the berthing of a Soviet vessel, and 
offering to finance Soviet security details upwards of $500,000, the Soviets still decided 
not to attend the Games.  But, the attempt to do so did have one lasting outcome.  When 
Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to the General Secretary position on 11 March 1985 upon 
the death of Chernenko, he did so knowing fully well that Reagan was seeking 
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reconciliation between the two countries as evidenced by his actions during the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympics. 
The two world leaders met for the first time on 19 and 20 November 1985 in 
Switzerland for what was termed the Geneva Summit.  There was the general belief that 
Gorbachev was no different than his predecessors, with Henry Kissinger arguing that “he 
[Gorbachev] was a protégé of Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, and Mikhail 
Suslov, then chief party ideologue.”57  Gorbachev was another USSR leader raised in the 
uncertain time of Stalin’s ‘Great Terror.’  Born on 2 March 1931, Gorbachev’s home 
village of Privolnoye was “crude and poor” and had no basic accommodations, such as 
roads or electricity.58  In his early childhood, he witnessed a “murderous famine” in his 
village where “thousands died, a disproportionate number of them young children.”59  
Worse, Gorbachev witnessed his paternal grandfather carted off to Siberia to cut lumber.  
The absence of his grandfather left a “tormented family that soon became destitute.”  It 
was later revealed that “half the family died of starvation.”60  It was then no surprise as to 
why “Gorbachev turned out to be such an unusual Soviet Communist.”61  
Despite the first meeting between the two leaders lasting more than an hour over 
the time limit, little was accomplished.  The second day of the meeting witnessed 
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Gorbachev being “belligerent” and Reagan standing “firm.”  However, the two simply 
meeting was a sign of positive progress in the strained international relationship.  The 
two leaders met again on 11-12 October 1986 in Reykjavik, Iceland for the Reykjavik 
Summit.  The meeting was, if anything, turbulent. Despite excellent progress throughout 
the duration of the talks, all Soviet proposals hinged on one item: “that the United States 
accept severe limits on the development of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative.”62  It 
killed any progress the two leaders made at the Summit.  However, the Reykjavik 
Summit did alter the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev.  It was noted that at 
the conclusion of the Summit, Gorbachev was absolutely convinced that it would “work 
out” between Reagan and him.  No longer did he believe that “the U.S. administration is 
political scum that is liable to do anything.”63  
 Just a year later, in 1987, the two signed the historic intermediate-range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty, marking the first agreement between the two nuclear superpowers to 
reduce their arms.  And then, on 12 June 1987, Reagan provided one of the enduring 
expressions of his desire to again provide the Western ideal of freedom and democracy to 
the tightly-controlled citizens of Eastern Europe.  Standing at the Brandenburg Gate in 
the still divided Berlin, Reagan spoke to a massive gathering, and emphatically orated: 
… we welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and 
security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen 
the cause of world peace.  There is one sign the Soviets can make that 
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would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of 
freedom and peace.  General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if 
you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek 
liberalization: Come here to this gate.  Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate.  Mr. 
Gorbachev, tear down this wall.64 
The speech – while powerful – was one of Reagan’s many artfully crafted displays of 
power.  While making preparations for the speech, Reagan’s aides argued “aggressively” 
for permission to use the 196-year-old Brandenburg Gate as the backdrop for the 
television cameras.  West German authorities were incredulous to the idea, deeming it 
“too gimmicky, too provocative and perhaps too dangerous.”  Reagan’s people got their 
way, thanks in no small part to West German chancellor Helmut Kohl.65  Two years later, 
largely in part due to Gorbachev’s dedication to Glasnost and Perestroika, the Berlin 
Wall fell.  And eventually so, too, did the Soviet Union.  Gorbachev never deviated from 
his fundamental belief that the “Soviet Union could only solve its many problems if the 
people of the country felt a stake in the way it is run.”66  Gorbachev expanded on this 
belief, saying: 
This fulcrum is really to rouse people and to make use of the rich political, 
cultural, and scientific potential that has accumulated in our society in the 
years of Soviet power.  In all spheres of life, including the spiritual sphere, 
we will have to overcome a very basic factor – alienation, which, 
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unfortunately, occurs under socialism when it is deformed by 
authoritarian-bureaucratic distortions.  Alienation … can be overcome 
only [with] democratization and openness.  A house can be put in order 
only by a person who feels he owns the house.67 
However, since the rapid liberalization of Eastern Europe collapsed the Soviet Union, 
Reagan’s seconds-long sound bite from in front of the Brandenburg Gate has become the 
American “shorthand to describe the complicated fall of communism.”68  The 
construction of Reagan’s legacy seems to dictate that the President asked for the wall to 
be torn down – and it simply fell.  
 Reagan’s remarks at the Berlin Wall that afternoon did, however, provide an 
opportune moment for a consideration of the transpired events that ultimately permitted 
the President to make such comments.  Indeed, it is unlikely that Reagan would have 
stood feet from East Germany and unequivocally asked Brezhnev to destroy the Berlin 
Wall.  Nor would Andropov or Chernenko be any less aghast at Reagan’s words.  It was 
only as Cold War tensions tempered could Reagan do so.  Ronald Reagan’s use of the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games as a mediator in Cold War relations served a 
role in tempering those tensions. 
The Soviet decision to boycott the Games does not diminish the fact that 
Reagan’s actions in the lead up to the Games demonstrate that there is much more to the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympics than just a retaliatory story.  From an outside perspective, 
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especially that of American media, it appeared as if Reagan’s administration failed its 
country, its Olympic Committee, its associated athletes, and – perhaps most of all – the 
Olympic Movement, for not successfully luring in the Soviet Union.  However, the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games did become a small part of a much larger foreign 
policy picture as Reagan and the Kremlin moved ever closer to the historic summits that 
would eventually lead to the end of the Cold War.  Reagan’s concessions at the Olympics 
were proof to the Soviet Union that, perhaps, the American President was not a “rogue 
cowboy” or a “raving lunatic” bent on driving international relations into a deepening of 
the Cold War.  After all, Reagan – in his policy-shifting speech of 16 January 1984 – 
provided an anecdote about what American-Soviet peace could provide: 
Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and Anya could find 
themselves, say, in a waiting room or sharing a shelter from the rain or a 
storm with a Jim and a Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep 
them from getting acquainted.  Would they then deliberate the differences 
between their respective governments?  Or would they find themselves 
comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a living?  
Before they parted company they would probably have touched on 
ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and the 
problems of making ends meet.  And as they went their separate ways, 
maybe Anya would say to Ivan, ‘wasn’t she nice, she also teaches music.’  
Maybe Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn’t like about his 
boss.  They might even have decided that they were all going to get 
together for dinner some evening soon.69 
                                                
69
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Reagan’s political use of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games was but his first step in 
successfully seeing to it that Ivan and Anya, and Jim and Sally, met for dinner without 
fear of a life-eradicating nuclear holocaust interrupting their evening. 
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